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My summarized take after reading all your responses: The Benevolent Universe Premise describes an attitude that views man as empowered to survive in an intelligible universe: he can discover facts, causal connections and the unknown. He is equipped with a tool that, when applied correctly, allows him to build an ever-growing context of knowledge which, rather than being threatened by new knowledge, is strengthened by it. It's also helpful to make a few distinctions that clarify thinking about the kind of world we live in: (1) the metaphysical vs. the man-made; (2) the unknowable vs. the unknown; With respect to distinction #1: The differences between men and objects are consequential enough (a badly styled outfit is capable of being visually irritating, a badly developed soul is capable of murder) to separate them out for analysis. With respect to distinction #2: A quote from John Galt's speech describing the feeling of living in an unknowable universe: Actually, this is something I had in mind originally too. According to the quotes below we consider “accidents” as not being the essence or the “norm” of human life. It’s still not really clear to me what kind of conceptual stepping stones I need to jump over to be fully convinced of this. I can see that we have a tool to discover the unknown, but there is still the unknown—and the unknown can include causes of negative, deadly consequences and this fact is "in the nature of existence." I don’t think I’ll get an answer until I explore lots of real-world examples of how men actually dealt with the unknown, e.g., the case of discovering blood types compatibility and how that unfolded. This is what Greg pointed out with exploring “positive reinforcements” too. Some quotes: With respect to distinction (1), the man-made: Rearden reflecting in Atlas Shrugged: “The Inexplicable Personal Alchemy:" With respect to distinction (2), an unknown as opposed to unknowable universe: Leonard Peikoff's lectures:

In another thread, a selection of critters is offered to observe free will. The concept of rolling can certainly be formed from observing a ball, tire, a stone or even a log roll along a stretch of surface. In the case of animals, hunger develops, the quest for food ensues (in the case of humans, this presumes he has learned to identify hunger by some unspecified means.) "Choosing" to look for food does not strike me as what Rand is referring to when she penned: that which you call 'free will' is your mind's freedom to think or not, the only will you have, your only freedom, the choice that controls all the choices you make and determines your life and your character. Is this the same freedom found in jellyfish, honeybees, alligators, elephants, as is found in man? It seems to fall short in the realm of "the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections." Digressing to positing an explanation of determinism, why wouldn't there be agreement on all matters, were mechanistic determinism a valid (pesky free-will laden) choice to select from? After all, are not all residing in the context of existence? To paraphrase another writer, Steven Covey, is the effort here to understand, or simply to be understood?

I like this. It articulates the "burrowing down" aspect in conjunction with the recursive relationship that identity and causality share. This might be related to a machinist handbook where various formulas are offered to evaluate different aspects of consideration regarding material selection in conjunction with various shapes in addition to various failure modes. A rectangular beam, a cylindrical beam - constant cross section, tapered cross section - steel, wood - torsional load, compression load. An nice example of subsequent data augmenting and ultimately superseding a previous conclusion. Given my age, pay grade, and familiarity - I'm going to have to pass on this one at this time. This is a sub-forum to test an aspect of the forum software. Instead of being dialog intensive, an O.P. can set forth a question to which subsequent answers can be ranked. The question I asked was based on a snippet from Atlas Shrugged that had recently elevated in my mind. A search for "discovering causal connections" did not expose the earlier posting I had done on OO that might have tied into this post. This example would be exemplary of an answer that should rise to the top where it submitted to the most objective of evaluators. I had discounted Rene Descartes, and was not aware of this contribution of his to rainbows, attributing it to Issac Newton instead. I consider Newton's contribution to the field quite strong, and am unaware if he had used Descartes' consideration(s) as a basis for his considerations, though it would not be entirely surprising at this point. Mathematics is but another man-made contribution of knowledge to me. Between ARI contributors of Corvini and Knapp, it is clear that the metaphysical roots of the subject are not without some controversy. My own investigations into Fermat's, and to a lessor degree, Collatz's conjectures have tainted what I thought to be one of the nobler of the sciences. Thank-you, Stephen.

Greg, This doesn’t go to the interpretation of Rand aspect, but at first glance it seems right that discovering causal connections, whether by the developing young child or by the scientific researcher, makes more specific the causal character (agent and patient) of a thing and thereby makes definition of a thing—answering to “what is it?”—fuller in capturing the identity of a thing. An example might be precising the notion of “strength of column materials” by defining the various kinds of stresses to which a material thing such as a column can be subjected and therewith defining those various kinds of resistance capabilities of different materials. Observational discovery of failure modes (just what they look like) of columns may have contributed historically in getting to formulating those various kinds of stresses and resistance strengths correlative to those stresses. Early naturalists identified sponges as plants, but then . . . Perhaps good examples would be in: Duane Emerson Roller’s The Development of the Concept of Electric Charge (1954) / Max Jammer’s Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics (1961) / Theodore Arabatzis’ Representing Electrons (2006) / Hasok Chang’s Inventing Temperature - Measurement and Scientific Progress (2007) But I’m a little surprised how poorly I’m doing at coming up with easy examples that fit the mold you suggested of precising definition (better capturing identity of something) through discovering causal relations that are part of a thing’s identity. And although examples for the more highly educated might be helpful to testing out this way of getting more precise (less ill-defined) concepts and communicating the pattern to our more educated friends (or using it on them or on oneself to better the defined identities), easier examples would be helpful all round. Looking to the notions Don Watkins took up, it would be interesting to see any worked-out cases or dialogues by pointing to causal connections. This reminds me of Rand's reduction of the concept justice in ITOE. I notice, by the way, cases contrasting with the scientific and engineering ones above, in which causal discoveries do not seem to contribute to improving definition. I mean people could identify and teach and learn what a rainbow is before Descartes discovered how sunlight and water droplets end up forming a rainbow. Then again we can have the Moon Illusion pointed out to us and even have pointed out to us that if we take a photo of that marvelously big moon near the horizon its size in the photo shrinks to nothing to write home about, i.e., the same size it has in our viewing of it at zenith. Discovery of what in our brain results in us having the Moon Illusion will increase our store of what it is that is the Moon Illusion, but it still seems that we know what the Moon Illusion is, and very stably, even without having yet found the underlying neurological reason for it. (Leonard Peikoff has an example like these also, probably in OPAR.) However frequent the relation you mentioned between defined identity and causal discovery, I should say the latter is not the only route by which defined identities are improved. The methods of discovery by which mathematicians added to the defined identity of complex numbers beyond their definition when they were originally introduced would not be discovery of causal relations.

"We are the cause of all the values that you covet, we who perform the process of thinking, which is the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections." "We are the cause of all the values that you covet. Note, 'cause' is italicized. "We who perform the process of thinking" combines this 'cause' with the actor and sets up the identification of what thought consists of in this context. Thus, thinking "is the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections." In a matter of disagreement, a search to discover a causal connection should lead to a lack of precision with some ill-defined identity. Is this an accurate assessment?

II.A Empirical Realism – Kant Rand’s conception of logic is thick, not thin. “Logic rests on the axiom that existence exists,” and “existence is identity” (AS 1016). Logic is not only the art of not affirming A and not-A, including avoidance of inferences that could allow A and not-A. Logic is that, in Rand’s view, but it has that character by its role in the enterprise of identifying existents and their natures. Logic as noncontradictory identification includes not affirming A and not-A, but also not affirming A while denying essentials of A or other conditions necessary or sufficient for A (further, Branden c. 1968, 63–76; Piekoff 1991, 118–21, 125–26, 137–39). Similarly, Rand’s conception of thinking is thick, not thin. Thinking is the conceptual, integrative process of “defining identity and discovering causal connections” (AS 1038). Kant sometimes used think (denken) in a thin way, which is a common way. There it meant only entertainment of something noncontradictory in the thin sense. Kant engaged the thick, the cognitive, beyond thin thought, and this engagement was his springboard to transcendental idealism (KrV B xxvi, n103). Transcendental idealism comports with an empirical realism. Both begin in Kant’s expositions of the concepts of space and time. We think of things being in ourselves as minds or outside ourselves as minds. Kant maintained that if we think of anything outside our minds, we must think of it as in space. We can think of the space as empty of objects, but we cannot remove the space and yet be thinking of the outside-ourselves-as-minds. If we are thinking of the way of things outside ourselves as minds, we are thinking of the spatial. In Kant’s view, this is only a condition of our own human cognition, for all we know, but it is a necessity for us (A24 B38–39, A26–28 B42–44, A59 B42; Falkenstein 1995, 186–216). Kant reasons further that because space is necessary to any outer experience we can have, we cannot get our grasp of space through outer experience, and space must be character of our mind’s form of experiencing the physical world. Spatial relations will necessarily be part of the determinate character of physical things as experienced by us, but that character is from us as minds. Space is not a property of any things in themselves nor relations among things in themselves (A26 B42; see also Boydstun 1997, 11–17; Shabel 2010, 93–117; Parsons 2012, 5–41). Kant calls intuition our direct knowing of something whole, direct knowing of a singular thing whole (A25 B39–40, B236n, A320 B377). That, as opposed to knowing discursively, judgmentally, inferentially, knowing by generalization of instances or by accumulation of parts. “Intuition that refers to the object through sensation is called empirical intuition. The . . . object of an empirical intuition is called appearance. Whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation I call its matter; but whatever in an appearance brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance can be ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance. Now, that in which alone sensations can be ordered and put into a certain form cannot itself be sensation again. Therefore, although the matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, the form of all appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind; and hence that form must be capable of being examined apart from all sensation.” (A20 B34) No. Some order of sensations could be received with the sensory activations, and this order could be a factor in determining the structure of sensory organs in development and in evolution such that certain order in sensory sensations and in their further processing is discerned when presented (cf. Sellars 1967, 6–8, 28–30, 53–57; Pippin 1982, 47–52, 70–71, 115–23, 188–89, 226–28; Parsons 2012, 18, 30–41). The magnolia is seen by me presently as left of the willow oak, and the boxwoods are seen as between me and those trees. That can be because those are the spatial relations among the two trees, the shrubs, and my body as they are in themselves at this time. Kant thought that only if our abstract consideration of spatial relations in Euclidean geometry (taken in Kant’s day to be in all its structure the geometry of the physical world) were of structures brought to the world by our minds, only then, could the effectiveness of the method of geometry—posits, constructions, theorems—be explained (A24, A46–49 B63–66). That is a mistake. If spatial relations are in our every outer experience because they are always in the world we experience as outside ourselves as minds, then too, the relations could come to be in our minds for our treatment as in geometry (cf. Pistorius 1786, 94–99; 1787, 179–82; 1789, 255–56). What the method of Euclid’s geometry shows is that empirical methods of observation and experimentation are not the only methods effective in discerning something true of physical possibilities and impossibilities (further planes: Stalnaker 2012; Burgess 2008; Belot 2011, 86–90, 117–49; Correia and Schnieder 2012; Williamson 2013). Conditions of physical possibilities are indeed conditions of the possibility of our experience. Space can be a condition for the possibility of all experience of things outside ourselves as minds, and that, precisely because space is a condition of the physically possible (cf. Westphal 2004, 77–78, 84; Allison 2004, 128–32). Kant has gotten a good insight into Euclid’s method and into the fundamental standing of space in empirical experience. But he overlooks the sort of realist assimilation of those insights I have just proposed (B167–68; Boydstun 1997, 17; further, Carey 2009, 70–72, 96, 449–50; Piaget and Inhelder 1948). In speaking of appearance and the form of appearance, Kant does not mean illusion. He stresses the characters in appearance are actually given as in their relations to us as minds. Because such characters, such as spatiality, are not in objects apart from our apprehension of those objects, he calls the objects as given to us appearances (Bxxv–xxviii, A29–30 B45, A44–46 B61–63, B69–71, A155–58 B194–97, A257–58 B313–14, A293–98 B349–55, A490–97 B518–25, A506–7 B534–35, A538–41 B566–69; Prolegomena 4:287–93, 4:375; further, Allison 2004, 50–73; Grier 2001, 86–93; Westphal 2004, 38–41, 50–66; Parsons 2012, 33–41). The grand epistemological illusions, in Kant’s estimation, are: treating things as they are in sensory perception as though they were those things as they are in themselves; the prior certainty of inner appearances over outer ones; and the reification of abstractions into things in themselves. (See further, Bird 2006, 10–13, 23–24, 33–34, 40–44, 100, 110–15, 122–26, 173–85, 207–13, 409–15, 462–67, 505–21, 530–39, 558–76, 683–88; Grier 2001; Abela 2002; Westphal 2004.) Our exposition teaches that space is real (i.e., objectively valid) in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is ideal in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves, i.e., without taking into account the character of our sensibility. Hence we assert space is empirically real (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting that space is transcendentally ideal, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we omit [that space is] the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves. (A28 B44; also A369–77, B274–77) Kant’s metaphysical and transcendental expositions of the concept of space argue that our most fundamental grasp of space is not a concept of space, but is an intuition of space. It is an intuition on which our concept space rests once we bring limitations to all-encompassing space (A25 B39). Our concepts belong to the faculty of understanding, not an intuitive faculty. Concepts unify intuitions and contact objects in appearance only through subsumed intuitions, through their shared characteristics (A320 B377). Concepts without intuitions are empty (A51 B75). On the other hand, sensory intuitions (the only kind we have) without concepts are blind. Appearances become experience only by their conceptual rendition. Human experience is itself impossible unless shot through with rationality, contrary the presumption of Hume. An intuition without concepts is only a particular set of the mind to an object in appearance; it is not a cognition (A50 B74). Experience, by join of intuition and concepts, is cognitive. In Rand’s terms, that is a claim by Kant that only experience engaging recognition under concepts is experience as identification. That might sail provided one enlarged the sense of concept to include elementary image and action schemata of the prelinguistic child (which, by the way, are retained in the adult). Even then, I should not let the ship sail because it may be that although all concrete existents have both (i) particular identity and (ii) specific identity (answering to (a) that, which, when, and where, and (b) what), one’s identifications might sometimes be perceptions of only particular identity, and that may be without operation of concepts or schemata. Yet, beyond the span of working memory, no experience of purely particular identity lasts. For experience wider than that, the ship can sail, with the schemata-proviso. I should pause over an apparent contradiction in Rand. I reported her 1961 view, against the Empiricists, that our knowledge of the world is not “by direct perception of immediate facts, with no recourse to concepts.” In 1966 Rand defined knowledge as “a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation” (ITOE 35). This definition suggests that a perceptual observation could be knowledge, and this is in some tension with the 1961 dicta. I think Rand’s conception of perceptual observation as knowledge is not meant to be a cognition free of all assimilation under concepts. The conception of knowledge is as our long-term awareness of continuous existence, the world’s and our own (ITOE 57). There are some concepts, indeed, that “are implicit in every state of awareness, from the first sensation to the first percept to the sum of all concepts” (ITOE 55). This implicitness is not only analytic, but genetic. The concepts of existence, consciousness, and identity are, in Rand’s view, working implicitly and are available for adult conscious acknowledgment (see also Taylor 2002, 110–15; Haugeland 2013, 91–98). These concepts and their close kin, and their more primitive schematic forms, hold knowledge together, even if implicitly, and this includes knowledge not reasoned on observation, but simply by observation (cf. Kelley 1986, 150, 154–74; Burge 2010, 244, 248–51, 396–436). I notice this does not preclude yet other, less general concepts or schemata reflecting broad structure of an observation being also implicitly at work in a particular observation that is knowledge. Adult experience is touched by concepts, both in our practical negotiations of the world and in scientific observation and controlled experimentation. On that much, Kant and Rand are in agreement. Just as Kant required a priori intuitions of the form of appearance in which objects are given to us, so he required a priori concepts through which any object given in appearance can be thought by us. Those formal a priori intuitions, space and time, together with a priori concepts of objects in appearance, make human experience possible. Jointly, these intuitions and concepts are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience itself (A92–94 B125–27). By way of important contrast in Rand’s metaphysics, the very general concepts and principles necessary for every experience apply not only to objects as in those knowledge-making experiences, but to objects and relations among them. They apply necessarily to rate of heat flow, for example, not only to rates of heat flow as sensed into or out from our skin. They apply to things as they are connected and not connected to other things, including to ourselves as minds (cf. Pistorius 1788, 178–79; 1789, 257–60). Such necessary concepts would be existence, identity, and causality, whose axiomatic or corollary standing has been argued by Rand and by scholars of her metaphysics. To those conditions, I should add time and space expressly, and some geometry as well, to Rand’s metaphysics as necessary conditions, if not axiomatic ones, for objects and our experience of them. Kant’s appearance should be dropped—spatiality is a character of objects, not only a character of our apprehension of them—though there remains grain to be gathered from Kant and planted in new soil. (To be continued.) References Abela, P. 2002. Kant’s Empirical Realism. Oxford. Allison, H. E. 2004 [1983]. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. 2nd ed. Yale. Belot, G. 2011. Geometric Possibility. Oxford. Bird, G. 2006. The Revolutionary Kant. Open Court. Boydstun, S. 1997. Space, Rotation, Relativity – Kant. Objectivity 2(5):1–31. Branden, N. c. 1968. The Basic Principles of Objectivism. Lectures transcribed in The Vision of Ayn Rand. 2009. Cobden. Burge, T. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford. Burgess, J. R. 2008. Mathematics, Models, and Modality. Cambridge. Carey, S. 2009. The Origins of Concepts. Oxford. Corrreia, F., and B. Schnieder, editors, 2012. Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge. Falkenstein, L. 1995. Kant’s Intuitionism. Toronto. Grier, M. 2001. Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion. Cambridge. Haugeland, J. 2013. Dasein Disclosed. Harvard. Kant, I. 1781, 1787. Critique of Pure Reason. W. S. Pluhar, translator. 1996. Hackett. ——. 1783. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. G. Hatfield, translator. In Immanuel Kant – Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Cambridge. Kelley, D. 1986. The Evidence of the Senses. Louisiana State. Parsons, C. 2008. Mathematical Thought and Its Objects. Cambridge. ——. 2012. The Transcendental Aesthetic. In From Kant to Husserl. Harvard. Peikoff, L. 1991. Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Dutton. Piaget, J., and B. Inhelder. 1948. The Child’s Conception of Space. F. J. Langdon and J. L. Lunzer, translators. 1956. Norton. Pippin, R. B. 1982. Kant’s Theory of Form. Yale. Pistorius, H. A. 1786. On Johann Schultze’s Elucidations. In Sassen 2000 (S). ——. 1788. Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant. (S) ——. 1789. Kant’s Purism and Selle’s Empiricism. (S) Rand, A. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House. ——. 1966–67. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. 2nd ed. Meridian. Sassen, B., translator, 2000. Kant’s Early Critics – The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy. Cambridge. Sellars, W. 1967. Science and Metaphysics – Variations on Kantian Themes. Ridgeview. Shabel, L. 2010. The Transcendental Aesthetic. In The Cambridge Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge. Stalnaker, R. 2012. Mere Possibilities – Metaphysical Foundations of Modal Semantics. Princeton. Taylor, C. 2002. Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer Distinction. In Reading McDowell on Mind and World. N. H. Smith, editor. Routeledge. Westphal, K. R. 2004. Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge. Williamson, T. 2013. Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford.

Hey all, Sorry for showing up late. Here's my chewing of the first two weeks worth of reading. Ayn Rand began early as a hero-worshipper and someone who did not waste her time (218). She was drawn to action-packed fiction, and wrote during classes that bored her. A valuer from the get-go. At twelve she became curious to answer why questions (219). She wanted to know just what she like, but what about certain things led her to liking them. Her answers to such questions were in the form of generalizations. From an early age she was interested in complex causal connections, and in discovering general, high-level, answers. These general answers were always grounded in evidence. "Principle" was a term designated to the general answers she found; "reason" was the process of looking at evidence to discover such principles. A stringent thinker from the get-go as well. Note that the drive behind such thinking was to further her current knowledge and pursuit of her values. I think this points to a crucial aspect of Rand and Objectivism: the importance of value and reason is inseperable. Going along the evidence-based trend, she studied history "to acquire facts about man's past development" (221). Going along the principle-finding trend, she "also studied philosophy to develop clearer definitions of her broadest values" (219). "Her goal was to improve the use of the [English] language...." so that she could show "the character of an ideal man, and, by implication, the philosophical ideas that guide his actions (223). To this end, she got a job as a junior screenwriter (222). She also journaled extensively, wrote letters, and started writing short stories (223). This stands out as an integrated and purposeful organization of career and hobbies. Distilling abtract ideas into characters was one of Rand's great literary strengths (personal opinion). It is interesting to note that the coupled relationship of abstractions (ideas) and concretes (people, actions, things) is fundemental to her epistemology (226).

Today I shared answers to Questions from section on "Perceiving first level causal connections". Sharing sample answer for wider audience. Q9. What is the significance of perceiving causal connections? Ans: From TLL The primary method of grasping causal connection, therefore, is to perceive it. Building on this foundation, scientists develop more sophisticated, experimental methods of discovering causality, in higher level cases where perception of the cause is not possible. The use of such methods requires an analysis of variables going far beyond the first level cognition. In regrard to first level generalizations, however, direct perception of cause and effect is essential - and sufficient. MY FURTHER ANALYSIS Continuing my disagreement further on first level generalizations being self-evident, though I accept these are "validated"[reduced after being formed] by direct perception of cause and effect. I see error in statement that "first level generalizations are self-evident" as extension of intrinsic theory of concepts, Aristotelian variant. There is nothing innately written on the percepts that says "pushing rolls the ball". We first have to isolate frames of percepts from the observed sequence of ball rolling after being pushed. In first percept its not rolling and it is not pushed, in second percept it is pushed and in third percept its rolling. We then subsume second percept under concept push formed before, and third percept under concept rolling formed before. The ball in all these percepts is subsumed under concept ball. And when we look into three percepts, ball is the common entity combining these percepts. So forming first level generalizations requires isolation of perceptual frames, identifying concepts of existents in these perceptual frames, integrating the concepts using common entity across the perceptual frames.[so "Subsuming as unit percept of static ball just prior to being pushed" + "Subsuming as unit percept of pushing" + "Subsuming as unit percept of rolling ball" = "First level generalization" "Pushing rolls the ball"]. [in above percepts, first percept of "ball not rolling when not pushed" immediately precedes other two percepts often but not always. But second and third percepts have to occur chronologically always, such that percept of pushing[cause] has to be seen immediately before percept of rolling[effect] for the first level generalization "pushing rolls the ball" to form. The first percept can act as foil, like perception of chair acts for concept table. Further, like initial first level concepts, I think initial first level generalizations can also be formed pictorically]. So when scientist tries to design experiments, he is creating circumstances that will help him grasp "higher level generalizations" as if they are "first level generalizations". Like balls falling same distance from table after rolling on the table through inclined planes of same inclinations. Here while the perception is not very different from what first level generalization "pushing or inclination rolls the ball" can subsume as unit. The inference drawn is a much higher level generalization "Horizontal motion is unaccelerated", because the percepts are subsumed by higher concepts like "horizontal", "motion" and "unaccelerated" by the scientist. So perceiving of perceptual connections, where effect happens immediately after cause, can also help in validating hypothesis formed elsewhere(pendulum experiments in this case).

New Buddha, there is only one set of evidence to appeal to. I don't see it as the selection from the available evidence, but the ability to distinguish between the designed and the natural within it. The I.D. proponents see patterns that exist naturally and point those patterns out as being similar to a designers use of patterns in developing man-made objects and conflate the two. Geometry, a man derived science, permits the development of gears, springs, circles, square and triangles that are seldom seen directly in nature, allowing the development of a watch. As we continue to identify patterns in nature (causal connections) such as electrons, protons, neutrons making up a multitude of different atoms - which further interact to become a greater multitude of compounds and so on, the issue becomes one of interpretation of the evidence: is it simply discovering the nature of eternal existence, or do we apply the fundamental alternative of life (existence or non-existence) to inanimate indestructible matter and try to force fit an explanation that more or less aligns with the I.D. proponents (unchallengeable?) premise in this case.

Your Love of Existence In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says “existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved” (NE 1168a6; further, 1170a20–b10). In Atlas Shrugged, Rand writes: “All life is a purposeful struggle, and your only choice is the choice of a goal. . . . Such is the choice before you. Let your mind and your love of existence decide” (AS 1068). Those Atlas lines are near the end of Galt’s speech, which was the first extended statement of Rand’s philosophy. Woven all together therein were metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology (broadly), ethics, and politics. In the present essay, I want to reflect on this text of Rand’s in connection with her fundamental metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and metaethics. The first sense of existence in the Rand quotation is one’s own personal living existence. I suggest two further senses of love of existence that are cohorts of that first sense. One of these further senses is love of human existence of which one’s own is a case. The other is love of existence-with-identity in general, against nothing. In On the Soul, Aristotle says: “That too which involves no action, i.e. that which is true or false, is in the same province with what is good or bad: yet they differ in this that the one is absolute and the other relative to someone” (DA 431b10–12). We should hesitate over the conception of cognition involving no action, for at least there is the aim and movement towards truth. Aristotle will concede that, and we should concede to Aristotle that good and bad are relative to an agent, whereas truth and falsehood are independent of the identifier. American Pragmatists take thoroughgoing issue with Aristotle’s conception that cognition is sometimes untied from possible action in the world. They could warm, however, to Aristotle’s thought that true and false are in the same province as good and bad. Rand was warm to that idea as well. She set forth a way, different from Pragmatist ways, for tying true and false to good and bad. Hers is a tie more intimate than would be suggested by Aristotle in my isolated quote from him in DA 431. Rand articulates an absolute character of agent-relative good and bad by taking them in view under identities of existents, their traits, relationships, and kinds. She stresses particularly the kind to which the individual human belongs, the kind one is. Rand once remarked that if she were to place a preamble over the total of her fiction writing it would be: “To the glory of Man” (1963, 172). Her fiction and her Objectivist philosophy are shot through with love of the existence of man. “Man, not men [as a collective]” (1946, XII). Man the individual, independent, productive, rational animal; not man the irrational animal, the all-sharing animal, the suicidal animal (AS 1013). Man worthy of honor and love is man as maker of the means for human life. Man in this goodness is the broad ideal that should be held dear to every individual.* Man in this goodness is concretely in oneself and in others. For such men, there is possible the joy that is happiness and there is for each “the joy he receives from the virtues of another” (1034, also 1059–60).[1] Rand’s character John Galt is an artistic concretization of ideal man in general. By Galt she has ideal man speak to each reader, at least to each retaining “a remnant of the dignity and will to love one’s life” (AS 1052). Ideal man says to the listener: “Whatever living moments you have known, were lived by the values of my code” (1060), the code of reason, purpose, and self-esteem (1018). “If existence on earth is your goal, you must choose your actions and values by the standard of that which is proper to man—for the purpose of preserving, fulfilling and enjoying the irreplaceable value which is your life” (1014). “Let your mind and your love of existence decide.” Love of one’s existence includes love of man the ideal, rational being. Aristotle held in the Metaphysics: The side of the list of opposites to which Aristotle fundamentally fastens thought and desire is the side of being and its categories, in opposition to their negations. The primary type of being, on which all others depend, is substance. There is not only substance that is essence of sensible, material things; there is substance that is essence of pure intelligibility, pure in that it is entirely free of sensible matter. Substance of pure intelligibility is most actual and is logically prior in being to substance of material things. According to Aristotle, the intelligibility of the world and our fundamental desire to understand the world spring ultimately from the expression in the world and in ourselves of immaterial maximal being. It is ultimately towards this being that all life, perception, and human intelligence strive. Aristotle identifies ultimate being that draws our thought with the unmoved mover of the heavens and of the world of nature below. It moves the world by its allure. God is this being. God the first mover is good and most worthy of human desire and intellectual reach. “And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal” (Met. 1072b26–28). God’s permanent state is ours in the moments our thought is in active possession of its objects. That is our own divinity, the best within us.[2] There are great differences between Rand and Aristotle in this area, but much in common as well. Recall this passage of Rand’s: The existence in “love for existence” in the preceding quoted passage is at once existence of the individual human and existence of the world, of existence per se. One’s living self-existence together with existence of the world is here spoken of as a lover to which one may be worthy. This mild personification of one’s biological nature as well as of existence in general is employed elsewhere in Galt’s speech. Rand speaks of human virtue as loyalty to life, akin to the loyalty of “a bird or flower reaching for the sun” (AS 1059). One’s biological nature calls for rationality and calls one to rationality (1012–14, 1021–22). Then too, Rand speaks of the world as being a place “so eagerly worth seeing” (AS 701). It was as if Galt’s eyes imparted that value to the world, as if his sight lit the seeing-value of the world. In the world is worth for those worthy by sight. Galt is a moral avenger. In her mild personification, Rand speaks of existence and its law of identity also as a moral avenger (AS 1062). Subversion of mind affronts reality (1013); all the same, “reality is not to be cheated” (1037). There is something one owes to all of existence, as well as to oneself: rationality (1022). One may drop rationality. That is an attempt “to negate existence, an attempt to wipe out reality. But existence exists: reality is not to be wiped out, it will merely wipe out the wiper. . . . / . . . Reality will wipe him out, as he deserves; reality will show him that life is a value to be bought and thinking is the only coin noble enough to buy it” (1018). “By refusing to say ‘It is’, you are refusing to say ‘I am’” (AS 1018). Then truly and fully loving “I am” is loving “It is.” “Whoever rejects reality rejects existence [of self]” (AS 1046). Then whoever loves their existence loves reality in its affordance of human comprehension and human life. Rand against Aristotle (and Plato): It is earthly life alone, not God, that is the undergirding and ultimate reason we seek understanding. The value of thinking arises purely from the value of life, earthly life (a, b, c). Joined to love of existence as object of thought is love of thinking of existence. As with contemplation in Aristotle’s God, thought in man is itself a mode of life (I say, harmoniously with Rand who does not say this[4]). Thinking itself—the process of grasping that two and two make four—thinking itself—“the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections” (AS 1038)—thinking itself bears the goodness of life, the foundational end in itself. One’s thinking self is an end in itself because its organized activity is an occasion of life itself and because it is the integral, necessary, and proper leader of a human life. Rand with Aristotle (and Plato): Aristotle, as I said, fastens thought and desire fundamentally to being and its categories, in opposition to their negations. Rand upholds life, not death, as the premise proper to man (AS 1050). “Your fear of death is not a love for life and will not give you the knowledge needed to keep it” (1013). Furthermore, Rand with Aristotle: Notes 1. Cf. NE 1155b17–20, 1156a14–19, 1156b7–24, 1157b25–1158a1, 1167a18–20, 1169b31–1170b10. 2. See further, Lear 1988, 134–41, 265–306, and Richardson Lear 2004, 188–207. 3. The idea that man is a completion and height of nature, in which man is at home and to which he says Yes is an idea in her earlier novels that Rand developed and brought forward to Atlas. In his self-transformation from Equality 7-2521 to a Prometheus, Rand’s protagonist of Anthem says “all things come to my judgment, . . . and I seal upon them my ‘Yes’ or my ‘No’” (1938; quoted in Mayhew 2005a, 39; see also Milgram 2005, 17–18). He discovers that it is he, his body and spirit, that is the meaning of the earth (XII). For architect Howard Roark of Fountainhead, his work is consecrated to a human joy, “a joy that justifies the existence of the earth” (PK VI 80).* 4. Well, in the original edition (1937) of We the Living, Rand has Kira say to Andrei “What do you think is living in me? Why do you think I’m alive? Because I have a stomach and eat and digest food? Because I breathe and work and produce more food to digest? Or because I know what I want and that something that knows how to want—isn’t that life itself?” (quoted in Wright 2005, 203). References Aristotle c. 348–322 B.C. The Complete Works of Aristotle. J. Barnes, editor. 1984. Princeton. Lear, J. 1988. Aristotle – The Desire to Understand. Cambridge. Mayhew, R. 2005a. Anthem ’38 & ’46. In Mayhew 2005b. ——., editor. 2005b. Essays on Ayn Rand’s Anthem. Lexington. Milgram, S. 2005. Anthem in Manuscript: Finding the Words. In Mayhew 2005b. Rand, A. 1943. The Fountainhead. Bobbs-Merrill. ——. 1946 (1938). Anthem. Issue 3(1) of The Freeman. ——. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House. ——. 1963. The Goal of My Writing. In The Romantic Manifesto. 1971. Signet. Richardson Lear, G. 2004. Happy Lives and the Highest Good. Princeton. Wright, D. 2005. Needs of the Psyche in Ayn Rand’s Early Ethical Thought. In Mayhew 2005b.

I take it that the two share the same fundamental root in measurement omission and the unit perspective. Concept formation applies this to entities to form classes of entities, whereas induction applies this to actions of entities to form classes of causal connections applicable to the classes of entities so observed acting. This indicates two things to me: first, that while measurement-omission is crucial to both, concept-formation has the primacy (just as Identity is hierarchically superior to Causality), and second, that after a short while the two must proceed together, often in lock-step fashion, where learning about cauasal connections increases one's knowledge about the entities these connections relate to and also make possible the identification of more abstract entities (eg learning the concept of society properly, as opposed to a collection of unconnected men who happen to be congregated together for some accidental reason, is only possible after learning about causality in the interactions among certain men as well as commonalities in social institutions etc). Thus I think that the need of discovering the method of concept formation before discovering the full answer to the question of induction comes from identifying their common root as part of the discovery of that method. Does this help? JJM

This essay will focus on the aspects of John Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy that discuss his ideas on causation and induction. Before presenting his rules of philosophizing, which amounts to his theory of how induction works, John Herschel discusses the characteristics of cause-and-effect. The Five Characteristics of Cause-and-effect In Part 1, I mentioned how we study phenomena in order to discover connections among things which we term cause-and-effect. Herschel believes that enumerating the characteristics of cause-and-effect will be necessary for our presentation of general rules, rules designed to guide us in examining the facts we’ve collected, and deciding upon their common cause. Indeed, the rules of induction that Herschel presents are informed by the attributes he lists. There are five characteristics, and they can be abbreviated as (1) invariable antecedence, (2) invariable negation, (3) increase or diminution, (4) proportionality, and (5) reversal: (1) Invariable antecedence: There’s an unalterable connection between the antecedent, the cause, and the consequent, the effect, unless prevented by some counteracting cause. Herschel cautions that it isn’t always obvious how cause and effect works in a given case. An effect may appear gradually while the cause is still accumulating in intensity (e.g. a slow boil), or the cause and effect happen so instantaneously that the interval cannot be perceived (e.g. the generation of lightning). (2) Invariable Negation: The effect doesn’t exist whenever the cause is absent, unless there is some other cause that is capable producing the same effect. (3) Increase or Diminution: The increase or decrease in the magnitude of the effect, corresponding to the increased or diminished intensity of the cause, in such cases as admits of increase and diminution. (Like the increase or decrease in pressure applied to a table by your hand with the increase or decrease in energy and effort you put into pushing your hand into the table.) (4) Proportionality: The effect is proportional to the cause in cases of direct, unimpeded action. (5) Reversal: Reversal of the effect with that of the cause—when the cause ceases to exist, so does the effect. Herschel’s “Rules of Philosophizing”: the Ten Rules of Inductive Reasoning Following his list of cause-and-effect’s features, he makes ten, “observations, which may be considered as so many propositions readily applicable to particular cases, or rules of philosophizing” (Prelim. Disc., p. 152). He characterizes these methods as an “inductive search for a cause,” and describes them as follows (with titles made up by me): 1. The Method of Exclusion: If in our group of facts there is one in which the sought-after phenomena is wanting or the opposite, then such a peculiarity is not the cause we seek. Herschel postulated that causes precede effects, so if there’s a fact which doesn’t reveal the phenomena, then that fact cannot be the cause we’re looking for. 2. The Method of Agreement: When the facts agree in a certain respect in all cases, then this is the cause in question, if not, it is a collateral effect of the same cause; if there is only one point of agreement, then this becomes a certainty. If there is more than one cause, they may be “concurrent causes.” 3. The Method of Strong Analogy: That we do not deny the existence of a cause when we have many strong analogies to support it, though it may not be apparent how such a cause can produce the effect, or even though it may be difficult to think of its existence under the circumstances—we must appeal to experience rather than decide “a priori” against the cause, and try whether to see if the mystery can be unraveled. (He gives the example of the bright sun which we think to be intensely hot, and the question of how light can produce heat or maintain it, neither of which we knew back in his day. We can’t simply deny either inference just due to our ignorance, however.) 4. The Method of Contrary Facts: Contrary or opposing facts are equally instructive for the discovery of causes as are favorable facts. (He gives the example of an iron vessel, the air of which contains moistened iron filings, and leads to the diminishing of its bulk due to some part of the air being taken out and combining with the iron to produce rust. If you examine the remaining air, you will discover that the air will neither support flames (combustion) nor animal life (respiration). This is a contrary fact (neither an affirmation of combustion nor respiration), but it shows that the cause of the support of flame and animal life is to be seen in the part of the air which iron abstracts, and which rusts it.) 5. The Method of Degrees or Intensity: Causes become more obvious when we arrange the facts in order of intensity in which some peculiar quality subsists, though not necessarily, since counteracting or modifying causes may be acting at the same time. 6. The Method of Counteracting Causes: That it is the counteracting or modifying causes, operating unperceived, that prevent the effect of the cause we seek in the cases where the resulting phenomena would have been favorable if not for the intervening cause. Exceptions to a proposed general law can often be removed by removing or allowing for such counteracting causes. (Like Galileo’s thoughts on free fall, and how the resistance of different medium affect the rate of fall of objects as opposed to a vacuum. My example.) 7. The Method of Difference: If we can find in nature, or produce by experiment, two instances which agree exactly in all but one particular, and differ in that one, the influence of that difference in producing the phenomenon must be made sensible. If the differing particular is present in one instance but doesn’t exist in the other, the production or non-production will determine if it is or is not the only cause. This is even more evident if we can make the reverse happen: it the differing quality is then absent in the first case but present in the latter, and the effect is reversed from the first case. But if the total presence or absence of this differing aspect only produces a change in the degree or intensity of the phenomenon, we can only conclude that it acts as a concurrent cause or condition with some other cause to be sought elsewhere. In nature an occurrence of two phenomena agreeing in everything except for one respect is rare, but experiment makes this much easier to produce. This is the grand application of experiments of inquiry in physical researches. This quality increases the value of experiments, since it makes the inquiry into nature more pointed, and its answer more decisive. 8. The Method of Concomitant Variation: If we’re trying to discover the influence of a circumstance, and cannot completely wipe it out or oppose it, we must find cases where it varies considerably in degree. If that cannot be done, we may be able to alter its influence one way or another through introducing a new different circumstance, which we think will likely produce this effect, and thus obtain an indirect evidence of its influence. (Think of a catalyst, it would be the new circumstance that starts or makes more powerful a chemical reaction, for instance. We would do well to remember that it is indirect evidence, and that the new circumstance may have a direct influence of its own, or become a modifying one on some other circumstance (like the air reducing the bulk of an iron vessel, which certainly influences the composition of the vessel). 9. The Method of Residues or Subduction: Complicated phenomena have a plurality of causes, which concur, oppose or are independent of each other (like horizontal and vertical motion), and operate at once, and thus produce a compound effect. The phenomena can be simplified by subducting the effect of all known causes either by deductive reasoning or by appeal to experience, the result being a residual phenomenon that requires explanation. This is the process by which an advanced science progresses (or an advanced philosophical theory, explaining minor technical issues; my note). Most of the phenomena of nature are very complicated; when the effects of all known causes are estimated with exactness and thus subducted, the residual facts are constantly appearing in the form of new phenomena, leading to the most important conclusions. (The small discrepancies of predicting the motion of orbiting objects with gravity as the sole cause, lead to the supposition of a resisting medium as the cause of the discrepancy.) (Another example: François Jean Dominique Arago discovered that if you suspend a magnet on a silk thread and vibrate it, and the air resistance, along with the inability of the thread to perpetually move, will cause the magnet and thread to eventually rest. Place a copper plate beneath the magnet and its motion is further retarded, which quickly leads to a whole new relation of facts (copper and magnetic motion.)) 10. The Method of Causal Connection: The detection of a possible cause by comparing gathered-up cases must lead to one of two things: (1) the detection of the real cause and its manner of acting, which furnishes the complete explanation of the facts; or (2) the establishment of an abstract law of nature, pointing out two general phenomena as invariably connected—where there is one, the other also appears. The invariable connection is a phenomenon of a higher order than a given particular fact. When many of these are discovered, we can again “classify, combine, and examine them, with a view to the detection of their causes, or the discovery of still more general laws, and so on without end.” (p. 159) For Herschel, these are the methods by which the process of induction reasons from phenomena to causes. It may help to consider five of these methods to be kinds of inferences, and the other five as precautions or tips for the inductive investigator to keep in mind as he searches for a cause. I’ll now restate them as “kinds of inference” and as “causal tips”: On the five kinds of inference: (1) The first method (Exclusion) is a kind of eliminative reasoning, in which you reason that some thing or circumstance isn’t a necessary or sufficient cause of an effect or phenomena being studied, based on either observation or experiment. (2) The second (Agreement) is a more sophisticated form of enumerative induction, in which from the instances it is reasoned that the facts share the same cause in the quality that they have in common, or it’s reasoned that this common quality is a collateral effect of whatever causes the facts being studied; if there is more than one cause, then the induction would conclude that there may be two or more causes which act at the same time to produce the effect (“concurrent causes”). (3) The seventh method (Difference) is a form of causal reasoning, in which we note how the one factor that a group of facts do not share plays into the production or non-production of the phenomena being studied, adding that it may or may not be the cause, or only a concurrent cause. (4) The eighth method (Concomitant Variation) is another kind of casual reasoning in which we infer the influence of a circumstance on a phenomena by finding instances in which the circumstance varies in degree, or failing this, introduce a new circumstance which affects the first, giving us indirect evidence of its influence. (5) The ninth method (Residuals/Subduction) involves either deductive reasoning or inference from an appeal to experience, by which we break down a complex phenomenon of compound effects with multiple causes, correlating known causes with their effects, in order to wind up with a simpler, residual phenomena that requires a new inductive investigation for its cause. (There is one other method that Herschel considers important for induction: analogical reasoning. I will discuss this more in-depth in Part three.) On the causal tips: (1) The third method (Strong Analogy) cautions us to avoid denying that something is the cause of a phenomenon “a priori,” without experience, when that thing has many strong analogies in support of it being the cause. Even if it’s hard to conceive of how the cause could produce the effect, we can’t allow our reason to be sole arbiter over what can be the appropriate cause, or ignore relevant analogical evidence. (2) The fourth method (Contrary Facts) instructs us that contradictory instances, like air not supporting flame or life (as opposed to the positive instances that normally apply in life), is informative in our search for a cause. This is similar to Bacon’s account of induction, which considers positive and negative (or “contradictory”) instances of the phenomena being investigated. (3) The fifth method (Degrees) suggests that we arrange the phenomena being studied according to the range of intensity belonging to some quality of them, which may make the discovery of the cause easier. The arranging of phenomena by their intensity in order to discover the cause was first used in Bacon’s theory of induction, in his Table of Degrees or Comparison. (4) The sixth method (Counteracting Causes) warns us that in cases which don’t convey the effects of the cause we’re investigating, it is due to counteracting or modifying causes, maybe acting in a manner that cannot be directly perceived. (5) The final one (Causal Connections) remarks that the detection of a possible cause must lead to either the detection of a real cause and manner of acting which explains the facts, or the formation of an abstract law of nature, which describes two general phenomena as being invariably connected. It’s important to note that Herschel believes that these inductive rules are more like general guidelines than a strict methodology, which is contrary to Mill’s inductive method. (But Mill’s theory of induction is a topic for another time.) This also means that he doesn’t believe that scientific induction must discover certain causes in some necessary order (like heat, then radiation, then molecules, etc.). In his presentation of how to induce a theory of dew-formation (following the theory of Dr. William Well, Essay on Dew (1818)), prior knowledge that heat radiates from objects was crucial for understanding the cause of dew, but Herschel remarks that, even with no knowledge of heat radiation, our induction of dew would nevertheless had made the fact of radiation known to us. Following this idea, he says: In the study of nature, we must not, therefore, be scrupulous as to how we reach to a knowledge of such general facts: provided only we verify them carefully when once detected, we must be content to seize them wherever they are to be found. (Preliminary Discourse, p. 164, Aphorism 170) Herschel then proceeds to list the ways in which we can verify the inductive conclusions we reach. The Three Methods of Verifying Inductions Examination It is a tendency of the human mind to speculate, to leap forward, on the basis of a sketchy analogy between some phenomena, to a cause or law. Because of this, many of our most important inductions must be considered as conclusions drawn from few cases, and “verified by trial on many.” “Whenever,” Herschel states, therefore, we think we have been led by induction to the knowledge of the proximate cause of a phenomenon or of a law of nature, our next business is to examine deliberately and seriatim [that is, points taken one at a time] all the cases we have collected of its occurrence, in order to satisfy ourselves that they are explicable by our cause, or fairly included in the expression of our law… (ibid., p. 165, Aphorism 172, words in brackets mine) An induction has to be able to account for and explain all the cases and phenomena from which it was generated. Herschel advises the inductive reasoner to examine all the cases he has gathered up to determine if each and every one of them can be explained by the induction, and that they all are properly represented in the inductive law or generalization that has been formulated. What Herschel decides to do with “contradictory instances,” with instances that seem to disconfirm the induction, is well worth noting. He remarks that any exceptions of the induction must be “carefully noted and set aside for re-examination at a more advanced period,” where at this more advanced stage of knowledge, the cause of the exception might become known, and afterwards the exception may turn out to be an affirmation of the induction in a way that was never thought to be so. In verifying our induction, the steps needed for the verification will differ depending on whether the cause or law we’ve reached is already known and generally recognized as a general causal law, of which the phenomenon we were studying is merely one additional effect of this general cause, or if it is less general, less known, or altogether new. If it is less known, less general, or new, then our verification, examining all the known cases and noting that they all agree with the induction, will suffice, because it shows that induction really does fit with the facts that are known. But if it is generally known and recognized as a more general cause, “the process of verification is of a much more severe and definite kind,” Herschel imparts. This more severe kind of verification traces the relevant causal actions with more precision, and this precision is reached by modifying the circumstances of each case gathered in the induction; we test the circumstances and estimate the effects of our tests, in order to show, “that nothing unexplained remains behind.” He modifies this point by stating that we’re only concerned with explaining this known cause or causes, not with unknown modifying causes. If unknown modifying causes occur, we’ll first discover their existence by the presence of residual phenomena that occur in our evidence for our induction. If an induction is really valid and a comprehensive one, then any unexplained phenomena that remain after comparing the inductive conclusion with its cases, in all their circumstances, must be a residual one (instead of a necessary indicator that the induction is false). The residual phenomena then become the subject of another train of inductive reasoning to discover what their cause or law(s) is. This is how inductions become more general and more specific and how new sciences rise up: It is thus that we may be said to witness facts with the eyes of reason; and it is thus that we are continually attaining a knowledge of new phenomena and new laws which lie beneath the surface of things, and give rise to the creation of fresh branches of science more and more remote from common observation. (ibid., p. 166, aphorism 174) An example of an induction leading to residual phenomena that Herschel discusses is the gravitational law--that planets are kept in their solar orbits, and moons in their planetary orbits, by an attractive force which decreases in strength as the squared distance increases—which historically led to discrepancies in explaining the motions of the planets, and larger ones in the cases of the moons. These two became “residual phenomena,” were studied in subsequent inquiries, and determined to be cause by the same gravitational law, but now applied to the mutual attractive force of the planets on each other (answering the issues of measuring solar orbits) and the force by which the sun influences the motions of the moons (answering the issues of planetary orbits). Prediction The second verification of inductions is the induction’s capability to predict new phenomena that are analogous to the ones that were originally considered in the formation of the induction. For an inductive law of nature to be general enough to serve as a foundation upon which greater inductions may be built, the law of nature must be universal in its applications. And we won’t know if it will be general enough to apply to more than what instances were used to form it, unless we’ve already experienced the law’s ability to do that very thing—to allow us, before trial or experiment, to state what will happen in cases similar to the ones already included under the induction. To verify the induction in this way, we must extend its application to cases not originally part of the induction; this means carefully varying the circumstances under which the causes act in our induction, in order to determine if its effects are truly universal. This includes applying the inductive law to extreme cases. Herschel illustrates the importance of the extreme case with Galileo’s inductive conclusion that gravity’s acceleration was the same on all bodies, great and small, remarking that Galileo couldn’t prove this with extremely light objects like feathers or cotton due to the counteracting resistance of the air during their fall. The invention of the air pump, however, allowed this law of acceleration to be tested by an extreme case: Isaac Newton exhausted the air from a glass using the pump, and dropped a guinea (a British coin) and a downy feather at the same time, the result being that they struck the bottom at the same time. Of course, in air the coin would strike first, followed by the feather as it slowly floats to the ground. After giving this example, Herschel announces, “[let] any one make the trial in the air, and he will perceive the force of an extreme case.” (For some cool videos demonstrating the validity of Galileo’s induction that resistance is what prevents objects of different shapes and weights from falling at the same rate of acceleration, see the famous “Apollo 15 Hammer and Feather Experiment” and a new version of the “http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXDZWKmRxI0” experiment made by a person using his personally-designed apparatus.) A further requirement is to be applied to inductive laws whose expression is quantitative: its universal validity must be established not only by subjecting it to trial in all manners of varying circumstance, but every trial made must be of precise measurement. The means for subjecting the quantitative law to trial should also be designed such that the trial can be repeated many times in order to make any deviations from the law apparent. Consilience Consilience is the third, and the best, verification criterion for an induction. And it consists of completely unsuspected verifications of the induction arising from areas of study least expected. Herschel focuses on the psychological aspects of consilience, in that an induction is consilient when unsuspected or unknown cases or even groups of facts actually verify the induction’s truth when they weren’t expected to, especially cases that were at first considered hostile to the induction’s validity. “Evidence of this kind,” Herschel remarks, “is irresistible, and compels assent with a weight which scarcely any other possesses” (ibid., p. 170, Aph. 180). He states that this is often the case with “residual phenomena”: Unexpected and peculiarly striking confirmations of inductive laws frequently occur in the form of residual phenomena, in the course of investigations of a widely different nature from those which gave rise to the inductions themselves. (ibid., p. 171, Aph. 181) The term “consilience” was coined by Herschel’s good friend and fellow scientist, William Whewell, who also worked out his own theory of induction. As I’ll discuss in my future essays on Whewell, consilience had this psychological aspect for Whewell too, but also a causal, logical element: a “jumping together of inductions” in the form of causal unification of different event or process kinds into more general kinds (a more general induction), whose members all share a common cause or property. (The last sentence is paraphrased from Dr. Laura Snyder’s “Reforming Philosophy,” p. 182) Science as a Process of Induction and Deduction The lower stage of induction that’s been discussed is how we reach proximate causes, laws of nature which apply to vast amounts of phenomena of certain kinds. Deduction is the method by which we trace out these laws into their farthest reaching consequences and effects. Indeed, “it is very important to observe, that the successful process of scientific enquiry demands continually the alternate use of both the inductive and deductive method.” (Prelim. Disc. p. 175, Aph. 184) Speaking further about the relation between induction and deduction, he states: The path by which we rise to knowledge must be made smooth and beaten in its lower steps, and often ascended and descended, before we can scale our way to any eminence, much less climb to the summit. The achievement is too great for a single effort; stations must be established, and communications kept open with all below. To quit metaphor ; there is nothing so instructive, or so likely to lead to the acquisition of general views, as this pursuit of the consequences of a law once arrived at into every subject where it may seem likely to have an influence. (ibid.) This is also how greater inductions (hypotheses and theories) are verified, by deductions made from the inductive conclusions using specific facts, and testing to see if the theory fits with the results. I’ll cover this relationship more in Part 3. Part 3 will cover Herschel’s views on analogy, the greater inductions called “theories,” the role of hypothesis, and the three ways for discovering the general laws which are the foundation for these theories. Meta-blog, automatic cross-post

Notes on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy" Lecture 5 Not a transcript. These notes paraphrase the speaker's points and are not accurate quotes unless in quote tags. {Curly brackets denote my comments} Supplemental course material. MATHEMATICS IN PHYSICS (cont'd) James Clerk (pronounced Clark) Maxwell is to electromagnetism as Newton was to mechanics. Discovered a changing electric field creates a magnetic field. ex. magnetic field around a charging capacitor (only while charging/discharging) J.C. M. reached this discovery by mathematics alone. Verifying observations came from later experiments. Follow-on discovery that changing E-field causing changing B-field {B is magnetic}which causes a changing E-field ... led to description and discovery of electromagnetic waves. Wave properties such as propagation, reflection, refraction, interference all can be inferred from the e.m. wave equation. Speed of propagation was found to be 186,000 mph, the same as optical light. Enabled identification of light as an example of e.m. waves. E.M. and Optics were integrated and the means of integration was mathematics. In physics math is essential and of the deepest importance. "Why?" is answered decisively in the last lecture. THE VALIDATION OF INDUCTIVE FUNDAMENTALS How can the last, widest fundamentals in a field be proved or validated? They cannot be perceived or verified by experiment because they are too abstract, too far removed from concretes. No chain of mathematics can do it. What says the Inverse Square Law applies to the entire universe? These principles are primaries, they cannot be derived or deduced from anything bigger or deeper {universe is the biggest concept there is} {see Notes on "The Art of Thinking" for a fuller explanation of primaries} A wrong answer is the hypothetical deductive fallacy. "If theory predicts all the observed data it must be true" If you are a man, you are mortal. The pig is mortal. Therefore the pig is a man. What is necessary is the statement "ONLY this theory predicts all the observed data." How can we know no other theory will ever be possible? Maybe what you think is impossible is just the result of a poverty of imagination or a limitation of knowledge? "A broad theory is true when it represents an integration of diverse fundamentals within an intensively studied area." Fundamentals from at least two different fields, then integrated together. An intensively studied area is required to ensure enough context has been acquired to reach a fundamental. All along the ascent of greater integrations the lesser fundamentals eliminate possible competing theories until at last only one possibility remains. Alternate candidate theories are not just subjectively inconceivable but objectively arbitrary and must be dismissed. Analogy: Author writing a novel. At the beginning a novel could go in a hundred different directions even with the same characters and theme. Further along the writing process, choices are made and future possibilities narrow. Near the end, the writing races along because there are few choices to make. Established characters and prior circumstances constrain what can happen at the conclusion. An integration of fundamentals is a super-integration. Ex. Newton's Laws of Motion and of Gravity explain and integrate all of the discoveries in astronomy and physics. They are super-integrations. Passage from possible, probable, certain is apparent. On early, lower levels and identification with certainty can be made in one leap. Coordinating results from multiple fields typically takes time for the fundamentals to be established. Ex. ATOMISM - validating a universal Atomism is the theory that matter is particulate, all matter throughout the universe. (will skip the math, we already studied the role of math in physics) (atoms/molecules considered equivalent, molecules are made of atoms) Didn't Democritus prove atomism by pure philosophic deduction? No. Democritus rationalized by taking for granted unproven and even false principles, such as his principle that "motion is impossible in a plenum" FACT: Count Rumford while having some cannon bored out while submerged in water noticed the water temperature increase and steam formation. That is all that changed by the drilling. (Difference) The motion of the drilling did not cause the vat of water to move as a whole, it must be that some internal parts of the water are in motion. If heat was a continuous fluid, how could drilling introduce an endless supply of this fluid? STATUS: AMBIGUOUS. "Possible" requires movement toward a defined proof, which is still unknown. Unexplained is the water transforming to steam. Contradictory evidence existed that was explained nicely by the fluid theory of heat (mixing liquids at different temperatures produced a mixture at an intermediate temperature). Conservation of heat is easily comprehensible if it is a substance, but how can motion be conserved? FACT: Discovery of "Law of Definite Proportions" in chemistry. Complete reactions were always the result of integer ratios of substances measured by weight. If matter were continuous why would elements do this? But if elements are made of atoms then the nonexistence of half-atoms or fractional atoms explains the impossibility of fractional reactions. STATUS: POSSIBILITY Congruent evidence from 2 diverse fields, heat and chemistry. No evidence from mechanics or e.m. (jumping ahead in the history) FACT: Avogadro solved a certain problem in the chemistry of gases by hypothesizing equal volumes of gases contained equal numbers of molecules. This enabled a determination of relative atomic weights. Also sorted out which gases are diatomic. Big step forward for atomic theory because it allowed measurement within the theory. FACT: Electrolysis of hydrogen bearing compounds showed hydrogen was electropositive (it collected around the negative plate) This created a question: how could two like substances form into one compound in violation of the 'opposites attract' principle of electricity? STATUS: POSSIBILITY FACT: "Law of Constant Heat Capacity" discovered. Heat capacity is the amount of work required to raise one gram of substance by one degree ©. "Law of Constant Heat Capacity" is that measured heat capacity of a substance multiplied by the atomic weight of that substance is a constant. Explanation from atomic theory was that each molecule absorbs the same amount of heat. STATUS: PROBABILITY Fluid theory of heat is incompatible with the idea of atomic weight, so is a real problem for that competing idea. FACT: Isomers discovered in chemistry. Different compounds can be made from combining the same elements in the same proportions. Atomic explanation was a different internal structures among compounds. Methyl Alcohol and Methyl Ether FACT: Faraday's electrolysis experiments showed electricity comes in discrete units. FACT: J.J. Waterston discovered the "Ideal Gas Law". This has universal implications because it is known that all substances become gases if heated enough. PV~nmv2 P pressure V volume n number of atoms m atomic mass v velocity of atoms. Charles' Law established PV~T where T is temperature. Thus T~nmv2 establishing temperature is a form of kinetic energy of the atoms. STATUS: PROBABILITY Not a certainty because the 'billiard ball model of gases' behind the Ideal Gas Law is an assumption still unproven. An independent demonstration of the Ideal Gas Law was needed. FACT: Slow dispersion of gases was a problem. Computed velocity of atoms is very fast, but gases that can be smelled can be perceived to cross a given distance much slower than that. J.C. Maxwell working on pendulum damping found that damping was a constant as a function of air density. This was deduced from the Ideal Gas Law in 1867 and verified later experimentally. FACT: Mendeleyev's Periodic Table of the elements was organized by atomic mass and valence. Predicted 6 new elements based on holes in the table. 6 new elements were found. STATUS: Atomic theory explained Avogadro's Law, temperature, Ideal Gas Law. Avogadro's Law explained chemistry, valence, periodic table of elements. By the 1870's enough evidence had gathered to regard atomic theory as proven jointly by chemistry and physics. Waiting until Brownian motion is too late. Transition points are debatable within limits and are not quantifiable. The need for an overarching super-integration of fundamentals is indispensable. Philosophers have claimed such integrations are impossible but they have been accomplished and withstood the test of time and later discoveries. 5 RULES OF INDUCTIVE REASONING 1. At every stage of science, valid concept formation is essential because valid concepts are the only green light to valid induction. 2. Induction begins with self-evident, first level generalizations, to which all other generalizations must ultimately be reduced. 3. Induction requires the contextual discovery of causal connections, using methods of Difference and Agreement. 4. Induction at every level beyond the first level requires integration with other knowledge - and on the highest levels requires the discovery of principles which integrate fundamentals from a diversity of fields. 5. In the physical sciences, after their early stage, the above steps depend on and are performed through and only through mathematics. Note parallels to rules for concept formation 1. Valid concepts 2. Reduction to first level concepts 3. Definition by similarities and difference in essentials 4. Integrate hierarchically and horizontally 5. Measurement omission INDUCTIVE ERRORS Science is self corrective so long as the correct method is followed. Honest Errors by Scientists Overgeneralization - corrected when new contexts and qualifications are discovered Imperfect fit - corrected by a better theory. Newton fixed Kepler's 3rd Law Mistaken explanations - when other theories are still possible. corrected when new unexplainable data appears Premature Integration - refuted by later data. Ex. Kepler's attribution of the Laws of planetary motion to magnetic influence from the sun Committing fallacies in deduction is not a 'problem of deduction' or an attack on deduction, neither are errors in induction a special problem for induction. Errors at Large Absence of any defined method, leading to reliance on emotions and authority. No other explanation is possible for the absurd "inductions" in racist and rationalist generalizations. Always the pretense of evidence in these cases is enumerative swan counting, not causation discovering. Emotionalist and authoritarian corruption is not confined to induction but is a general problem for all thought. Philosophical Issues - this presentation has been based on Objectivism - intrincism, skepticism, empiricism, mysticism will cut the thinker off from reality ex. Progress was rapid in electrical phenomenon once discovered because the Bible had no dogma about electromagnetism Worst enemy of science today is not 'religionists' but the skeptics who only want to 'save the appearances' and give up theorizing about reality. from textbook "Modern Physics" by Van {somebody} in a relativity chapter: "The question might now be raised as to whether or not a moving rod is really shortened by its motion and a moving clock really slowed down. The answer of course is that motion has no effect on the properties of a measuring rod or clock. However the real length of a rod plays no part in physical theory, only measured quantities are of interest." Logical positivism and empiricism rejects any conceptually reached knowledge of reality. Uninterpreted formalisms are the favored method. LP as a student in a quantum mechanics class watches a professor come in and put a big T and a lowercase t on the board. Prof says "For every big T there is a little t". LP asks "What does T stand for?" Prof responds "The terms are uninterpreted at this stage, they have no meaning." Quote from Professor of Evolutionary Genetics @ University of Leeds, England from Apr 16, 2000 NYT Book Review. "Personally I like to think of the universe not as a machine but as a bus network in which the identity of the buses and the reason they keep running are ultimately unknowable. Science is like a bus time table. Forget truth. If you can put together a good timetable you will have a much better chance of catching a bus." Occam's Razor - "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." Utterly invalid, truth is not necessarily simple. "Correspondence to reality" is superior to "fewest elements". At best, Occam's Razor is a misguided way to state "avoid the arbitrary". Using Occam's, reality can be discarded because it complicates the equations. Reality is not simple enough. Q: How do I know a first level gen is really first level? A: Self-evidency, which is perceptual. There is no further test for 'perceptual or not' than 'can you perceive it?' Q: Atomic theory was applied to explain things before it was proven. A: Even before reaching proven status it has evidence in its favor so is not arbitrary. {A theory can only be proven or disproven by attempting to use it} Q: How can calculus and continuous variables validate a theory of discrete phenomena such as atomism or QM? A: Pass {answered next lecture} Q: Why are your proffered Razors valid. "Gens are not to be multiplied beyond necessity." A: Context was specified, not left at mere simplicity. All 'Razors' state that something should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The difference is what is necessary. Occam's supplies no context beyond counting elements. Rand's Razor is not arbitrary like that. {this question revisited again next lecture} Q: Modern science textbooks A: Separate the first handed info from some authority's theory. David Harriman is preparing a text based on a hierarchy. Ayn Rnd used to say to me "Your classes are not a total waste because you can learn in reverse. Keep asking yourself "What is wrong with what this guy is saying?""

This conspiracy theory was unfortunately based on uncorroborated speculation without verifying the facts. It apparently tries to make a case that the texts of Western Marxism as a whole (or Cultural Marxism in the conspiracy theory parlance) had been originally intended to constitute a blueprint so that their supportive readers would carry out a cultural revolution, and also claims that calculated manipulation by these supporters to push the offshoots of this blueprint to a wider audience has been central to the formation of the worldview of very many cultural rebels since the 1960s, which is then supposed to have further spawned political correctness and other culturally subversive societal phenomena on a correspondingly wide scale. Especially the claim about the great influence of Western Marxist texts on the Boomer generation seems to be the most uncorroborated and suspicious one, and even the link between the rebellious ideas of the 1960s and the later occurrences of cultural subversion isn't totally straightforward, as it's hard to say e.g. which parts of political correctness originate from the 1960s rather than from the newer left-wing ideas of the 1970s or 1980s, even though undeniably some original Boomer rebels of the 1960s have been in the forefront of advancing cultural subversion. By the way, the concept of Western Marxism had been popularized by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's work Les aventures de la dialectique not earlier than in 1955, and was hardly ever used by the Western Marxists themselves to describe their ideas. They didn't even identify with each other very closely, so finding a common denominator for these scholars appears to have been mostly an invention of later generations. This seems to undermine the possibility of any organized conspiracy by the Western Marxists. Of course, there is no doubt that some university students and other cultural rebels in the late 1960s definitely read some of the works of the Frankfurt School among other popular anti-establishment theories, a small number even went to hear their lectures, and some rebels even carried out advanced studies under the Frankfurt School core persons such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. But how many percent did the total number of cultural rebels constitute out of the enormous total number of all students in the Western countries? How many ideas did these rebels adopt directly from the Frankfurt School compared to the ideas taken from other theorists? Was the adoption of some Frankfurt School ideas a formative experience for the students' political views to the extent that one can say that the worldview of these students was a result of conscious planning by the Frankfurt School? Did the rebels who were most influenced by some ideas from the Frankfurt School have a significant impact on the development of the New Left compared to the enormous number of rebels who were influenced by completely different theorists such as Third-World oriented militants, Existentialists, Situationists, traditionally revolutionary Marxists such as Trotskyists and Maoists and moreover by completely different themes such as the numerous variants of Third World issues, feminism and environmentalism? These questions remain open, as none of the conspiracy theorists has tried to estimate the approximate percentage of how much the Frankfurt School affected the worldview of the total mass of students in the 1960s. If this approximate percentage turns out to reveal only a negligible influence on the worldview of each student, or even if this approximate percentage turns out to reveal a significant influence but only on a handful of students, then this type of answer would indicate that the conspiracy theory is untrue, i.e. it erroneously attributes the specific mindset of the 1960s cultural rebellion to the texts of the Western Marxists instead of to the genuine main influences behind the rebellious mindset. But a reliable answer can only be discovered through meticulous and statistically oriented historical research, little of which has been carried out so far. Another caveat in this conspiracy theory is: did the Boomer rebels hate the traditional worldview because they happened to read some Western Marxist texts, or did they read some Western Marxist texts because they had decided to hate the traditional worldview? Which really caused which? I already posted a thorough analysis in another thread, explaining how this conspiracy theory was born, but I have ever since been quite unsatisfied even with my own ability to separate fact from fiction there. So I decided to post here a revised version to better emphasize which parts of the conspiracy theory have been definitely verified to be true so far and which parts have been definitely disproved so far. Another important task is to try to discover the textual sources (mostly books and articles) from which the different versions of this conspiracy theory have taken their facts and half-truths. William Lind, a rather brilliant military theorist, who also appears on the video in the first post of this thread, has written several widely-circulated versions of this conspiracy theory. He has been co-operating at least with the Free Congress Foundation (FCF), which is an American conservative organization. His colleagues at the FCF have also written several additional versions of this conspiracy theory, and I'll list the most famous versions below. The most comprehensive version seems to be the Free Congress Foundation e-book, which includes six chapters on different aspects of the conspiracy theory: http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/index.aspx The first two chapters as well as Chapter V of this e-book are going to be the most relevant ones for our use here, even though they unfortunately include a lot of uncorroborated speculation and even some erroneous facts: http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/pcessay1-3.aspx http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/pcessay5.aspx For another version of the same historical account, which may also have been used as a source for Chapter V of the e-book, see Gerald Atkinson's older text from 1999 called What is the Frankfurt School?: http://www.newtotalitarians.com/FrankfurtSchool.html According to the bibliographical footnotes in Gerald Atkinson's text, there exists an even earlier historical account written in 1996 by Raymond Raehn (Critical Theory: A Special Research Report, 1 April 1996), which I suspect is partly similar to Raehn's Chapter II in the e-book. Unfortunately, this oldest version isn't available online, so I can't compare it to the later versions. However, Gerald Atkinson's older text Who Placed American Men in a Psychic 'Iron Cage?': Part II The Thread of 'Cultural Marxism' includes a few excerpts from Raehn's 1996 account and also many other citations (including original page numbers) which may have been used as sources for the FCF e-book as well: http://www.newtotalitarians.com/PsychicIronCagePartII.html There do also exist other significant versions of this conspiracy theory which have been published in the 2000s. Probably the most famous of these later versions is Chapter Four in Patrick Buchanan's book The Death of the West. http://www.amazon.com/Death-West-Populatio...255-7503505-199 William Lind has also written a short overview which somewhat faithfully repeats the main points of the e-book. This overview has been published under two different names Next Conservatism: What is Cultural Marxism and Unmasking Political Correctness: http://www.restoringamerica.org/cultural_marxism.htm http://acuf.org/issues/issue47/051102cul.asp One of William Lind's versions of this conspiracy theory Who stole our culture? was published as Chapter 10 in the book The Culture-Wise Family: Upholding Christian Values in a Mass Media World by Ted Baehr and Pat Boone: http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=55833 And then there is, of course, an improved version from William Lind called The Origins of Political Correctness: An Accuracy in Academia Address: http://www.academia.org/lectures/lind1.html This particular version of the conspiracy theory includes less wild speculation in its commentary of the 1960s cultural rebellion than the earlier versions, which were full of uncorroborated links regarding how the Western Marxists allegedly imposed their ideas on the Boomer youngsters. Such claims especially overlooked the minimal role of Western Marxism in the absolutely central formative years of the New Left between 1960-1964. Apparently, William Lind wanted to come up with a chronologically more accurate version, which correctly makes the link between the Boomer rebels and Western Marxism only after the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations had properly started in 1965 (i.e. after the formative early years of the New Left), but which gives the questionable impression that most Boomer demonstrators were just basically normal youngsters until they needed a theoretical rationalization and thus got spoiled later by the Frankfurt School theories. Not a bad hypothesis, but Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter have researched the personality of many New Left activists in their book Roots of Radicalism, and if I understood their research correctly, both the early New Left activists as well as the later New Left activists seem to have acted more or less on their respective rebellious personality types rather than on outside influences. The following passage seems to be the key of how William Lind tries to implicate Critical Theory as the culprit of the 1960s cultural rebellion. >"But the student rebels needed theory of some sort. They couldn’t just get out there and say, "Hell no we won’t go," they had to have some theoretical explanation behind it."< Excerpted from: http://www.academia.org/lectures/lind1.html But this passage also seems to admit that the student movement already existed by its own initiative before it started to look for suitable scholarly theories such as Critical Theory, and also seems to admit that these scholarly theories were mostly the post-facto rationalization of what the students were already doing rather than the original guiding blueprints for their actions. I think this difference is crucial, and refutes the claim that the Frankfurt School had planned or was a major cause of the 1960s cultural rebellion. It seems to me that not much would have changed in the 1960s if the cultural rebels had used some other anti-Establishment theory as their main tool of historical interpretation instead of Critical Theory, as the practical actions organized against militarism, bureaucracy, and capitalism had a quite straightforward format without much concern for theoretical nuances. And indeed, it's not at all clear if the cultural rebels even used Critical Theory as their main rationalization in the 1960s, as there were simultaneously many competing theories and themes popular among the New Left. However, if we regard Western Marxist texts as a relatively passive and outdated tool, which was adopted and heavily revised since the late 1960s by the Boomer rebels for their own purposes, rather than as a ready-made and self-activating blueprint for a revolution, this gives the claims regarding the Boomer rebels' use of Western Marxism much more credibility. For example, it's possible to prove that some left-wing intellectuals of the 1960s have indeed used Western Marxist ideas originating in the 1920s and 1930s to formulate their political positions such as their support for radical multiculturalism, even though it must be said that these uses have often been orthogonal to the original anti-capitalist emphasis of Western Marxism. I managed to find the following examples of revisionist use of Western Marxism as a tool serving other purposes: - Stuart Hall: Gramsci's relevance for the study of race and ethnicity - Cornel West: The Cornel West Reader, especially the chapter The Making of an American Radical Democrat of African descent - Douglas Kellner: Marcuse's Challenge to Education - Ilan Gur-Ze’ev: Adorno, Horkheimer, Critical Theory and the Possibility of a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy - Henry A. Giroux: Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning, especially Chapter 15: Antonio Gramsci - Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe: Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics - Edward Said: Traveling Theory Revisited See David Black: Frantz Fanon and Marxist-Humanism. >Said claims that “Fanon seems to have read Lukacs’ book and taken from its reification chapter an understanding of how even in the most confusing and heterogenous of situations, a vigorous analysis of one central problematic could be relied on to yield the most extensive understanding of the whole.”< Excerpted from: http://www.thehobgoblin.co.uk/journal/h32002_DB_Fanon.htm The politically calculating reason why the FCF wants to emphasize the connection between Marx, Western Marxism and the cultural rebels of the 1960s may be explained by the following revealing remark by William Lind: >"But if the average American found out that Political Correctness is a form of Marxism, different from the Marxism of the Soviet Union but Marxism nonetheless, it would be in trouble. The next conservatism needs to reveal the man behind the curtain - old Karl Marx himself."< Excerpted from: http://www.restoringamerica.org/cultural_marxism.htm Very many Americans already hate Marxism after having endured the Communist threat during the Cold War, so presenting the Frankfurt School as a link transmitting Marxism to the Boomer rebels in the 1960s is apparently expected by Lind to make most Americans hate the Frankfurt School and the Boomer rebels by association as much as most Americans used to hate Marxism. Even though I haven't confirmed yet whether this is indeed what Lind really meant, this type of intention would at least explain why the FCF goes to so much trouble to emphasize the continuum from Marx to the Frankfurt School and further to the New Left, which are actually three different generations of quite unsimilar thinkers from totally different eras. In any case, here is a key passage taken from the FCF e-book chapter VI (Further Readings on the Frankfurt School) which states explicitly that William Lind isn't content to consider political correctness as a simple consequence of the 1960s cultural rebellion as a spontaneous youth movement: >"The Frankfurt School, or the Institute for Social Research as it was formally known, was established at Frankfurt University in Germany in 1923. This fact alone is important, because it tells us that Political Correctness is not merely a leftover of the American student rebellion of the 1960s."< http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/pcessay6.aspx For contrary evidence regarding the alleged role of Critical Theory in the 1960s cultural rebellion, Herbert Marcuse seems to have indirectly admitted on page 23 of his book An Essay on Liberation that Critical Theory would first need to be adapted to advance the goals of the 1960s cultural rebels, as it didn't serve the sensibility of the 1960s in its original form: >"The new sensibility has become a political factor. This event, which may well indicate a turning point in the evolution of contemporary societies, demands that critical theory incorporate the new dimension into its concepts, project its implications for the possible construction of a free society."< http://www.amazon.com/Essay-Liberation-Her...e/dp/0807005959 Some of the Frankfurt School's ideas were even misused compared to their original purpose. This was most clearly indicated when Adorno lamented in 1969: >"I established a theoretical model of thought. How could I have suspected that people would want to implement it with Molotov cocktails?"< Excerpted from: http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9811/inside.html This was not the first time when the Frankfurt School members expressed their dissatisfaction with what the Boomer rebels were doing, compared to how the original Critical Theory interpreted the zeitgeist of the 1960s, as can be read in Rolf Wiggershaus's book The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, chapter Critical Theory in a Period of Upheaval. Conspiracy theories speculating on the role of the Frankfurt School in the development of the New Left are actually much older than the FCF conspiracy theory, and seem to go back to the early 1970s. Rolf Wiggershaus lists some of these early conspiracy theories in his book The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, p. 657. The following quote really convinced me that political correctness had already become visible in Germany as early as in 1972. >Since the publication in 1970 of his book The Poverty of Critical Theory, [Gunter] Rohrmoser has promulgated, in constantly varying forms, the view that Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer were the terrorists’ intellectual foster-parents, who were using cultural revolution to destroy the traditions of the Christian West. Academics such as Ernst Topitsch and Kurt Sontheimer, who saw themselves as educators and liberal democrats, followed in Rohrmoser’s footsteps. In 1972 Topitsch, a critical rationalist who was Professor of Philosophy in Graz, had stated that behind the slogans of “rational discussion” and “dialogue free of domination” there was being established at the universities “a distinct terrorism of political convictions such as never existed before, even under Nazi tyranny.”< http://www.amazon.com/Frankfurt-School-Pol...y/dp/0262731134 The most central member of the Frankfurt School for the cultural rebellion of the 1960s is claimed by most conspiracy theories to be Herbert Marcuse, and this speculation may prove to be correct even in reality. The following quite neutral-looking historical text surveys the role of Herbert Marcuse in the 1960s: James Panton: Intellectual Influences on the New Left in America: C. Wright Mills and Herbert Marcuse http://reconstruction.eserver.org/081/panton.shtml As this text considers Herbert Marcuse a relatively unknown figure in the early 1960s before he released One-Dimensional Man in 1964, Marcuse may not have had much influence during the formative years of the early New Left in 1960-1964. It is true that Marcuse had published Eros and Civilization already in the 1950s with a significant readership, but this book can hardly be used as a blueprint for practical action, as it mainly presents a Freudian theory about repression in the Western civilization and discusses what kind of lifestyle might arise without this repression. To support my hypothesis that Western Marxism had only a minimal influence on the early New Left, I would like to note that Ayn Rand wrote a partial review of the philosophical and political background of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964 called The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion', and doesn't even mention Marcuse nor the Frankfurt School in her entire text, even though other well-known historical figures such as Sartre, Camus and Marx are mentioned, as well as the possibility of this movement being politically self-contained and even anti-ideological. Unlike the first half of Ayn Rand's review of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, most historical accounts of political correctness do not unfortunately seem to be based on this level of meticulous factual research of newspapers, magazines and interviews, but are rather based on uncovering similar aspects of different movements from different eras, and then blindly assuming some kind of causality between them. Even the excellent text by Frank Ellis called Political Correctness and the Ideological Struggle seems to be constructed in this suspect manner. A better way to carry out research might be to start with trying to disprove potential connections between different intellectual movements, for example, by demonstrating that there was not enough time and links for one movement to be markedly influenced by another movement. Thus, posing the question of whether the early New Left of 1960-1964 could have realistically been influenced by the then quite unknown Frankfurt School would have automatically pointed out the inadequacies of the conspiracy theory, but this question was probably not even considered by the FCF. As we saw here, disproving a hypothesis by looking for contrary evidence may often be a more sound method of research than to go looking for compatible evidence to support a hypothesis. It needs to be pointed out that there was actually one influential book called The Authoritarian Personality co-authored by Theodor Adorno which was available in English already in the early 1950s, but it is dubious whether this kind of mainstream research can be considered a part of the alleged dissemination of Western Marxist ideas, as the eradication of Fascism and prejudice may have been the only common goal of its politically diverse set of authors. And in 1955 came out another popular book called Eros and Civilization by Herbert Marcuse, which revised Freud's theories to suit his Socialist dream of the perfectibility of man and also superficially presented some concepts such as alienation and reification taken from the Western Marxist criticism of capitalist society. But this book is not nearly as deep philosophically as the hard-core texts of Western Marxism such as Lukàcs's and Adorno's dialectical methods to expose the reification in capitalism and bourgeois culture, and isn't thus very suitable for serious theoretical work nor for planning concrete political actions. So it seems that there were very few if any authentically Western Marxist texts widely available in English for the Boomer youth cadres to use as ready-made plans for their cultural rebellion in the early 1960s. Besides, most of the Western Marxists (Georg Lukàcs, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin especially) come across in their biographies as stereotypical theoreticians, who were quite incompetent at planning ahead even in their personal choices, and therefore definitely unlikely to be able to plan an entire rebellion. I doubt that it's even possible to plan a rebellion by theoretical analysis only, without having advanced reality-based organizing skills to fuse into theories, which is a different talent altogether and which was either non-existent or atrophied in the Western Marxist ivory towers (see Lukàcs's phrase Grand Hotel Abgrund criticizing the passive theorizing of the Frankfurt School, even though he was a pure theoretician himself). One thing that puzzled me about the FCF e-book was why the e-book only mentioned some arbitrary Western Marxist philosophers and scholars but not other very well-known Western Marxists. For example, Karl Korsch and Ernst Bloch are mysteriously ignored in the e-book altogether, and I wonder why, especially as many Boomer rebels were interested to read Ernst Bloch in particular (according to his Wikipedia entry: "Bloch's work became very influential in the course of the student protest movements in 1968 and in liberation theology."). What I did was try to reverse-engineer the e-book into its original sources, and then find out the lineage (i.e. the entire recursive web of references) of the textual components appearing in the e-book, in order to research whether the missing Western Marxists were ignored in the original sources, too, or whether they were dropped only from the e-book. I took a look at the FCF e-book chapter VI (Further Readings on the Frankfurt School), browsed through most of the books and articles listed there, and noticed that the Chapter II of the e-book written by Raymond Raehn is amazingly similar to an earlier article by the LaRouche-related writer Michael Minnicino, who was also mentioned in the FCF e-book Chapter VI as a recommendation. I suspected that Raymond Raehn may have built his chapter II more or less directly on Minnicino's article, as this level of textual similarity can hardly be a coincidence. Here is a link to Minnicino's article, so that you can compare yourselves: Michael Minnicino: New Dark Age: Frankfurt School and Political Correctness http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-96..._frankfurt.html Minnicino's article is a typical example of what you can expect from LaRouchian historiography, whose style I already knew from some other texts on the Internet. They usually contain lots of well-researched facts and intellectual charisma, which are then unfortunately tied together into more or less fallacious conspiracy theories. The key to understanding LaRouchian historiography is apparently that they have a few favourite philosophers such as Plato, Leibniz and Schiller, whom they consider as geniuses and good guys, as well as many philosophers whom they hate passionately as bad guys such as Aristotle, the British empiricists, Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Western Marxists. Many LaRouchians seem to think that the question of which philosophy is most prevalent in society is one of the determining factors of the ultimate success and survival of that society. Minnicino's account is a stereotypical LaRouchian text in this respect, as it deals directly with his support for the metaphysics of the most attractive German idealism (especially their views on creativity) as well as with the competition between the good philosophers including Plato, Leibniz and Schiller against the bad philosophers including the Frankfurt School and some other Western Marxists, who had sinned against Minnicino's LaRouchian sensibilities by denigrating human creativity as well as metaphysics in general. I wonder if Raymond Raehn of the Free Congress Foundation might have taken his basic plotline and historical facts from Minnicino's text, then finding out which books Minnicino had used as his sources (apparently these are not listed in the Fidelio article), reading these books himself, and finally leaving out of his version the most unbelievable causal claims of Minnicino's text like for example the claim about Western Marxism causing the dullness of the mainstream mass media since the 1940s. At least Raehn must have been aware of Minnicino's article, as he had accidentally cited two sentences from it almost verbatim without mentioning the source. It looks like Raehn's text might be a kind of disassembling, assessing and repackaging Minnicino's textual components with many independent additions of his own to replace the content left out. But then again, simply by noting that Raymond Raehn and the FCF in general may have based their plotline and many of their facts on Minnicino's text doesn't tell us enough about the first historical origins of these textual components. If Minnicino's text was indeed a model for Raehn, then we must next ask where did Minnicino get his textual components, as he certainly can't have made them up from nothing? Therefore, we need to reverse-engineer Minnicino's text, too, in order to find out the sources which have contributed to Minnicino's text directly (and thus the FCF e-book indirectly). If you take a look at the list of articles contained in the back issues of the Fidelio magazine at the Schiller Institute web site, you'll notice that there exists another text by Michael Minnicino and Webster Tarpley about the same topic called The Evil Philosophy Behind Political Correctness. Tarpley is a very famous conspiracy historian, so his mere co-operation with Minnicino suggests that we can indeed expect at least this second Fidelio article or even both Fidelio articles to be heavily implicated in the conspiracy genre, and thereby presumably the FCF e-book to be implicated in it as well. Unfortunately, the Schiller Institute web site doesn't have the text of this second Fidelio article, but I managed to find it in another online magazine. I don't know much about the background of this other magazine, but it is irrelevant, as the text in itself proves to be very illuminating: http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/polcorr.htm This second Fidelio article presents the Frankfurt School as well as the Western Marxist Georg Lukàcs, who were both discussed already in the first Fidelio article, as intellectual heirs of the Continental anti-metaphysical philosophical tradition by Nietzsche and Heidegger which the LaRouchians hate. Moreover, the text begins by commenting positively on Allan Bloom's very famous book The Closing of the American Mind, which had gained a huge following in the five years before the publication of Minnicino's first Fidelio article. I took a look inside Bloom's book, and there is a considerable textual similarity between his account of philosophical traditions most popular in the 1960s and the corresponding account by Minnicino. They both emphasize that the 1960s cultural rebels were mainly interested in Continental philosophy such as that of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Marcuse and Lukàcs among others. Apparently, Minnicino had read Bloom's book, and made some independent further research about some of the philosophers that Bloom had pointed out. The LaRouchians are known for deep research, and I can imagine Minnicino piling up the best biographies of these philosophers (actually, Minnicino even tellingly mentions "university bookstore" in the first Fidelio article), making notes on them, and writing a plotline based on them. Bloom probably didn't mean to imply that the Continental tradition in general nor the Frankfurt School in particular were the direct cause of the general flavour of the 1960s cultural rebellion, but Minnicino may have had his own reasons based on earlier LaRouchian historiography to hypothesize such a causality, even if it may not stand the test of common sense. Bloom also didn't have an incentive to attempt to compile a comprehensive list of all intellectual influences on the 1960s cultural rebellion, and his making an arbitrary short list of some known influences has probably found its way to every historical account inspired by Bloom, thus further distorting common knowledge about which forerunners were the main influences on the New Left, if any. It might be easiest to understand the evolution of the conspiracy theory by reading its variants in the following order (not necessarily the order in which these projects had been started): 1) Bloom's book -> 2) the second Fidelio article -> 3) the first Fidelio article -> 4) Raymond Raehn's Critical Theory: A Special Research Report in 1996 -> 5) the FCF e-book -> 6) Chapter Four in Patrick Buchanan's book The Death of the West. While trying to trace the lineage of textual components in the Fidelio articles, I bumped into an interesting connection between the first Fidelio article and an earlier LaRouchian publication. More specifically, the title of the first Fidelio article New Dark Age is almost identical to the title of an earlier LaRouchian book written by Carol White called The New Dark Ages Conspiracy, which was published in 1980. According to the Acknowledgements section of the book, "Lyndon LaRouche not only contributed the inspiration for this book, but provided outline which has proved an invaluable guide". So it seems that we can consider this book as a kind of semi-official LaRouchian view of the course of the 20th century. Because the title of the book was almost identical to the title of Minnicino's first Fidelio article, I expected to find an identical account of the role of Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Frankfurt School in the book. I was wrong. Even though the book predictably outlines the course of the 20th century as a great conspiracy by the British elites whom the LaRouchians hate, the other despised tradition of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School isn't mentioned even once in the entire book (nor are Adorno and Marcuse individually). It seems that LaRouche was then completely preoccupied with opposing the British elites and their empiricist philosophy, and didn't bother too much about getting repulsed by other lesser evils such as the philosophical tradition started by Nietzsche. As explained in Wikipedia: >"The New Dark Ages Conspiracy by Carol White, 1980 (ISBN 093348805X): alleges that a group of British intellectuals led by Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells attempted to control scientific progress in order to keep the world backward and more easily managed by Imperialism. In this conspiracy theory, Wells wished science to be controlled by some kind of priesthood and kept from the common man, while Russell wished to stifle it altogether by restricting it to a closed system of formal logic, that would prohibit the introduction of new ideas. This conspiracy also involved the promotion of the counterculture."< Excerpted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Views_of_Lynd...h.22_conspiracy Some significant change must have happened in the LaRouchian movement between 1980 when The New Dark Ages Conspiracy book came out and 1992 when the first Fidelio article came out, getting the LaRouchians considerably more interested in opposing the anti-bourgeois, anti-metaphysical philosophical tradition started by Nietzsche and, on the other hand, opposing the repercussions of the 1960s counterculture more than ever before. The second Fidelio article gives us some hints about what may have caused this change by mentioning the publication of Allan Bloom's book in 1987 and Lyndon LaRouche's trial in 1988. As many of us know, the publication of Allan Bloom's book in 1987 coincided with the start of the so-called Culture Wars in America between the politically correct left-wingers of the academia against the loose alliance of Conservatives and supporters of Enlightenment liberalism. As the LaRouchians are known to be very intellectually oriented, they must have been aware of the main texts and developments of the Culture Wars, as hinted to in both Fidelio articles, probably inspiring some LaRouchian historians to thoroughly research the course of the philosophical tradition started by Nietzsche, which they may have overlooked before. Another event which got the LaRouchians interested in the Frankfurt School in particular must have been the law suit against Lyndon LaRouche. The LaRouchians apparently suspected that their enemies were trying to use tricks from the Frankfurt School personality theory to make LaRouche look guilty. So both the general zeitgeist of the late 1980s as well as the pressing need caused by the trial may have been the specific reasons which spurred Minnicino to carry out independent research into the Frankfurt School and other Western Marxists, who had after all been already recognized by Allan Bloom to have played some kind of unclear role in the development of the Politically Correct Left since the 1960s. One more significant event in the 1980s was the publication of the famous book The Aquarian Conspiracy by Marilyn Ferguson in 1980, which predicted the rise of a New Age type of mass movement based on Boomers immersed in the mystical visions of the 1960s. The LaRouchians took action against Ferguson's book, and probably intensified their research into the roots of the 1960s counterculture very soon after her book came out, as they considered it a harmful influence on Americans. Such previous work on the history of counterculture might explain how Minnicino was able to make a very sophisticated analogy between the 1960s cultural rebellion and the little-known Asconan counterculture of the early 1900s in both of his Fidelio articles. Maybe it was this very analogy which made Minnicino see the generation of the Western Marxists and other such cultural rebels of the early 1900s as the architects of the 1960s cultural rebellion, instead of considering the latter rebellion as a spontaneous, improvised movement by the anti-authoritarian segment of Boomers. Minnicino's source regarding the Asconan counterculture remains unclear to me, but it might be Martin Green's book Mountain of Truth: The Counterculture Begins; Ascona, 1900-1920, which dwells on Otto Gross and other Asconan cultists: See Martin Green: The Asconan Idea in Politics: http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ascona.html But why hypothesize any architects for the 1960s cultural rebellion at all? I don't know. Maybe the possibility of a spontaneous birth of a mass movement would be quite antithetical to the LaRouchian view of history, which likes to believe that philosophical movements and their specific gurus shape history instead of spontaneous organization by the masses. Sometimes it may be so, but was the 1960s cultural rebellion one of these cases? This remains to be proven. I have presented above some textual lineages which the LaRouchians may have utilized in carrying out their historical research into the Nietzschean and the Frankfurt School traditions of philosophy as well as into the 1960s counterculture. But I would also like to discover which section of the first Fidelio article could be considered the starting point of Minnicino's argument. Even though the book The New Dark Ages Conspiracy doesn't help us at all in answering this question, there exists an earlier book called Dope, Inc. published in 1978 about the alleged complicity of the British elites in the international drug trade. This book does indeed contain one nearly identical textual component later found also in the first Fidelio article, and I suspect this particular textual component may also have been Minnicino's starting point when he started his deep research for his Fidelio articles. On page 393 of Dope, Inc. (first edition) written by the U.S. Labor Party Investigating Team, i.e. the LaRouchians, we can find the following paragraphs: >"The social theory of rock was elaborated by British agent and musicologist Theodor Adorno, who came to the United States in 1939 to head the Princeton University Radio Research Project. (18) Adorno writes 'In an imaginary but psychologically emotion-laden domain, the listener who remembers a hit song will turn into the song's ideal subject, into the person for whom the song ideally speaks. At the same time, as one of many who identify with that fictitious subject, that musical I, he will feel his isolation ease as he himself feels integrated into the community of "fans." In whistling such a song he bows to a ritual of socialization, although beyond this unarticulated subjective stirring of the moment his isolation continues unchanged .... The comparison with addiction is inescapable. Addicted conduct generally has a social component: it is one possible reaction to the atomization which, as sociologists have noticed, parallels the compression of the social network. Addiction to music on the part of a number of entertainment listeners would be a similar phenomenon.' (19) The Hit Parade is organized precisely on the same principles used by Egypt's Isis priesthood and for the same purpose: the recruitment of youth to the dionysiac counterculture. In a report prepared for the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research, Paul Hirsch described the product of Adorno's Radio Research Project. (20) According to Hirsch, the establishment of postwar radio's Hit Parade 'transformed the mass medium into an agency of sub-cultural programming.'"< The pages 379-380 of the book Dope, Inc. give us some hints of how the LaRouchians may have first bumped into Adorno, and how they viewed Adorno when they were still preoccupied with opposing British empiricism: >18) Theodor Adorno was a leading professor at the Frankfurt School of Social Research in Germany, founded by the British Fabian Society. A collaborator of twelve-tone formalist and British intelligence operative, Arnold Schonberg, Adorno was brought into the United States in 1939 to head up the Princeton Radio Research Project. The explicit aim of this project, as stated in Adorno's Introduction to the Sociology of Music, was to program a mass "musical" culture that would steadily degrade its consumers. Punk-rock is, in the most direct sense, the ultimate result of Adorno's work. 19) Theodor Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music (New York: Seabury Press, 1976). 20) Paul Hirsch, "The Structure of the Popular Music Industry: The Filtering Process by Which Records are Preselected for Public Consumption." Institute for Social Research's Survey Research Center Monograph, 1969.< Otherwise, Adorno and the Frankfurt School are not mentioned at all in Dope, Inc., which is not surprising considering that mainly connections related to the British elites were explored in the book, and the Frankfurt School had very few if any such connections. If we compare this short anecdote on Adorno in Dope, Inc. to the section The Establishment Goes Bolshevik: "Entertainment" Replaces Art in the first Fidelio article, we'll notice that the plotline of the first Fidelio article can be imagined to be built around this earlier short anecdote. I don't know definitely whether it was, but at least it could have been. From this anecdote, we can see that the LaRouchians seem to hypothesize a sequence 1) starting from the alleged rebellious intention of Adorno ("to program a mass 'musical' culture that would steadily degrade its consumers") to 2) his alleged development of suitable methods during WWII while working for research projects on the mass media ("in 1939 to head up the Princeton Radio Research Project") and further to 3) the alleged transmission of Adorno's rebellious vibes to the impressionable Boomer youngsters through the mass media tricks coauthored by Adorno. Voilà! A sinister intention, the development of suitable methods to carry it out and an apparently successful realization make the LaRouchian hypothesis of Adorno's devious conspiracy look superficially credible. When this three-part sequence had been rediscovered, the rest of Minnicino's work on the article may have simply consisted of gathering further evidence to make a convincing case around the three-part conspiratorial sequence. But of course, such cherry-picking of supporting facts from various sources can only improve the superficial credibility but not the real credibility of the hypothesis in view of alternative and more likely interpretations of Adorno's actions, which actually make all three parts in this sequence extremely suspect from the point of view of a neutral observer. Apparently in the 1970s, the LaRouchians were researching anything and everything related to the British elites they hated. So let's make a guess. Maybe it was while they were browsing sources related to Britain's role in counterculture, mass psychology and musical addiction when they first bumped into Hirsch's report. They may have noticed via Hirsch's remarks that the Princeton Radio Research Project with Adorno was one of the earliest research projects into the effects of the mass media on audiences, and as Adorno's other works were obviously influential in the academia, the LaRouchians may have suspected that Adorno must be a British-connected scholar worth mentioning. Indeed, Adorno had spent a short time studying at Oxford, which must have had its fair share of Fabianists, and he had also started his stay in America by working for the Princeton Radio Research Project, whose approach might indeed be interpreted to be based on British empiricism which the LaRouchians hated. If the LaRouchians had had more interest in Adorno and the Frankfurt School back then, they would have noticed very soon that Adorno and the Frankfurt School didn't like British empiricism at all, and also didn't believe in the political approach of the Fabianists and other Social Democrats who were too tame to oppose bourgeois society. Let's continue with further guesses. When the Culture Wars and the LaRouche trial got the LaRouchians more interested in the Frankfurt School in the late 1980's, Minnicino may have rediscovered the short anecdote on Adorno in Dope, Inc., leading to some biographical research on Adorno and the Frankfurt School, which identified them as members of the anti-bourgeois, anti-metaphysical tradition started by Nietzsche rather than as British empiricists. After gathering interesting details of biographical information about them and about a few other anti-bourgeois philosophers and scholars mentioned by Bloom, whose involvement in the Nietzschean tradition had been doubly confirmed by those books that Minnicino had read while researching Adorno and the Frankfurt School, and tying these biographical details together with a LaRouchian conspiracy plotline, one finally gets the final product of the Fidelio articles. Those philosophers and scholars mentioned by Bloom (e.g. C. Wright Mills) who didn't reappear in the other books that Minnicino was browsing through, were probably just dropped from Minnicino's account as inconsequential. If we consider Bloom's book as a kind of attempted short list of the main culprits of the 1960s cultural rebellion and its aftermath, then Minnicino's account could be even a short list of a short list, explaining why so many other genuine intellectual influences on the 1960s cultural rebellion were omitted from Minnicino's account. I'm now able to make a wild guess regarding the order in which this biographical research may have proceeded: 1) After possibly reading Bloom's book, Minnicino may have then found the Adorno anecdote either in Dope, Inc. or in another unknown LaRouchian manuscript -> 2) Minnicino must have made further independent research, discovering the timeline and general idea of Western Marxism possibly by reading Martin Jay's book on the Frankfurt School called The Dialectical Imagination or maybe even by reading Martin Jay's book on Western Marxism called Marxism and Totality -> 3) Minnicino seems to have gathered many biographical details from Susan Buck-Morss's book The Origin of Negative Dialectics, which also emphasizes the link between Georg Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School -> 4) Minnicino also seems to have gathered some interesting details about Georg Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School from other books and biographies such as Michael Löwy's Georg Lukàcs - From Romanticism to Bolshevism. Susan Buck-Morss's book also includes on its page 34 a famous quote from Walter Benjamin, which might explain where Minnicino got his idea to consider the Frankfurt School as the original architect of later political correctness, even though it must be said that Walter Benjamin was hardly writing here about the same type of political correctness which later appeared in the American academia: >"... that the tendency of a work of literature can be politically correct only if it is also correct in the literary sense. That means that the tendency which is politically correct includes a literary tendency."< It's unlikely that my wild guess about the specific order in which the first Fidelio article was constructed could be accurate, but at least this type of sequence of events would make sense based on the textual components selected for the first Fidelio article. I suggest that readers now independently ponder other possible sequences of how Minnicino's work on that article may have proceeded. Maybe the LaRouchians had made some further research on the Frankfurt School between Dope, Inc. and the first Fidelio article, which Minnicino may have relied on while writing this text. Unfortunately, I still don't know Minnicino's exact sources, as his articles don't include a detailed bibliographical section. Whatever the exact lineage of how the LaRouchians had researched Adorno and the Frankfurt School, the LaRouchian explanation to the apparent discrepancy between the very marginal following of Western Marxist ideas in the 1940s, 1950s and the early 1960s compared to the huge scale of the mass rebellion after the mid-1960s seems to be the alienating dullness of the post-war mass media, which the LaRouchians presumed to be rigged by the Princeton Radio Research Project to brainwash the Boomer youngsters, who then allegedly started to act out their brainwashing in the late 1960s when they were old enough for mass demonstrations. To disprove this LaRouchian explanation, one would need to demonstrate the non-existence of any Frankfurt School influence on how programs were selected by the American mass media in the 1940s, 1950s and the early 1960s. I expect this kind of demonstration to be possible either by making a statistical analysis of representative radio and TV playlists from these decades (thus disproving the existence of a dissemination channel to carry out subversion) or by finding very specific biographical data about Adorno between 1939 and 1941 to prove that he was not trying to achieve mass alienation while working on the Princeton Radio Research Project (thus disproving his intention to carry out subversion through the mass media). The first Fidelio article also lists as alleged alternative dissemination channels of the Frankfurt School ideas: 1) the involvement of many members of the Frankfurt School in WWII-related US government projects, 2) the popularity of the book Eros and Civilization after 1955, 3) the Frankfurt School's possible influence on some of their friends who were nationally popular scholars in other fields, as well as 4) Herbert Marcuse's guru status among the New Left. These four dissemination channels supposedly fermented the Boomer youth towards the 1960s cultural rebellion with their combined effect. Surprisingly, the easiest one of these dissemination channels to refute may be the significance of Marcuse's guru status by noting that Marcuse wasn't widely known until his book One Dimensional Man in 1964 (see Panton's text above), i.e. a few years after the start of the rebellion in 1960-1961, and that he only achieved a prominent guru status when the rebellion was already peaking in 1966-1968. To refute the potential dissemination channel of Western Marxist ideas through bestselling books written by friends of the Frankfurt School, one would need to demonstrate that these bestsellers did not contain any fundamentally Western Marxist themes, even though they may have contained some remotely similar themes from other sources. To refute the potential dissemination channel via the book Eros and Civilization, one would need to research how wide was its audience and how deeply did the Western Marxist themes in it such as alienation and reification affect its readers. To refute the possible dissemination channel through the everyday work of those members of the Frankfurt School who were working in US government projects, one would need to demonstrate that these were one-off projects without any lasting effect on how their customers, especially Boomer kids, or the US government agencies themselves perceived the national situation. One could easily dismiss Minnicino's Fidelio articles as typical LaRouchian conspiracy theories, and it seems intuitively possible to disprove his claims, but only by carrying out the refutations of every possible dissemination channel one by one as outlined above would we reliably know if disproving Minnicino's claims is really as easy as it seems. The Free Congress Foundation, on the other hand, is a traditionally conservative organization with occasional Christian overtones, so it's a bit puzzling why they seem to have used the LaRouchian account of the Western Marxists as a source for their e-book (e.g. the first Fidelio article is explicitly listed in the e-book chapter Further Readings on the Frankfurt School), as one would imagine there'd be an ideological mismatch between the LaRouchians and the FCF. So, even though the Free Congress Foundation retains in its e-book many facts identical to those in Minnicino's Fidelio articles, and similarly hypothesizes the blueprint formed by Western Marxist texts to be the main cause leading to the 1960s cultural rebellion, the supposed motive of the conspiracy has been changed in the FCF account. As already stated above, Minnicino's articles are based on the LaRouchian way of presenting history as a struggle between competing philosophical and intellectual movements, explaining why he wants to hypothesize the main motive of this conspiracy to be simply subversion as usual, which the LaRouchians consider as the standard operating procedure of the devious elitists on the dark side of the struggle. On the other hand, the Free Congress Foundation seems to emphasize Western Marxism as the main cause of the 1960s cultural rebellion for the more calculating reason of wanting to stick the Marxist label to the rebellious ideas of the 1960s in order to discredit them by association. This might also explain why the Free Congress Foundation completely omits the Nietzsche and Heidegger part of Minnicino's second Fidelio article. It is ideologically more suitable for the Free Congress Foundation to present the 1960s cultural rebellion as a successor of Marxism, which many of their potential readers already hate. LaRouche, on the other hand, started as a rational Marxist, so it may be more convenient for the LaRouchians to downplay the influence of the original rational Marxism on the 1960s counterculture and instead present its alleged culprits including the Frankfurt School as successors of Nietzschean nihilism. Both the LaRouchians and the FCF have a piece of truth regarding the intellectual influences on the Frankfurt School, as can be verified in George Friedman's book The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School where he presents both Nietzsche (like the LaRouchians did) and Marx (like the FCF did) among the basic influences on the Frankfurt School, but on the other hand, paints a view of the Frankfurt School as being mostly a child of its time, i.e. pessimists typical of the cultural avant-garde of the 1920s, whose worldview may be best understood by reading Spengler's apocalyptic dark thoughts about the state of the Western civilization. Even without presenting a comprehensive list of their possible influences, George Friedman manages to explain the Frankfurt School's bent on tireless criticism by the non-actionable pessimistic situation they were facing since the 1920s as well as by the Bilderverbot thinking they had inherited from some of their lesser influences such as Judaism, which discouraged them from outlining any utopia and left them only criticism as their main tool. I would like to add that despite the Vietnam War and the nuclear threat, the 1960s was a decade with lots of optimism as well due to a rising economy and hopes of an affluent utopia, thus raising the question of social justice to the forefront, i.e. how to share the surplus. This was an entirely different problematic than Spengler's pessimism regarding the state of the Western civilization, as the Boomer rebels of the 1960s considered the Western civilization as too strong and dominating rather than too weak. This mismatch of zeitgeists seems to refute any claim that the pessimists of the 1920s, who feared the Western civilization was descending into cultural and possibly political barbarism, could have plausibly planned the worldview of the 1960s when optimists were crusading fearlessly for social justice to share the endless surplus they expected to come. One of the Free Congress Foundation writers Gerald Atkinson even seems to confess in his text Who Placed American Men in a Psychic 'Iron Cage?' Part II the inherent weakness of trying to prove that the Western Marxists of the 1920s could have planned a cultural rebellion in such a distant era as the 1960s: >"If such a core group could be found, then it would still depend on your personal "world view" as to its significance. If you believe in the "blind watchmaker," that is, cosmic and social events are random and guided only by the laws of nature, "evolutionary" in the sense of competing with other random events for survival in a stochastic world, you may choose to believe that such a core group was meaningless--it may have existed but so what? It may have been only one of an uncountable number of such groups in recorded history. And you may believe that any particular group's "window of opportunity" to influence future generations was passed by and did little to influence the course of America's history. If you believe, instead, that nature has a design, that all events can be connected and man can make sense out of many of them if he only "connect all the dots." then you may believe that this small core group has great influence, even today, in American Culture. If this is your world view, you may (but not necessarily) even believe in a "conspiracy" and "conspirators" which and who aim to alter our culture on a vast scale. It is clear, however, that irrespective of one's world view, it is informative to at least know of such a core group, what it believed, what it set out to accomplish, and what methods it followed to take action on its beliefs."< Excerpted from: http://www.newtotalitarians.com/PsychicIronCagePartII.html It is also somewhat ironic that the Free Congress Foundation decided to hypothesize that the 1960s with its return of street-level political activism could have been caused by the Frankfurt School's theories, which were especially marked in their belief that the time was ripe to discontinue the link between theory and revolutionary action and dedicate themselves to thinking about thinking, i.e. pure philosophical theory, as emphasized in George Friedman's book. Of the Frankfurt School core persons, only Herbert Marcuse could be considered as a partial supporter of the action-oriented New Left flavour of the late 1960s, and even Marcuse appears to have been more of an interpreter of events rather than their architect (e.g. see the following citation in Panton's text above: "Marcuse is a stimulant to fantasy and action, not the architect of a system. He is a writer of articles and manifestos, not an organiser of reality."). This irony rises the question of whether Minnicino and the Free Congress Foundation might even have some sinister motives when deciding to present the 1960s cultural rebellion and its repercussions as a consummation of Western Marxist texts. Similar suspicions have been raised, for example, by Bill Berkowitz of the SPLC in his article Reframing the Enemy: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport...icle.jsp?aid=53 As we have seen, there are indeed some puzzling plotholes in the FCF's historical account, which legitimizes healthy skepticism about the real motives of the Free Congress Foundation. I myself wonder why the FCF omitted from their e-book every well-known non-Marxist influence on the Western Marxists of the 1920s, which the FCF must have been aware of themselves, at least if they had read all the books listed in Chapter VI (Further Readings on the Frankfurt School) of the e-book. Why aren't, for example, Nietzsche, Kant, Husserl and Schopenhauer mentioned as significant influences on the Frankfurt School? Why aren't Nietzsche, Fichte, Dilthey, Weber and Simmel mentioned as significant influences on Georg Lukàcs? Why isn't Croce mentioned as a significant influence on Antonio Gramsci? Or similarly, one can ask why are the Western Marxists emphasized in the FCF e-book as the main theoretical influence on the New Left of the 1960s? Why aren't other well-known theoretical influences such as C. Wright Mills, Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon mentioned at all? It looks like the FCF has wanted to present the 1960s cultural rebellion against pre-1960s bourgeois society as an endeavour of the Western Marxists only, despite the numerous scholars from very diverse political orientations who were actually involved in such criticism. And is there any degree of connection between what the cultural rebels have been doing in their ivory towers and how laymen have been trained by the establishment to think about the Western society? In the words of Berkowitz: >"But can a theory like this, built on the words of long-dead intellectuals who have little discernible relevance to normal Americans' lives, really fly?"< That's exactly what makes the FCF conspiracy theory suspect. However, Berkowitz seems to indirectly raise the possibility that as most of the demonized characters in the FCF-constructed plotline happen to be Jewish, there might be a hidden anti-semitist motive behind the FCF plotline: >"Like Jews in general, the Frankfurt School makes a convenient antagonist — one that is basically seen as antithetical to all things American."< On page 2 of: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport...icle.jsp?aid=53 The occasional flirtations of some FCF members with genuine anti-semitists make this a very relevant question. Even more so when we remember that some critics of the LaRouchians, the possible origin of the current Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, have made the rather extreme accusation that the LaRouchians are in their general approach really blaming Jews either by code language or indirectly whenever they are demonizing the British elites. Anyway, let's see if the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory could be considered anti-semitist. To be honest, this is not the type of question I personally like to discuss, as it can awaken undesirable passions, but it's hard to avoid in case one wants to explore all the possibilities why the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory was constructed in the first place, so I hope to put an end to these suspicions with a neutral analysis. The available evidence would seem to suggest that Minnicino's both Fidelio articles and the FCF e-book were not constructed to arouse anti-semitism. The main evidence is that a genuine anti-semitist would certainly have included Ernst Bloch and maybe some other pre-WWII Jewish Marxists in the account. In the case of Minnicino, his pinning the Frankfurt School on the Nietzschean tradition is something that a genuine anti-semitist would hardly do, as for an anti-semitist, it would be more profitable and even easier to pin the Frankfurt School on Marx and his Jewish background. Besides, the second Fidelio article explicitly aims to thoroughly discredit many significant supporters of Nazism. In the case of the Free Congress Foundation, however, its pinning the Frankfurt School on Marx instead of Nietzsche doesn't similarly refute the accusation of anti-semitism automatically. The FCF version of the conspiracy theory also doesn't demonize the Nazis in the same manner as the second Fidelio article did. So is the FCF version specifically constructed to allow an anti-semitist reading? Apparently the answer is no, as the FCF have made an addition of their own to the plotline by including non-Jewish Antonio Gramsci alongside Georg Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School. A fanatical anti-semist certainly wouldn't have done so, as this choice completely eradicates any possibility to present the 1960s cultural rebellion as an all-Jewish plot. And why add one more character out of the blue anyway unless the goal is to attempt to present a more comprehensive account than in previous versions? Besides, Allan Bloom seems to have already outlined on page 225 of his book The Closing of the American Mind in 1987 the concept which the FCF has later named Cultural Marxism, so this was not really an original invention by the FCF as Berkowitz may have thought: >"In general, sophisticated Marxism became cultural criticism of life in the Western democracies."< http://www.amazon.com/Closing-American-Min...m/dp/0671657151 The role of Gramsci in the FCF version of the plotline appears to originate in some books and articles on the Culture Wars from the early 1990s, some of which are also listed in the Notes section for Chapter Four in Patrick Buchanan's book The Death of the West. Buchanan especially lists Christopher Lasch's book The True and Only Heaven there, and it's very illuminating to find out that Lasch's historical account of how the writings of certain Western Marxist philosophers (including Gramsci) influenced him in the late 1960s is extremely similar in its style, content and choice of philosophers to the FCF plotline. Therefore, I suspect that Lasch's book, which was well-known during the Culture Wars, may have been one of the most important sources for the FCF alongside Minnicino's first Fidelio article. In the following paragraph found on page 28 of Lasch's book, one can clearly see the similarity to the FCF plotline: >"By the late sixties, I thought of myself as a socialist, attended meetings of the Socialist Scholars Conference, and took part in several attempts to launch a journal of socialist opinion. Somewhat belatedly, I plowed through the works of Marx and Engels. I read Gramsci and Lukàcs, the founders of "Western Marxism." I immersed myself in the work of the Frankfurt school - Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse. Their synthesis of Marx and Freud - to whom I had been introduced in the first place by Marcuse and Norman O. Brown, who wanted to put psychoanalysis at the service of social theory - struck me as enormously fruitful, providing Marxism for the first time with a serious theory of culture. The tradition of English Marxism, as articulated by Raymond Williams and E P Thompson, appealed to me for the same reason. It repudiated economic determinism and the mechanistic distinction between economic "base" and cultural "superstructure." It showed that class consciousness is the product of historical experience, not a simple reflection of economic interest."< http://www.amazon.com/True-Only-Heaven-Pro...s/dp/0393307956 The amazing similarity of Christopher Lasch's account of his intellectual influences in the late 1960s to the FCF plotline seems to give the FCF a credible bona fide exlanation why their choice of characters in the plotline includes only some specific theorists of Western Marxism and not many other well-known influences on the Boomer rebels. On the other hand, when we remember that the LaRouchian version of the conspiracy theory may have had its modest origin as a minor anecdote in the book Dope, Inc. in an anti-British context long before political correctness and long before the Frankfurt School's alleged conspiracy were discussed at all, this lineage of how their plotline was constructed seems to give the LaRouchians a bona fide explanation for their choice of characters as well. Combined with Minnicino's explicit demonization of Nazism and the FCF's addition of Gramsci, we seem to have totally refuted Berkowitz's innuendos regarding the possible anti-semitist overtones of the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, even though it must be said that this conspiracy theory regrettably seems to have later become a favourite of many genuine anti-semitists. Finally, it should be noted that Perry Anderson's book Considerations on Western Marxism was apparently the original text on Western Marxism which put the concept into its current chronological form, i.e. provides a somewhat similar historical account to that presented above leading from the 1920s cultural rebellion of scholars to the 1960s cultural rebellion by the Boomer masses. The FCF's view of Western Marxism and its chronological timeline is actually similar enough to Perry Anderson's interpretation that I suspect the FCF may have used either his book directly or some of its elaborations as one of their sources. So we seem to have both supporters and adversaries of Western Marxism trying to pin the 1960s cultural rebellion on this tradition. What we are still lacking is a thorough analysis of whether the 1960s cultural rebellion was noticeably affected in its incubation phase 1960-1964 by any type of earlier philosophical theory at all or whether it was just improvised from its very start. For example, Ayn Rand seems to pin the 1960s cultural rebellion on the long-term general direction of philosophy in the Western world. In her text The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion', Ayn Rand was interested in discovering the philosophical background of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, which was one of the main events in the development of the New Left in the early 1960s. Her findings seem to be one of the best sources for answering the question about the philosophical background of the early student movement, and also form a good counterpoint to the historical accounts above. Here are a few illuminating excerpts: >"The core in this case, however, is not the disciplined Communist party, but a heterogeneous group of radical sects." Professor Petersen lists the various socialist, Trotskyist, communist, and other groups involved. Some of these activists "who liken their movement to a 'revolution', want to be called radicals. Most of them however, prefer to be called 'organizers.'" "Theirs is a sort of political existentialism", says Paul Jacobs ... The central theme and basic ideology of all the activists is: anti-ideology. "Their taste in reading runs more to Sartre than to Marx." "'These students don't read Marx', said one Berkeley Free Speech Movement leader. 'They read Camus.'" For a more sophisticated audience, the socialist magazine The New Leader (Dec. 21, 1964) offers a Marxist-Freudian appraisal, ascribing the rebellion primarily to "alienation" (quoting Savio: "Somehow people are being separated off from something") and to "generational revolt" ("Spontaneously the natural idiom of the student political protest was that of sexual protest against the forbidding university administrator who ruled in loco parentis").< This piece of research appeared in Ayn Rand's collection The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, which also has many other insightful writings on the topic of the New Left and their worldview. http://www.amazon.com/New-Left-Anti-Indust...n/dp/0452011256 These texts have been republished with additional new texts by Peter Schwartz in a new book called Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution. http://www.amazon.com/Return-Primitive-Ant...n/dp/0452011841 Ayn Rand's views are very helpful to emphasize that the spirit of the so-called cultural rebellion of the 1960s may really have been partly transmitted to the Boomer kids through mainstream education, thus not being so rebellious after all. Ayn Rand seems to pursue this interpretation especially in her text The Cashing-In: The Student 'Rebellion' where her exact words to describe the rebellious students are "epistemological agnosticism, avowed irrationalism, ethical subjectivism". She also gives there a proper bashing of the emptiness of existentialism, which she pins on the tradition of Kant's dichotomy. Leonard Peikoff has also written about the link between irrationalism in the pre-WWII era and in the 1960s in his book The Ominous Parallels: The End of Freedom in America (1982). http://www.amazon.com/Ominous-Parallels-En...a/dp/081282850X The page numbers given below are taken from a later edition of this book called The Ominous Parallels: A Brilliant Study of America Today. http://www.amazon.com/Ominous-Parallels-Br...r/dp/0452011175 Peikoff writes on pages 278-279 about the Frankfurt Institute (sic) and its alleged influence on the rebellious American intellectuals (circa 1970). He even mentions Herbert Marcuse's name, so it's possible that Allan Bloom, Michael Minnicino or the Free Congress Foundation may have taken further inspiration from Peikoff's book while writing their own versions. More specifically, Peikoff takes a look on pages 198-201 at the Weimar cult mentality, which may be remotely reminiscent of the New Age mentality of the 1960s. Peikoff also takes a look at Freud's influence on the prevalent irrationalism in the pre-WWII era, which is another topic common to most conspiracy theories surveyed above. For the general intellectual atmosphere in Weimar Germany, see p. 198. >"Weimar Germany was awash with mystic and occult crazes of every kind, including medieval revivals, Orientalist sects, anthroposophy, theosophy, etc. It was also awash with the social concomitants of such crazes."< The Frankfurt School is mentioned for the first time in the book on p. 201. >"The erudite theoreticians and social commentators of the Frankfurt Institute were formulating a new "Western" Marxism melding the socialism of Marx with the idealism of Hegel and the sex theories of Freud."< The Frankfurt School is also mentioned in passing on page 205 while listing the various irrational movements of the 1920s. >"Man's science, they say, requires the dismissal of values (Max Weber), his feelings require the dismissal of science (Heidegger), his society requires the dismissal of the individual (the Frankfurt Institute), his individuality requires liberation from logic (the Bauhaus) ..."< And finally, the alleged link of these irrational movements of the 1920s to many American intellectuals of the 1960s can be found on pages 278-279 with apparent similarities to Allan Bloom's later book The Closing of the American Mind. >If concepts lead to paralysis, there is another source of knowledge: passion. If the mind of the West has failed, there is a superior guide: the religions of the East. The quiet voices of the more civilized skeptics had prepared the way. They began to be drowned out by their natural successors. The successors included the Existentialists, the Zen Buddhists, and a number of figures inspired by Weimar Germany's Frankfurt Institute, who sought to fuse Hegel, Marx, and Freud. Typically, the fusers affirmed a nonmaterial dimension, denounced Aristotelian logic, and upheld the cognitive powers of an emotion-oriented faculty, such as "phantasy." Time magazine summarized the trend among American intellectuals eloquently, in a 1972 essay titled 'The New Cult of Madness: Thinking as a Bad Habit.' "'Reason' and 'logic,'" the essayist reported, "have, in fact, become dirty words - death words. They have been replaced by the life words `feeling' and 'impulse.'"< Excerpted from: http://www.amazon.com/Ominous-Parallels-Br...r/dp/0452011175 The name of Herbert Marcuse, as well as Peikoff's own hypothesis about the cause of the 1960s cultural rebellion can also be found on page 279. >It was a recapitulation in the New World of the history of nineteenth-century European philosophy. The standard textbook progression was reenacted, in mini-terms. "From Kant to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche" became "from Dewey to Norman O. Brown and Herbert Marcuse." The men and women growing up in the 1920s and '30s, the first large-scale group of Americans to be reared in Progressive schools, had been rendered incapable of offering their future children any intellectual guidance. As it happened, their children, growing up in the postwar years, were the first generation to be exposed to the new irrationalist trend. These children became the rebels of the sixties.< In view of this very interesting historical account by Leonard Peikoff, it seems possible that there may indeed have existed some type of link between the irrational movements of Weimar Germany and the last stages of the American cultural rebellion in the late 1960s. However, what is still lacking in all these historical accounts we have seen above is an explanation of which were the original intellectual influences on the Civil Rights movement, the Anti-War movement and the campus rebellions of the early 1960s (sit-ins, Freedom Rides, left-wing gay activism, early feminism, environmentalism spurred by Rachel Carson's book The Silent Spring, events against nuclear weapons, anti-war demonstrations, beatniks, protests against the strict dating rules at university dormitories, The Port Huron Statement, the founding of the SDS, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, teach-ins), which can't be explained by Western Marxism, as this tradition was relatively unknown in the early 1960s. One would assume that the New Left had already found its specific form and had chosen many or even most of its political themes by the mid-1960s before the re-issued books written by the cultural critics of Weimar Germany such as the Frankfurt School began to interest the New Left in the late 1960s. Peikoff's account seems to differ from the historical accounts of Bloom, Minnicino and the FCF in that it traces the spirit of the 1960s cultural rebellion to a larger ideological shift on the rational-irrational axis instead of to any single philosophical tradition. Peikoff's approach may yet prove to be a more credible explanation than Allan Bloom's and the LaRouchians' possible overemphasis on the Nietzschean philosophical tradition in general and the FCF's overemphasis on the Frankfurt School in particular. To conclude, let's recall what we have done in this analysis. I hope that I was able to take a relatively objective look at the hard evidence regarding the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, its notable plot holes as well as the notable weaknesses in one of its leading criticisms which blamed it for anti-semitism. I pointed out that the theoretical influences on the early New Left in 1960-1964 haven't been identified satisfactorily in most texts, and the formative power of these early influences compared to the later influences such as the Frankfurt School may in the end decide whether the Western Marxists can be credibly blamed for the 1960s cultural rebellion.

Integration has several usages. It is noticing similarities, and then uniting them as in forming concepts from implicit concepts It is preserving unity and consistency by rejecting contradictions It is accumulation of parts (or memories etc.) over time which forms a sum, or a whole which is more than the sum. It is inducing abstractions (such as causation) from observations "The process of thinking . . . is the process of defining identity and discovering causal connections." is an essentialized version. There are lots of other things that are thinking but those two are the cause of, or a result of, or equivalent to other processes of thought.

Hi, in the Ayn Rand lexicon, it says about thinking: "the process of thinking is defining identity and discovering causal connections." It goes on to say in another entry that thinking is the process of identification (like the first entry) and integration (this I don't know if it's like the first entry). So, my question is, what is thinking aside from defining identity? I don't understand discovering causal connections or integration. Any help is welcome. Thanks

Here is a fresh link to the Free Congress Foundation (the FCF) e-book: http://www.freecongress.org/centers/cc/pcessay1-3.aspx For another version of the same historical account, see Gerald Atkinson's article What is the Frankfurt School?: http://www.newtotalitarians.com/FrankfurtSchool.html According to the bibliographical footnotes in this Gerald Atkinson's article, there exists an even earlier historical account written in 1996 by Raymond Raehn (Critical Theory: A Special Research Report, 1 April 1996), which I suspect is similar to Raehn's Chapter II in the e-book. I originally read this conspiracy theory a couple years ago, and have ever since been interested to know how much of the FCF e-book is true. Now I finally had enough time to research this question. The basic claim of the e-book seems to be that the original first generation of the Frankfurt School and some related philosophers and scholars from the 1920s (including Georg Lukàcs, Antonio Gramsci and Walter Benjamin) influenced by Hegelian Marxism (i.e. the Western Marxists as they later came to be called) were the planners of the New Left of the 1960s. The e-book moreover claims that the subversive ideas of the New Left, which had supposedly been deviously planned by these 1920s philosophers and scholars, even spread further in Western societies as supposedly intended from the very start, and then spawned many politically correct successor movements in the academia, education and mass media, now even totally dominating the political thinking of the elites. According to my own very superficial research, the connection between the Western Marxists of the 1920s and the successor movements of the New Left since the 1960s seems to be much looser than claimed in the e-book. Especially, there may not be any causality, in the sense that the Western Marxists of the 1920s did not cause the youth rebellion of the 1960s. The New Left and other such student and youth movements had already reached a critical mass in the early 1960s (the sheer momentum of which may have lead into a large-scale youth rebellion without much need for planners) before they had had time to find out about the theories of Western Marxism, which mostly became available as new editions and translations of books and article collections no sooner than in the late 1960s or early 1970s. To prove the claims made in the e-book, one would have to demonstrate how the Western Marxist ideas, which were in the 1940s and 1950s mostly available only in manuscripts, small-edition journals and, even in the best case, books published in German, French or Italian, found their way into the hands of Boomer youth cadres. Besides, even if the availability of Western Marxist texts in the early 1960s could be demonstrated, there remains the even larger plot hole of where did these Boomer youth cadres get the instant understanding needed to ponder the very difficult scholarly questions in these works. I suppose it would take many years or even as long as a decade of full-time study to get acquainted with the problematics tackled by Western Marxism, which was obviously beyond the understanding of most twenty-something radicals and definitely beyond the understanding of all teenagers of the 1960s. The numerous anti-war demonstrations, other street actions and the experimental lifestyle of the 1960s radicals left them even less time to reach the scholarly prerequisites needed for a proper study of Western Marxism than other generations. By the way, this supposed link between the 1920s radicals and the 1960s radicals illustrates a general weakness in most historical accounts of political correctness. They are usually based on uncovering similar aspects of different movements from different eras, and then blindly assuming some kind of causality between them. Even the excellent article by Ellis mentioned above seems to be constructed in this manner. A better way to research the topic would be to try to disprove potential links between movements, for example, by demonstrating that a movement didn't have enough time and other resources to be influenced by another movement. In my opinion, disproving is a more sound method of research than to go looking for compatible evidence to support a hypothesis. There was actually one influential book called The Authoritarian Personality co-authored by Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt School which was available in English already in the early 1950s, but it is dubious whether this kind of mainstream empirical research can be called Western Marxism, even when motivated by goals compatible with a left-wing world view. And in 1955, there was, of course, the book Eros and Civilization by Herbert Marcuse, which revised Freud's theories to suit Socialist dreams of the perfectibility of man and also included a presentation of some aspects (like alienation and reification) of the Western Marxist criticism of bourgeois society, which was seen as unnecessarily dominated by toil and technology. But this book is not nearly as deep philosophically as the hard-core texts of Western Marxism such as Lukàcs's and Adorno's dialectical methods to expose the reification in capitalism and the bourgeois culture. So it seems that there were very few if any authentically Western Marxist texts widely available for the Boomer youth cadres to use as ready-made plans for their cultural rebellion in the early 1960s. Besides, most of the Western Marxists (Lukàcs, Adorno, Benjamin especially) come across in their biographies as stereotypical theoreticians, who were quite incompetent at planning ahead even in their personal choices, and therefore definitely unlikely to be able to plan an entire rebellion. I doubt that it's even possible to plan a rebellion by theoretical analysis only, without having advanced reality-based organizing skills to fuse into theories, which is a different talent altogether and which was either non-existent or atrophied in the Western Marxist ivory towers (see "Grand Hotel Abgrund"). So, in opposition to the view presented in the FCF e-book where the 1960s rebels were seen to be acting according to carefully crafted plans, I now personally believe that the 1960s rebellion arose spontaneously through chance meetings by socially active anti-authoritarian personalities of the Boomer generation at universities and cultural events. The type of discussion at such informal events can't obviously have been too philosophical, leading to a visionary and ethical rather than a theoretical outlook in the Boomer youth cadres. I also believe that the trendiness of this Boomer youth movement then attracted sellers of different types of rebellious paraphernalia, one merchandise of which was the reissue of books by obscure philosophers such as the Western Marxists of the 1920s for use as rebellious entertainment by the wannabe intellectuals of the New Left. It is, of course, undisputable that politically correct scholars of our times often use theories based on Western Marxism alongside theories inspired more directly by the 1960s to support their political goals towards an anti-capitalist and anti-modernist society, but I believe that the role of these theories is either purely as tools, as paraphernalia or as intellectual games. I suspect that politically correct scholars rarely if ever use these theories as math-like objective formulas to find the right choice, as the politically correct answer is almost always known beforehand, and what remains for the scholars is just to formulate an eloquent rationalization for the politically correct answer. If Western Marxism didn't exist at all, then its advocates could instead use some other rebellious way of thinking like, for example, the anti-bourgeois sentiments of the Surrealists or the Situationists for rationalizing the answers they have decided beforehand, as it probably doesn't really matter to them which theory they use as their tool, as long as it is rebellious enough to suit their identity. Subversion of traditional thinking patterns as an end in itself, in which politically correct scholars typically engage themselves for most of their time, would hardly change at all if they had never even heard about the Western Marxists of the 1920s. Revolutionary tradition is large enough to avoid their dependence on any particular branch of revolutionary theory. If there is any link between the Western Marxists of the 1920s and the New Left of the 1960s, then it may be simply that they were two different generations and movements of the long line of cultural rebels entrenched for centuries in art circles and more recently in the humanities departments at universities. In every new revolutionary movement, there is, of course, bound to be some reuse of ideas from previous generations of rebels. This kind of distant link which is based on the occasional reuse of of old ideas in a new context alongside a variety of new ideas sounds more plausible to me than claiming à la the FCF e-book that some Boomer kids managed to find little-known philosophical and sociological texts and then built a political movement by implementing their ideas. What I wrote above is, of course, just my own historical speculation, but I also have some interesting hard facts that I would like to discuss next. One thing that puzzled me about the FCF e-book was why the e-book only mentioned some arbitrary Western Marxist philosophers and scholars but not some other very well-known Western Marxists. For example, Karl Korsch and Ernst Bloch are mysteriously ignored in the e-book altogether, and I wonder why, especially as many 1960s rebels were interested to read Ernst Bloch in particular (according to his Wikipedia entry: "Bloch's work became very influential in the course of the student protest movements in 1968 and in liberation theology."). What I did was try to reverse-engineer the e-book into its original sources, and then find out the lineage of the textual components appearing in the e-book, in order to research whether the missing Western Marxists were ignored in the original sources, too, or whether they were dropped only from the e-book. I took a look at the presumed bibliography of the FCF e-book (found in the chapter Further Readings on the Frankfurt School), browsed through most of the texts listed there, and noticed that the Chapter II of the e-book written by Raymond Raehn is amazingly similar to an earlier article by the LaRouche-related writer Michael Minnicino, which was also mentioned in the e-book bibliography as a recommendation. I suspected that Raymond Raehn may have built his chapter II more or less directly on Minnicino's article, as this level of textual similarity can hardly be a coincidence. Here is a link to Minnicino's article, so that you can compare yourselves: Michael Minnicino: New Dark Age: Frankfurt School and Political Correctness http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_91-96..._frankfurt.html Minnicino's article is a typical example of what you can expect from LaRouchian historiography, whose style I already knew from some other articles on the Internet. They usually contain lots of well-researched facts and intellectual charisma, which are then unfortunately tied together into more or less fallacious conspiracy theories. The key to understanding LaRouchian historiography is apparently that they have a few favourite philosophers such as Plato, Leibniz and Schiller, whom they consider as geniuses and good guys, as well as many philosophers whom they hate passionately as bad guys such as Aristotle, the British empiricists, Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Western Marxists. I haven't yet found out the official opinion of the LaRouchians towards Marx and Hegel. Maybe this is because in the 1960s Lyndon LaRouche used to lead some kind of Marxist sect, so he may still have enough respect for Marx and Hegel from his younger years not to list them as repulsive philosophers. Anyway, many LaRouchians seem to think that the question of which philosophy is most prevalent in society is one of the determining factors of the ultimate success and survival of that society. Minnicino's article is a stereotypical LaRouchian text in this respect, as it deals directly with his support for the metaphysics of the most attractive German idealism (especially their views on creativity) as well as with the competition between the good philosophers including Plato, Leibniz and Schiller against the bad philosophers including the Frankfurt School and some other Western Marxists, who had sinned against Minnicino's LaRouchian sensibilities by criticizing German idealism. I wonder if Raymond Raehn of the Free Congress Foundation might have taken his basic plotline and historical facts from the Minnicino article, then finding out which books Minnicino had used as his sources (apparently these are not listed in the Fidelio article), reading these books himself, and finally leaving out of his version the most unbelievable causal claims of Minnicino's article like for example the claim about Western Marxism causing the dullness of mainstream mass media since the 1940s. It looks like Raehn's text might be a kind of disassembling, assessing and repackaging Minnicino's textual components with many independent additions to replace the content left out. But then again, simply by noting that Raymond Raehn and the FCF in general may have based their plotline and many of their facts on Minnicino's article doesn't tell us enough about the entire historical lineage of textual components found in the FCF e-book. If Minnicino's article was indeed a model for Raehn, then where did Minnicino get these textual components, as he certainly can't have made them up himself? Therefore, we need to reverse-engineer Minnicino's article, too, in order to find out the sources on which Minnicino's article directly and maybe the FCF e-book indirectly are based. If you take a look at the list of articles contained in the back issues of the Fidelio magazine at the Schiller Institute web site, you'll notice that there exists another article by Michael Minnicino and Webster Tarpley about the same topic called The Evil Philosophy Behind Political Correctness. Tarpley is a very famous conspiracy historian, so his mere co-operation with Minnicino suggests that we can indeed expect at least this second Fidelio article or maybe even both Fidelio articles, and thereby presumably, the FCF e-book, to be heavily implicated in the conspiracy genre. Unfortunately, the Schiller Institute web site doesn't have the text of this second Fidelio article, but I managed to find it in another online magazine. I don't know much about the background of this other magazine, but it is irrelevant, as the text in itself proves to be very illuminating: http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/polcorr.htm This second Fidelio article presents the Frankfurt School as well as the Western Marxist Georg Lukàcs, who were both also discussed in the first Fidelio article, as intellectual heirs of the continental anti-metaphysical philosophical tradition by Nietzsche and Heidegger that the LaRouchians love to hate. Moreover, the article begins by commenting positively on Allan Bloom's very famous book The Closing of the American Mind, which had gained a huge following in the five years before the publication of Minnicino's first Fidelio article. I took a look inside Bloom's book, and there is considerable textual similarity between his account of philosophies popular in the 1960s and the account by Minnicino. They both emphasize that the 1960s rebels were mainly interested in continental philosophy like that of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Marcuse and Lukàcs. Apparently, Minnicino had read Bloom's book, and made some independent further research about some of the philosophers that had been mentioned by Bloom. The LaRouchians are known for deep research, and I can imagine Minnicino piling up the best biographies of these philosophers (actually, Minnicino mentions "university bookstore" in the first Fidelio article), making notes on them, and writing a plotline based on them. Bloom probably didn't mean to imply that the continental tradition in general nor the Frankfurt School in particular were the direct cause of the general flavour of the 1960s rebellion, but Minnicino may have had his own reasons based on earlier LaRouchian historiography to hypothesize such a causality, even if it may not stand the test of common sense. Bloom also didn't have an incentive to attempt to compile a comprehensive list of intellectual influences of the 1960s rebellion, and his making an arbitrary short list of some known influences has probably carried on into every historical account inspired by Bloom, further distorting common knowledge about which forerunners were the main influences on the New Left. This second Fidelio article basically deals with the larger philosophical context of the anti-metaphysical philosophical tradition started by Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School related details of which are then discussed more closely in the first Fidelio article, so the second article might even be seen as a kind of starting point for approaching the first article. So I hypothesized a textual lineage (presented here as the most logical but not necessarily chronologically accurate lineage of the shared textual components): 1) Bloom's book -> 2) the second Fidelio article -> 3) the first Fidelio article -> 4) Raymond Raehn's historical research Critical Theory: A Special Research Report in 1996 -> 5) the FCF e-book -> 6) Chapter Four in Pat Buchanan's book The Death of the West. While trying to trace the lineage of textual components in the Fidelio articles, I bumped into an interesting connection between the first Fidelio article and an earlier LaRouchian publication. More specifically, the title of the first Fidelio article New Dark Age is almost identical to the title of an earlier LaRouchian book written by Carol White called The New Dark Ages Conspiracy, which was published in 1980. According to the Acknowledgements section of the book, "Lyndon LaRouche not only contributed the inspiration for this book, but provided outline which has proved an invaluable guide." So it seems that we can consider this book as a kind of semi-official LaRouchian view about the course of the 20th century. Because the title of the book was almost identical to the title of Minnicino's first Fidelio article, I expected to find an identical account of the role of Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Frankfurt School in the book. I was wrong. Even though the book predictably outlines the course of the 20th century as a great conpiracy by the British elites (presumably of the hated empiricist tradition), the names of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Marcuse and Lukàcs nor the Frankfurt School aren't mentioned even once in the entire book! It seems that LaRouche was then completely preoccupied with opposing the Anglo-American elites and their empiricist philosophy, and didn't bother too much about getting repulsed by other lesser evils such as the philosophical traditions started by Nietzsche. As explained in Wikipedia: "The New Dark Ages Conspiracy by Carol White, 1980 (ISBN 093348805X): alleges that a group of British intellectuals led by Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells attempted to control scientific progress in order to keep the world backward and more easily managed by Imperialism. In this conspiracy theory, Wells wished science to be controlled by some kind of priesthood and kept from the common man, while Russell wished to stifle it altogether by restricting it to a closed system of formal logic, that would prohibit the introduction of new ideas. This conspiracy also involved the promotion of the counterculture." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Views_of_Lynd...h.22_conspiracy Some significant change must have happened in the LaRouche movement between 1980 when The New Dark Ages Conspiracy book came out and 1992 when the first Fidelio article came out, getting the LaRouchians considerably more interested in opposing the anti-bourgeois, anti-metaphysical philosophical tradition started by Nietzsche and, on the other hand, opposing the repercussions of the 1960s counterculture more than ever before. The second Fidelio article gives us some hints about what may have caused this change by mentioning the publication of Bloom's book in 1987 and LaRouche's trial in 1988. As many of us know, the publication of Bloom's book in 1987 coincided with the start of so-called Culture Wars in America between the politically correct loony left of the academia against the loose alliance of Conservatives and supporters of Enlightenment liberalism. As the LaRouchians are known to be very intellectually oriented, they must have been aware of the main texts and developments of Culture Wars, as hinted in both Fidelio articles, probably inspiring LaRouchian historians to thoroughly research the course of the philosophical traditions started by Nietzsche, which they may have overlooked before. Another event which got the LaRouchians interested in the Frankfurt School in particular was the law suit against Lyndon LaRouche. The LaRouchians apparently suspected that their enemies were trying to use tricks from the Frankfurt School personality theory to make LaRouche look guilty. So both the general zeitgeist of the late 1980s as well as the pressing need caused by the trial may have been the specific reasons which spurred Minnicino to carry out independent research into the Frankfurt School and other Western Marxists, who had after all been already recognized by Bloom to have played some kind of role in the development of the loony left since the 1960s. One more significant event in the 1980s was the publication of the famous book The Aquarian Conspiracy by Marilyn Ferguson in 1980, which predicted the rise of a New Age type of mass movement based on Boomers immersed in the mystical visions of the 1960s. The LaRouchians took action against Ferguson's book, and probably intensified their research into the roots of the 1960s counterculture very soon after her book came out, as they considered it a harmful influence on Americans. The availability of such good sources about the history of counterculture might explain how Minnicino was able to make a very surprising analogy between the 1960s rebellion and the little-known Asconan counterculture of the early 1900s in both of his Fidelio articles. Maybe it was this very analogy which made Minnicino see the generation of the Western Marxists and other such cultural rebels of the early 1900s as the architects of the 1960s rebellion, instead of considering the 1960s rebellion as a spontaneous, improvised movement by the anti-authoritarian segment of Boomers. Minnicino's source regarding the Asconan counterculture remains unclear to me, but it might be Martin Green's book Mountain of truth: the counterculture begins, Ascona, 1900-1920 on Otto Gross and other Asconan cultists: Martin Green: The Asconan Idea in Politics http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ascona.html But why hypothesize any architects for the 1960s rebellion at all? I don't know. Maybe the possibility of a spontaneous birth of a mass movement would be quite antithetical to the LaRouchian view of history, which likes to believe that philosophical movements and their specific gurus shape history instead of spontaneous organization by the masses. I have presented above some wild guesses about the timeline of how the LaRouchians may have proceeded in carrying out their historical research into the Nietzschean and Frankfurt School traditions of philosophy and into the 1960s counterculture. But I would also like to speculate on which section of the first Fidelio article was considered the most important, i.e. the core of Minnicino's argument. Even though the book The New Dark Ages Conspiracy doesn't help us at all in answering this question, there exists an earlier book called Dope, Inc. published in 1978 about the alleged complicity of the British elites in the international drug trade. This book does contain one nearly identical textual component later found also in the first Fidelio article, and I suspect this very textual component is also supposed to be the core of Minnicino's plotline. On page 393 of Dope, Inc. (first edition) written by the U.S. Labor Party Investigating Team, i.e. the LaRouchians, we can find the following paragraphs: "The social theory of rock was elaborated by British agent and musicologist Theodor Adorno, who came to the United States in 1939 to head the Princeton University Radio Research Project. (18) Adorno writes 'In an imaginary but psychologically emotion-laden domain, the listener who remembers a hit song will turn into the song's ideal subject, into the person for whom the song ideally speaks. At the same time, as one of many who identify with that fictitious subject, that musical I, he will feel his isolation ease as he himself feels integrated into the community of "fans." In whistling such a song he bows to a ritual of socialization, although beyond this unarticulated subjective stirring of the moment his isolation continues unchanged .... The comparison with addiction is inescapable. Addicted conduct generally has a social component: it is one possible reaction to the atomization which, as sociologists have noticed, parallels the compression of the social network. Addiction to music on the part of a number of entertainment listeners would be a similar phenomenon.' (19) The Hit Parade is organized precisely on the same principles used by Egypt's Isis priesthood and for the same purpose: the recruitment of youth to the dionysiac counterculture. In a report prepared for the University of Michigan's Institute of Social Research, Paul Hirsch described the product of Adorno's Radio Research Project. (20) According to Hirsch, the establishment of postwar radio's Hit Parade 'transformed the mass medium into an agency of sub-cultural programming.'" In the Notes section on pages 379-380, the book Dope, Inc. gives us some hints about how the LaRouchians may have first bumped into Adorno, and how they viewed Adorno when they were still preoccupied with opposing British empiricism: "18) Theodor Adorno was a leading professor at the Frankfurt School of Social Research in Germany, founded by the British Fabian Society. A collaborator of twelve-tone formalist and British intelligence operative, Arnold Schonberg, Adorno was brought into the United States in 1939 to head up the Princeton Radio Research Project. The explicit aim of this project, as stated in Adorno's Introduction to the Sociology of Music, was to program a mass "musical" culture that would steadily degrade its consumers. Punk-rock is, in the most direct sense, the ultimate result of Adorno's work. 19) Theodor Adorno, Introduction to the Sociology of Music (New York: Seabury Press, 1976). 20) Paul Hirsch, "The Structure of the Popular Music Industry: The Filtering Process by Which Records are Preselected for Public Consumption." Institute for Social Research's Survey Research Center Monograph, 1969." Otherwise, Adorno and the Frankfurt School are not mentioned at all in Dope, Inc., which is not surprising considering that mainly connections related to the British elites were explored in the book, and the Frankfurt School had very few if any such connections. If we compare this short Adorno anecdote in Dope, Inc. to the section The Establishment Goes Bolshevik: "Entertainment" Replaces Art in the first Fidelio article, we'll notice that the plotline of the first Fidelio article can be imagined to be built around this earlier short anecdote. It explicitly mentions how the LaRouchians hypothesize a causality between the rebellious motive of Adorno ("to program a mass 'musical' culture that would steadily degrade its consumers"), his work during WWII in mass media research ("in 1939") and the supposed adoption of Adorno's rebellious vibes during the next decades by the impressionable Boomer youths through the mass media tricks coauthored by Adorno. Voilà! A sinister motive as well as the means and opportunity to implement it have been "demonstrated". Apparently in the 1970s, the LaRouchians were researching anything and everything related to the British elites they hated. So let's make a guess. Maybe it was while they were browsing sources related to Britain's role in counterculture, mass psychology and musical addiction when they first bumped into Hirsch's report. They may have noticed via Hirsch's remarks that the Princeton Radio Research Project with Adorno was one of the earliest research projects into the effects of the mass media on audiences, and as Adorno's other works were obviously influential in the academia, the LaRouchians may have suspected that Adorno must be a British-connected scholar worth mentioning. Indeed, Adorno had spent a short time studying at Oxford, which must have had its share of Fabianists, and he had also started his stay in America by working in the Princeton Radio Research Project, whose approach can indeed be considered to be based on the British empiricism that the LaRouchians hated. If the LaRouchians had had more interest in Adorno and the Frankfurt School back then, they would have noticed very soon that Adorno and the Frankfurt School didn't like British empiricism at all, and also despised the political approach of Fabianists and other Social Democrats who were too tame to oppose the bourgeois society. Let's continue with further guesses. When the Culture Wars and the LaRouche trial got the LaRouchians more interested in the Frankfurt School in the late 1980's, Minnicino may have rediscovered the Adorno anecdote from Dope, Inc., leading to some biographical research on Adorno and the Frankfurt School, which identified them as members of the anti-bourgeois, anti-metaphysical tradition started by Nietzsche rather than as empiricists. After gathering juicy bits of biographical information about a few anti-bourgeois philosophers and scholars mentioned by Bloom, whose involvement in the Nietzschean tradition was confirmed by the books that Minnicino had read while researching Adorno and the Frankfurt School, and tying these biographical facts together with a LaRouchian conspiracy plotline, one finally gets the final product of both Fidelio articles. Those philosophers and scholars mentioned by Bloom (such as C. Wright Mills) who didn't appear in the other books that Minnicino was browsing through, were probably just dropped from Minnicino's account as inconsequential. If we consider Bloom's book as a kind of attempted short list of the main culprits of the 1960s and its aftermath, then Minnicino's account is even a short list of a short list, explaining why so many other genuine intellectual influences on the 1960s rebellion were omitted from Minnicino's account. I now hesitate a wild guess regarding the order in which this biographical research may have proceeded: 1) After reading Bloom's book, Minnicino may have found the Adorno anecdote in Dope, Inc. or in another unknown LaRouchian manuscript -> 2) he must have made further independent research, discovering the timeline and general idea of Western Marxism possibly in Martin Jay's book on the Frankfurt School called The Dialectical Imagination or maybe even in Martin Jay's book on Western Marxism called Marxism and Totality -> 3) he seems to have gathered many biographical details from Susan Buck-Morss's book The Origin of Negative Dialectics, which also emphasizes the link between Georg Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School -> 4) Minnicino also seems to have gathered some more juicy details about Georg Lukàcs and the Frankfurt School from other books and biographies such as Michael Löwy: Georg Lukàcs - From Romanticism to Bolshevism. Susan Buck-Morss's book also includes on its page 34 a famous quote from Walter Benjamin, which might explain where Minnicino got his idea to consider the Frankfurt School as a planner of later political correctness, even though I personally think that Benjamin wasn't writing here about the same type of political correctness that later appeared in the American academia: "... that the tendency of a work of literature can be politically correct only if it is also correct in the literary sense. That means that the tendency which is politically correct includes a literary tendency." It's unlikely that my wild guess about the specific order in which the first Fidelio article was constructed could be right, but at least the order above would make sense based on the textual components selected for the first Fidelio article. Or maybe the LaRouchians had made some further research on the Frankfurt School between Dope, Inc. and the first Fidelio article, which Minnicino may have relied on while writing his article. Whatever the exact lineage of how the LaRouchians had researched Adorno and the Frankfurt School, the LaRouchian answer to the apparent discrepancy between the very marginal following of Western Marxist ideas in the 1940s and 1950s and the huge scale of the 1960s mass rebellion seems to be the alienating dullness of the post-war mass media, which the LaRouchians presumed to be rigged by the Princeton Radio Research Project to brainwash the masses. To disprove this LaRouchian explanation, one would need to demonstrate the non-existence of Frankfurt School influence on how programs were selected by the American mass media in the 1940s and 1950s. I'd expect this kind of demonstration to be possible either by making a statistical analysis of playlists from these decades (thus disproving the existence of means to carry out subversion) or by finding very specific biographical data about Adorno between 1938 and 1941 to prove that he was not trying to achieve mass alienation while working on the Princeton Radio Research Project (thus disproving a motive to carry out subversion). The first Fidelio article also lists 1) the involvement of many members of the Frankfurt School in war-time US government projects, 2) the popularity of the book Eros and Civilization after 1955, 3) the Frankfurt School's possible influence on some of their friends who were nationally popular scholars in other fields, as well as 4) Herbert Marcuse's guru status in the late 1960s among the New Left as other presumed dissemination channels of the Frankfurt School ideas, thus supposedly causing the 1960s rebellion with their combined effect. Surprisingly, the easiest one of these channels to refute may be the significance of Marcuse's guru status by noting that Marcuse wasn't widely known until his book One Dimensional Man in 1964, i.e. a few years after the start of the rebellion (circa 1960-1961 or even earlier), and he only achieved a prominent guru status when the rebellion was already peaking in 1966-1968. To refute the the potential dissemination of Western Marxist ideas through the bestsellers published by the friends of the Frankfurt School, one would need to demonstrate that these bestsellers do not contain any fundamentally Western Marxist components. To refute dissemination via Eros and Civilization, one would need to research how wide was its audience and how deeply did the Western Marxist components in it affect its readers. To refute the possibility of dissemination through those members of the Frankfurt School working in war-time US government projects, one would need to demonstrate that these were one-off projects without any lasting effect on how US government agencies perceived the national situation. One could easily dismiss Minnicino's articles as typical LaRouchian conspiracy theories, and it seems intuitively possible to disprove his claims, but only by carrying out the refutations of every possible dissemination channel as outlined above would we reliably know if disproving Minnicino's claims is really as easy as it seems. The Free Congress Foundation, on the other hand, is a traditionally conservative organization with occasional Christian overtones, so it's a bit puzzling why they seem to have used the LaRouchian account of the Western Marxists as one source for their e-book (the first Fidelio article is explicitly listed in the e-book section Further Readings on the Frankfurt School), as one would imagine there'd be an ideological mismatch between the LaRouchians and the FCF. The reason why a supposed causality from the Western Marxists into the 1960s rebellion, when presented in the conspiratorial style of the LaRouchians, also suits the propaganda purposes of traditional conservative organizers, may be explained by the following revealing remark by Bill Lind, which he has made in another article similar to the e-book: William S. Lind: What is Cultural Marxism http://www.restoringamerica.org/cultural_marxism.htm "But if the average American found out that Political Correctness is a form of Marxism, different from the Marxism of the Soviet Union but Marxism nonetheless, it would be in trouble. The next conservatism needs to reveal the man behind the curtain - old Karl Marx himself." (This article can also be found under the title Unmasking Political Correctness) So, even though the Free Congress Foundation retains in its e-book many facts identical to those in Minnicino's articles, and similarly hypothesizes a causality leading from the Western Marxists to the 1960s rebellion, the supposed motive of the Frankfurt School's conspiracy has been changed in the FCF account. As explained above, Minnicino's articles are based on the LaRouchian way of presenting history as a struggle between competing philosophical and intellectual movements, explaining why he wants to hypothesize such a causality, while the Free Congress Foundation seems to emphasize the same causality for the more calculating reason of wanting to stick the Marxist label to the 1960s rebellion in order to discredit it. This might also explain why the Free Congress Foundation completely omits the Nietzsche and Heidegger part of Minnicino's second Fidelio article. It is ideologically more suitable for the Free Congress Foundation to present the 1960s rebellion as a successor of the original Marxist philosophy, which most conservative voters already hate after having endured the Communist threat during the Cold War. LaRouche, on the other hand, started as a Marxist, so it may be more convenient for the LaRouchians to downplay the influences of the original Marxism on the 1960s counterculture and present the Frankfurt School as successors of Nietzsche. Both the LaRouchians and the FCF have a piece of truth regarding the intellectual influences on the Frankfurt School, as can be verified in George Friedman's book The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School where he presents both Nietzsche (like the LaRouchians did) and Marx (like the FCF did) among the basic influences on the Frankfurt School, but paints a view of the Frankfurt School as being mostly a child of its time, i.e. pessimists typical of the cultural avant-garde of the 1920s, whose world view may have been best illustrated by Spengler's apocalyptic dark thoughts about the state of the Western civilization. Even without presenting a comprehensive list of their potential influences, Friedman manages to explain the Frankfurt School's bent on tireless criticism by the non-actionable pessimistic situation they were facing since the 1920s as well as the Bilderverbot type of thinking style they had inherited from some of their lesser influences such as Judaism, which discouraged them from outlining any utopia and left them only criticism as their main tool. I would like to add that despite the Vietnam War and the nuclear threat, the 1960s was a decade with lots of optimism due to a rising economy and hopes of an affluent utopia, thus raising the question of social justice in the forefront, i.e. how to share the surplus. This was an entirely different problematic than the state of the Western civilization, which anyway seemed to the cultural rebels in the 1960s as too strong rather than too weak as it had for Spengler. This zeitgeist comparison of mine seems to disprove any claim that the pessimists of the 1920s, who feared the Western civilization was descending into cultural and possibly political barbary, could have plausibly planned the world view of the 1960s when optimists were crusading fearlessly for social justice to share the endless surplus to come. One of the Free Congress Foundation writers even confesses the inherent weakness of trying to prove that the Western Marxists of the 1920s could have caused a rebellion in such a distant era as the 1960s: Gerald L. Atkinson: Who Placed American Men in a Psychic 'Iron Cage?' Part II - The Thread of 'Cultural Marxism' http://www.newtotalitarians.com/PsychicIronCagePartII.html "If such a core group could be found, then it would still depend on your personal "world view" as to its significance. If you believe in the "blind watchmaker," that is, cosmic and social events are random and guided only by the laws of nature, "evolutionary" in the sense of competing with other random events for survival in a stochastic world, you may choose to believe that such a core group was meaningless--it may have existed but so what? It may have been only one of an uncountable number of such groups in recorded history. And you may believe that any particular group's "window of opportunity" to influence future generations was passed by and did little to influence the course of America's history. If you believe, instead, that nature has a design, that all events can be connected and man can make sense out of many of them if he only "connect all the dots." then you may believe that this small core group has great influence, even today, in American Culture. If this is your world view, you may (but not necessarily) even believe in a "conspiracy" and "conspirators" which and who aim to alter our culture on a vast scale. It is clear, however, that irrespective of one's world view, it is informative to at least know of such a core group, what it believed, what it set out to accomplish, and what methods it followed to take action on its beliefs." It is also somewhat ironic that the Free Congress Foundation decided to hypothesize that the 1960s with its return of street-level political activism could have been caused by the Frankfurt School's theories which were, according to Friedman's book, especially marked in their belief that the time was ripe to discontinue the link between theory and revolutionary action and dedicate themselves to thinking about thinking, i.e. pure philosophical theory. Of the Frankfurt School core personnel, only Herbert Marcuse could be considered as a supporter of the action-oriented New Left flavour of the late 1960s, and even Marcuse appears to have been more of an interpreter of events rather than their planner. This irony rises the question of whether Minnicino and the Free Congress Foundation might even have some sinister overtones when deciding to pin the 1960s rebellion and its repercussions on the Western Marxists. This possibility has been raised, for example, by Bill Berkowitz of the SPLC in his article Reframing the Enemy: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport...icle.jsp?aid=53 I can understand why Berkowitz is very suspicious about the real motives of the Free Congress Foundation. I myself wonder why the FCF omitted from their e-book most well-known non-Marxist influences on the Western Marxists of the 1920s, which the FCF must have been aware of in case they had themselves read through the books they have listed in the Further Readings on the Frankfurt School section. Why aren't, for example, Nietzsche, Kant, Husserl and Schopenhauer mentioned as influences on the Frankfurt School? Why aren't Nietzsche, Fichte, Dilthey, Weber and Simmel mentioned as influences on Georg Lukàcs? Why isn't Croce mentioned as an influence on Antonio Gramsci? Or similarly, why are the Western Marxists emphasized in the FCF e-book as the main influences on the New Left of the 1960s? Why aren't, for example, C. Wright Mills, Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon mentioned at all? It looks like the FCF has wanted to present the cultural criticism of the pre-1960s bourgeois society as a Western-Marxist-only endeavour despite the numerous scholars of all political orientations involved in such criticism. And is there even any degree of connection between what these cultural critics have been doing in their ivory towers and how non-experts see society? In the words of Berkowitz: "But can a theory like this, built on the words of long-dead intellectuals who have little discernible relevance to normal Americans' lives, really fly?" That's exactly what I'm wondering, too. Berkowitz seems to at least indirectly raise the possibility that as most of the demonized characters in the FCF-constructed plotline happen to be Jewish, there might be some hidden anti-semitist motives behind the plotline: "Like Jews in general, the Frankfurt School makes a convenient antagonist — one that is basically seen as antithetical to all things American. The school, says social psychology professor Richard Lichtman of the Berkeley-based Wright Institute, is "a convenient target that very few people really know anything about." "By grounding their critique in Marxism and using the Frankfurt School, [cultural conservatives] make it seem like it's quite foreign to anything American. It takes on a mysterious cast and translates as an incomprehensible, anti-American, foreign movement that is only interested in undermining the U.S.," he said. "The idea being transmitted is that we are being infected from the outside." "Not everyone who uses the cultural Marxism construct sees Jews in general at the center of the plot." The occasional flirtations of some FCF members with genuine anti-semitists make this a very relevant question. Even more so when we remember that some critics of the LaRouchians, the possible origin of the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, have made the accusation that the LaRouchians are in their general approach really blaming Jews either by code language or indirectly whenever they are demonizing the British elites. Anyway, let's see if the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory could be considered anti-semitist. To be honest, this is not the type of question I personally like to discuss, as it can awaken undesirable passions, but it's hard to avoid in case one wants to explore all the possibilities why the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory was constructed in the first place, so I hope to put the matter into rest with this neutral analysis. Available evidence would seem to suggest that Minnicino's both Fidelio articles and the FCF e-book were not constructed to arouse anti-semitism. The main evidence is that a genuine anti-semitist would certainly have included Ernst Bloch and maybe some other pre-WWII Jewish Marxists in the account. In the case of Minnicino, his pinning the Frankfurt School on the Nietzschean tradition is something that a genuine anti-semitist certainly wouldn't do, as for an anti-semitist, it would be more profitable and even easier to pin the Frankfurt School on Marx. Besides, the second Fidelio article explicitly aims to thoroughly discredit many intellectual influences of Nazism, which is something that an anti-semitist would hardly do. In the case of the Free Congress Foundation, however, its pinning the Frankfurt School on Marx instead of Nietzsche doesn't similarly refute the accusation of anti-semitism. The FCF version of the conspiracy theory also doesn't demonize the Nazis in the same manner as the second Fidelio article did. So is the FCF version specifically constructed to allow an anti-semitist reading? Apparently the answer is no, as the FCF have made an addition of their own to the plotline by including non-Jewish Antonio Gramsci alongside the Frankfurt School and Georg Lukàcs. A genuine anti-semist certainly wouldn't have done so, as this choice completely eradicates any possibility to present the 1960s rebellion as an all-Jewish plot, and why add one more character out of the blue anyway unless the goal is to attempt to present a reliable account? Besides, Allan Bloom seems to have already mentioned on page 225 of his book The Closing of the American Mind in 1987 the concept which the FCF likes to call cultural marxism: "In general, sophisticated Marxism became cultural criticism of life in the Western democracies." So the concept of cultural marxism may not be the FCF's own invention, as one might have easily imagined after reading Berkowitz's criticism of the concept. The role of Gramsci in the FCF version of the plotline appears to originate in some books and articles on Culture Wars from the early 1990s, some of which are also listed in the Notes section for Chapter Four in Pat Buchanan's book The Death of the West. Buchanan especially lists Christopher Lasch's book The True and Only Heaven there, and it's very illuminating to find out that Lasch's account of how the Western Marxist philosophers, including Gramsci, influenced him in the late 1960s is extremely similar in its style, content and choice of philosophers to the FCF plotline. Therefore, I suspect that Lasch's book, which was well-known during the Culture Wars, may actually have been one of the most important sources for the FCF alongside Minnicino's first Fidelio article. In the following paragraph found on page 28 of Lasch's book, one can clearly see the similarity to the FCF plotline: "By the late sixties, I thought of myself as a socialist, attended meetings of the Socialist Scholars Conference, and took part in several attempts to launch a journal of socialist opinion. Somewhat belatedly, I plowed through the works of Marx and Engels. I read Gramsci and Lukàcs, the founders of "Western Marxism." I immersed myself in the work of the Frankfurt school - Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse. Their synthesis of Marx and Freud - to whom I had been introduced in the first place by Marcuse and Norman O. Brown, who wanted to put psychoanalysis at the service of social theory - struck me as enormously fruitful, providing Marxism for the first time with a serious theory of culture. The tradition of English Marxism, as articulated by Raymond Williams and E P Thompson, appealed to me for the same reason. It repudiated economic determinism and the mechanistic distinction between economic "base" and cultural "superstructure." It showed that class consciousness is the product of historical experience, not a simple reflection of economic interest." http://www.amazon.com/True-Only-Heaven-Pro...53-2816707-3367 The similarity of Christopher Lasch's account of his main intellectual influences in the late 1960s to the FCF e-book, gives the FCF a credible bona fide for their choice of characters. On the other hand, when we remember that the LaRouchian version of the conspiracy theory may have had its modest origin as a minor anecdote in the book Dope, Inc. in an anti-British context long before political correctness and the Frankfurt School's alleged conspiracy were discussed at all, this lineage of how the plotline was constructed seems to give LaRouchians a bona fide explanation for their choice of characters as well. Combined with Minnicino's explicit demonization of Nazism and the FCF's addition of Gramsci, we seem to have totally refuted the criticism of Berkowitz regarding possible anti-semitist and other sinister overtones, even though it must be said that the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory regrettably seems to have later become a favourite of many genuine anti-semitists. Finally, it should be noted that Perry Anderson's book called Considerations on Western Marxism was apparently the original text on Western Marxism which put the concept into its current chronological form, i.e. provides a somewhat similar historical account to that presented above leading from the 1920s cultural rebellion of scholars to the 1960s cultural rebellion by the Boomer masses. The FCF's view on Western Marxism and its timeline is actually similar enough to Anderson's interpretation that I suspect the FCF may have used either his book directly or some of its elaborations as one of their sources. So we seem to have both supporters and adversaries of Western Marxism trying to pin the 1960s rebellion on this tradition. What we are still lacking is a thorough analysis about whether the 1960s rebellion was noticeably affected in its incubation phase by any type of earlier philosophical theory at all or whether it was just improvised from its very start. Ayn Rand was, of course, a critic of many aspects of the New Left, so I'd be interested to find out if she had some ideas regarding the philosophical background of the New Left of the early 1960s. To conclude, let's recall what we have done in this analysis. I hope that I was able to take a relatively objective look at the hard evidence regarding the Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, its notable plot holes as well as the notable weaknesses in one of its leading criticisms. I predict the question of deference to revolutionary tradition versus spontaneity by Boomers in the development of the 1960s rebellion to be the key to proving or disproving this conspiracy theory.

We can surely evaluate the validity of a statement, series of statements, or a theory by analyzing its internal consistency. It doesn't necessarily have to match up with my personal common sense or everyday experience, but it can't be inconsistent or contradictory. Posing 'a' wave as a fundamental "entity" is a false start. First one has to point at an entity, then illustrate what the entity does (such as waving). The wave theories I've read about either do not pose an entity or pose 'an' infinite entity (aether). Infinite entity is a contradiction, entities are finite, although one may travel incessantly along one without getting to an "end" (such as a mobius strip or a sphere). I agree with your points about Newton not positing a causal primary entity. Unfortunately his equations were so successful that the general trend in science from then on was the hunt for equations/relationships rather than a physical explanation. However Newton himself is an excellent example of why this is a bad path. His equation came from correlating observations, not from posing a physical mechanism. It was practically inevitable, then, that the equation would be overthrown by a new equation. Without a physical mechanism we are just throwing darts and hoping to get lucky enough to hit the right one, hoping our current set of observations are truly representative. Discovering equations and relationships in this way is good for technology and invention. In these areas you are primarily concerned with describing what happened (the apple fell this fast). You're not going to build any new gadgets by hypothesizing about what entity pulled the apple to the earth. Sure, *eventually* what you're hypothesizing *might* make it's way into a good mathematical model that leads to an invention, but someone will have already invented it by simply discovering the relationship itself by trial/error and mechanical tinkering. Imho the reification of space and time pulled physics away from, well, physics i.e. what is physical. Another step in the wrong direction, I think, was the rejection of de Broglie's hypothesis of a "kinked string" electron in favor of Born's "probability cloud". The latter is qualitatively no different than the planetary model. Whether the electron has a probability of being here or there is irrelevant, at one single instant we are staring at the planetary model. Ultimately the mathematics were no different, just as the mathematics were no different in relativity when space and time were reified. Physics just took another step away from the physical and another step toward the purely mathematical. In this sense I support the de Broglie/Bohm standpoint that Travis describes, but I can't help but think there is a way to do without the particles. Travis has more physics training than I, so perhaps he can explain the necessity of the particle. In the slit experiment, for example, if there is a continuous entity connecting the source atoms to every other atom on the screen, then an excitation of the source (a single photon) will excite all the connecting intermediaries. Each connection carries a signal a different distance depending on the angle. When the distance-traveled by two signals along this intermediary is equal to half the wavelength of the signal, the target atom is essentially both excited and unexcited. This gives us the observed diffraction lines. The particle is mainly used to justify quantization, but there's no reason to assume a structure for the intermediary that justifies quantization is impossible. Certainly the old "continuous luminiferous fluid aether" cannot physically justify quantization, however. Agreed, the issues you're raising echo my own thoughts. The physical mechanism by which I imagine gravity functioning is the physical connection between the atoms of the apple and the atoms of the earth. Each atom is connected to each other atom. When the apple is far away these connections all essentially superimpose and act like one connection (behaves like a boson). As the apple approaches earth the connections fan out, each one making an angle with each other, and they "un superimpose". In the former case we have a few number of effective connections and in the latter case we have a large number of effective connections. So when you said this: I would posit: The # of effective connections (at distance D) * G = Gravitational Potential ~ G*(m1*m2/d^2) And: The change in the # of effective connections * m = Force = m*a Inertia is dynamic, i.e. a change in the number of connections, and equals acceleration. The measured acceleration of the body is used to determine the empirical parameter "mass", the relationship between connections and acceleration. Gravity is specific to a location and is equal to the # of effective (non superimposed) connections at a given distance. Empirically it is approximately equal to the inverse square of the distance times the inertial masses times some universal constant G. We now have to determine the physical significance of "Big G". Consider the simplest gravitational system we can imagine in which we are confident gravity plays a role, 2 H atoms (the only atoms in our hypothetical universe). Since there is no change in the # of effective connections there is no acceleration. The force is 0, but the gravitational potential is 1 connection x G = G. By considering this simple system we've isolated the constant G away from inertial mass (Force = 0). So there is no acceleration. It's reasonable to assume that this complex constant G may be a composite of other universal constants which are characteristic of the fundamental nature of the connection. One of these constants is c, signals propagate torsionally/helically at this velocity along this connection. Another constant is the mass of the H atom. Let's factor c^2 out of G, where c^2 physically means that the signal travels diametrically between two specific atoms. We should expect it to have a proportionality to gravitational potential because a torsional signal above c (in a hypothetical universe) would demand that the atoms compensate by pulling harder. This is analogous to if you put a few twists in a rubber band and pull it apart to its untwisted length. Then twist it as many times as you can, you will have to pull much harder to stretch it back to its original (untwisted) length. C represents the stiffness of the connecting entity. G ~ 6.67E-11 kg-m^3/kg^2-sec^2 = 0.74E-27 kg-m/kg^2 * c^2 If c^2 is a constant we can factor out, so should be the calculated "rest mass" of the H atom: G = 0.44 m/kg^2 * c^2 * 1.67E-27 kg = 0.44 m/kg^2 * c^2 * H The result, free of astronomical exponents, tempts one to conclude this is not a coincidence. If we consider that the two H atoms are rotating about each other. If neither atom actually moves toward or away from the other, neither "feels" inertia. In everyday life if we rotate a ball we feel it pull on us. But this is because we are acting contrary to the pull between the ball and i.e. the earth. If the length of the connection between these two H atoms doesn't change they should feel nothing different than if the two atoms were at rest. Nothing is acting on either one that is contrary to their mutual tug. There is no reason to feel the resistance "inertia" unless, as Mach surmised, you are actually pulled by every other atom in the U. If every atom in the U is interconnected and possesses a detectable property known as mass, the source of this empirical parameter should be the aggregate pull of matter *outside* our two-atom system, which is contrary to their mutual tug. As soon as we connect our two atom system to the rest of the U and one moves it necessarily feels the tug of every connection. If the mass of the H atom represents the linear/outward pull component associated with a single connection, the radial component (left/right and up/down) should be present as a squared quantity (two directions). This is the physical interpretation of Mach's principle, when you move your pinky every atom in the universe pulls radially. This is contrary to the linear tug between the two H atoms, which is why it's in the denominator. This is intuitive. Now we have: 0.44 m * c^2 * H/M = 0.44 * c^2 * Mach's Principle The meter factor could represent the amplitude of this helical/torsional entity. Essentially it is a weighted average of the amplitude of every connection between the atom under study and every other atom in the U. Amplitude should have proportionality to force because a greater pull is needed to counteract a wider or taller wavy entity at a given frequency. The meter factor could ultimately be a variable based on the current distribution of matter in the universe, but for a given short period in universal history considered constant. So in physics we draw the distinction between gravitational potential and inertia: F = Mach's Principle * change in # of effective connections GP = Mach's Principle * # of effective connections at a location Energy is simply the aggregate of torsional signals traveling outward along each connection to every atom in the U. The mass of one atom times the aggregate of these signals = m*c^2. Under this model a "gravity shield" will never be produced because it will necessarily be connected to whatever it's shielding

I'M OFFERING MY ENTIRE OBJECTIVIST LIBRARY FOR SALE ON EBAY WITH AN OPENING BID OF $400. THAT'S LESS THAT THE COST OF A SINGLE COURSE. THE EBAY LINK IS HERE AND THE COURSES OFFERED ARE BELOW: THE ART OF THINKING: This is a course on what to do with your mind during the act of thought, when to do it and how to do it. Dr. Peikoff teaches you how to make the principles of Objectivist epistemology the guide of your own daily thought processes. These lectures are part new theory and part exercises. 1. Volition as a means of Clarity
The problem of clashing contexts; why some students are unable to fully accept what they know to be the truth. The perpetual "clarity-seeker." Why the only solution in such cases is will (not more arguments).
 2. Hierarchy
Thought as integration. Hierarchy as an indispensable form of integration. Reducing advanced ideas to perceptual data.
 3. Thinking in Essentials
Thinking in essentials as a form of unit-reduction. How to decide what is essential in a particular case, such as a movie, book or person. Translating commonplace remarks in terms of essentials.
 4. Question & Answer Session (1hr.)
 5. Thinking in Principles
Principles as fundamental integrations reached by induction. Principles and essentials. Are principles inescapable or not?
 6. Certainty
Can one be certain about the future? Can one base predictions on statistics? If knowledge is contextual, must one say: "The senses are valid, or Atlas Shrugged is a great novel, in the present context of knowledge"? Can one properly specify one's context, yet still be guilty of an error?
 7. Thinking versus Writing
Pre-writing versus writing problems. Understanding a point versus knowing how to present it—and what is required for each. The grave error of trying to understand through writing for others.
 8. Question & Answer Session (2 hrs.)
Dealing with immoral people. Why academic philosophers reject Objectivism. The difference between truth and certainty. The epistemological status of statistics. 
(Audio 14 hrs., 31 min.)
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY by Leonard Peikoff 1. The First Problem: Are There Any Absolutes? The father of philosophy: Thales. The philosophy of flux: Heraclitus—"You cannot step into the same river twice"—change as the only absolute. The mind-body opposition begins: the mathematical mysticism of the Pythagoreans. 2. The Triumph of the Metaphysics of Two Worlds. The birth of determinism: the materialism of Democritus. The birth of "It seems to me": the skepticism of the Sophists— "Might makes right." Socrates. The first complete philosophy: Plato. Plato's metaphysical dualism. 3. The Results in This World. Plato's epistemology—the myth of the cave. Plato's ethics/politics: reason vs. emotion—Platonic love—the Philosopher-King—communism as the political ideal. 4-5. A Revolution: The Birth of Reason. Aristotle. Epistemology: sensory evidence as the base of knowledge—the laws of logic—the nature of truth. Ethics/politics: happiness as the moral goal—reason and the good life—the Great-Souled Man—the ideal society. 6. Philosophy Loses Confidence. The philosophy of pleasure: the hedonism of Epicurus. The philosophy of duty: Stoicism. The new Skepticism: Pyrrho of Elis. Neo-Platonism: Plotinus. 7-8. Philosophy Becomes Religious—and Recovers. The rejection of reason and happiness: Christianity. The first major Christian philosopher: Augustine—faith as the basis of reason—the ethics of self-sacrificial love—man as a corrupt creature. The Dark Ages. The rediscovery of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas: the union of Aristotelianism and Christianity—the absolutism of reason and the new role of faith. The aftermath: the Renaissance. 9. The New Breach Between the Mind and Reality. Materialism and determinism in the name of science, dictatorship in the name of harmony: Thomas Hobbes. The father of modern philosophy and the first famous Continental Rationalist: René Descartes— the method of universal doubt—"I think, therefore I am"—the theory of innate ideas. 10. The Breach Deepens . . . The second famous Rationalist: Spinoza—pantheism—determinism. The third famous Rationalist: Leibnitz—the unreality of matter—the "windowless monads." British empiricism: John Locke. 11. . . . and the Attempt Collapses. Empiricism becomes subjectivist: Bishop Berkeley—"To be is to be perceived." Empiricism becomes bankrupt: the skepticism of David Hume—the attack on the external world and on causality—the breach between logic and fact. 12. Conclusion. The Objectivist answer to key problems posed by Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Detailed Description INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC by Leonard Peikoff This course (with exercises) covers the standard topics taught in introductory courses in Aristotelian logic. It defines the principles of valid reasoning, and discusses prevalent logical fallacies. It formalizes the steps by which one derives conclusions from premises, and it provides a methodology by which to evaluate one's own thinking processes. (Each lecture includes a question period.) 1. Basic Logical Theory
The cognitive role of logic. The laws of logic and their validation. Logic vs. mysticism and subjectivism. Logic and reality.
 2-3. Informal Fallacies
Twenty-two common fallacies, including: the appeal to authority, ad hominem, ad populum, ad ignorantiam, begging the question, equivocation, composition, division, misuse of the mean and false alternative.
 4. Introduction to Deductive Reasoning
The nature of deductive argument. Validity and truth. Mixed and pure hypothetical arguments. Alternative arguments.
 5.-6. The Aristotelian Syllogism
Categorical propositions. Immediate inference. Rules of syllogistic validity. Analyzing arguments in ordinary language.
 7-8. Definition
The cognitive role of definitions. Genus and differentia. The method of formulating valid definitions: five Aristotelian rules of definition. Definitional fallacies.
 9-10. Inductive Generalization
Induction vs. deduction. Induction by simple enumeration. Experimental induction: Mill's methods of discovering causal connections. Major inductive fallacies, including: hasty generalization, oversimplified generalization, post hoc. The justification of induction. The argument from analogy.
(Audio 27 hrs., 1 min.) OBJECTIVE COMMUNICATION by Leonard Peikoff This course teaches you how to present ideas effectively. It identifies certain principles of intellectual communication, and applies them to three areas: writing, speaking and arguing. It is concerned, not with style, but with substance, i.e., with the basic methods necessary to achieve a clear, absorbing presentation of your viewpoint. Dr. Peikoff draws on principles from such diverse fields as epistemology, drama, education and polemics. If you want to be able to convey your thoughts objectively whether you are preparing a report for work, a paper for school or a book for a publisher this course will dramatically enhance your skills. Throughout the sessions, volunteers were given an opportunity to make brief presentations. Since the subjects of these exercises (included as a booklet with the taped course) are limited to aspects of Objectivism, the exercises may also expand or refresh your knowledge of this philosophy. The ten sessions, which are themselves masterful examples of objective communication, consist of the following: Basic Principles and Methods (opening lecture)
The nature and problems of intellectual communication. The role of epistemology: the "crow epistemology" and the Law of Identity; knowledge as contextual. Motivating the audience. Delimiting the subject. Logical organization of material. Balancing abstractions and concretes. Writing (4 lectures)
Written presentation. Similarities and differences between writing and speaking. Making a piece of writing self-contained. How to judge a formulation's objectivity. Exercises in editing philosophic statements to achieve precision of thought. Analysis of samples of student writing. Speaking (3 lectures)
Oral presentation. The nature and problems of extemporaneous delivery. The problem of overloading the listener's mind. Transitions, pace and emphasis. Monitoring the audience's response. How not to bore the listener. Analysis of short talks by students. Arguing (2 lectures)
When and when not to argue. The art of philosophical detection. Selecting the essential points to answer in a discussion. The major pitfall of polemics: conceding the opponent's premises. Arguing politics, and how to deal with spurious "facts." Training oneself in philosophic argumentation. Analysis of mock arguments, with students (or the instructor) serving as "devil's advocate." Ayn Rand answers questions from the audience at the end of Lecture 1, ranging from esthetics to politics. Of particular value is her discussion of the fiction writers whose works best illustrate the craft of writing. (Audio 25 hrs.) WRITING: A MINI COURSE by Leonard Peikoff Learning to write, Dr. Peikoff explains, requires not only an understanding of the proper principles, but also the ability to apply those principles to one's actual writing. These lectures feature exercises on six different aspects of good writing. The topics are:
1. Selectivity: How to determine what is essential.
2. Structure: How to organize your material hierarchically.
3. Emotional vs. Factual Tone: How the same idea can be conveyed in dry, factual terms—or in colorful, emotionally evocative language.
4. Context: How to compose an introductory sentence that sets the context and makes a complex subject fully intelligible.
5. Motivation: How to prepare a brief, motivational opening for a talk.
6. Condensation: How to write in concise English. (Audio 3 hrs., 45 min.) ARISTOTLE AND THE RENAISSANCE by Robert Mayhew Ayn Rand wrote: "The Aristotelian revival in the thirteenth century brought men to the Renaissance." These lectures—which cover 500 years, from the rediscovery of Aristotle, to the end of the Renaissance—demonstrate the truth of this statement. Questions to be answered include: How could Aristotle's ideas take hold in a hostile culture? Did they take hold fully? What was Aquinas' contribution? What effect did Aristotle's ideas have on Renaissance philosophy? Who were the major Renaissance Aristotelians? Dr. Mayhew concludes with a consideration of the lessons Aristotle's influence on the Renaissance has for modern Aristotelians fighting, in a hostile culture, for Objectivism. (Audio; 3 hrs.) FREE WILL by Harry Binswanger Ayn Rand is the first philosopher to recognize that the free will is at the root of not only ethics but also epistemology. By identifying that "Man is a being of volitional consciousness," that one's choice to think or not is an act of free will, she revolutionized our understanding of the relationship of consciousness to existence. In these lectures, given at 1999 Lyceum Conference, Dr. Binswanger presents and validates the Objectivist theory of free will, with emphasis on the relationship between volition and the reality-orientation. Topics include: mental focus: what exactly is "focus"? how do we know focus is volitional? focus vs concentration; drift, evasion, "meta-evasion" and self-monitoring"; the error in asking "what makes one man focus and another not?"; free will as the base of objectivity, and determinism as the premise of mysticism. (Audio 3 hrs.) SELECTED TOPICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE by Harry Binswanger Speaking as both professional philosopher and amateur scientist, Dr. Binswanger presents original and challenging solutions to a number of problems that have fascinated, tantalized and perplexed students of philosophy and science. 1. Mathematics
Geometry: Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry; reconceiving the hierarchical order of the basic concepts of geometry; a proper definition of "straight line"; a proper definition of "parallel lines" and its role. Numbers: reducing the concept of "number" to perceptual reality—or, "where is fiveness?"; negative numbers, irrational numbers and imaginary numbers; infinity and "ultrafinitism." 2. Physics and Biology
Physics: the finite universe; "place" vs. "space" in conceptualizing the universe; why there can be no real voids. Biology: mechanism vs. vitalism; the theory of natural selection and its epistemological status; the goal-directedness of living action. (Audio; 3 hrs.) RELIGION VS MAN by John Ridpath
Dr. Ridpath examines religion as the most significant example of the destructiveness of false philosophic ideas. In these two lectures he presents a detailed history of religion, including its origins in primitive myths. He uncovers the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical doctrines of the world's major religious systems: Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Dr. Ridpath demonstrates why the essence of religion stands in fundamental opposition to the requirements of human life. The talks include a moral comparison between Eastern and Western religions, and conclude with a warning on the present-day dangers posed by religion. (Audio; 3 hrs.) THE GREATNES OF THE 18TH-CENTURY ENLIGHTENMENT by John Ridpath The 18th-century Enlightenment is one of history's most vivid demonstrations, on a vast scale, of human potential. It reveals the heroic ability of man to command the world. It gives us factual proof that men can live in freedom, prosperity, benevolence and happiness. These two lectures present the context for appreciating the greatness of the 18th century, by contrasting it with the mysticism and the misery that came before. Dr. Ridpath examines the Enlightenment in detail—both its intellectual essence and its existential accomplishments. He also identifies the ambiguities and even contradictions present within the Enlightenment—thus allowing us to assess fully the nature of this heroic epoch in human history. These lectures are a demonstration of the enormous power of reason and freedom in human life. (Audio; 3 hrs.) SETTING GOALS TO IMPROVE YOUR LIFE AND HAPPINESS by Edwin A. Locke Part 1 is one 90 min. lecture (search item IL02C) This course is a major expansion of a talk by the same title given in 1985, focusing in depth on the topics of work and love. The work section discusses such issues as discovering what career you would like; healthy and unhealthy ambition; self-marketing; work vs. family; and money. The section of love contrasts the Objectivist view of love as egoistic to altruism and narcissism, and then presents numerous examples of what it would mean specifically to love someone egoistically, including the important role of the conscious mind in sustaining a romantic relationship. (Audio; 4 hrs) THE PHILOSOPHIC CORRUPTION OF PHYSICS by David Harriman 1. Newton to Kant:
Newton's physics and his philosophic legacy. The attack on the rational foundations of physics by 18th century philosophy. Hume's rejection of entities, identity and causality. Kant's "anti-Copernican" revolution. The primacy of consciousness. Kant's view of space and time. 2. Kant's Physics & the Early 19th Century:
Kant deduces the principles of physics from his "categories." The primacy of action over entities. The acausal idea of "action—at—a—distance." Kant's influence on English physics. Faraday's view of force and matter. 3. The Death of Classical Physics:
The transition to Kantian empiricism. Physics as the "mathematical description of appearances." Mach's positivism and its later influence. The rejection of atoms—after their existence was proven. Boltzman's tragic fight for classical physics. 4. Relativity: The Physics of Appearances
Einstein's subjectivism and rationalism. The rejection of induction. The constant speed of light and two possible approaches toward an objective theory. Einstein's "length contraction," "time dilation" and "relativistic mass." "The curvature of space." 5. Quantum Theory: The Physics of Nihilism
Kantian nihilism takes over in Germany. Physicists are "emancipated" from the constraints of identity, causality and logic. The development of quantum theory. Schrodinger's cat paradox. Prospects for the future. "Mr. Harriman's understanding of the integration of physics and philosophy is unique and his presentation is clear, logical, well-illustrated and even emotionally powerful...It is a brilliant case study of the role of philosophy in perverting a science across centuries—and at the same time a revolutionary indication of how to untangle and reconstruct this science within a rational (Objectivist) framework." Dr. Leonard Peikoff (Audio; 6 hrs. 30 min.) PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF DEFENSE by Dr. Ellen Kenner Whether dealing with a deviously critical mother, a deliberately incomprehensible professor or an envious co-worker, how do you resist the tendency to "keep the peace," to forgive and make excuses for them—to apologize for the good within you? How do you remain morally true to yourself? How do you avoid granting them the "sanction of the victim"? In this course Dr. Kenner provides how-to advice on detecting and counteracting intentionally manipulative people. With an abundance of examples—drawn from both real life and fiction—she explains the subtle methods by which manipulative people gain psychological footholds. Rather than being formal lectures, these six sessions include frequent questions from the students as well as staged confrontations in which Dr. Kenner plays the role of a manipulator. Though she sketches out some of the psychological principles involved, her central purpose is to teach practical skills that can help you maintain your integrity, pursue your happiness and navigate safely through the traps of would-be manipulators. [Audio; 6 hrs.] JUDGING, FEELING, AND NOT BEING MORALISTIC by Leonard Peikoff These lectures offer an intensive analysis of the process of evaluative judgement. They apply the enormously abstract subject of morality to difficult cases. These lectures are invaluable guidelines for making moral decisions. (Audio 3 hrs., 59 min.)