Free Will and Determinism: is the "focus" exception valid?

[Thumos]

Objectivism tries to avoid the conflict between Free Will and Determinism by removing the “decision/choice to focus” from the conflict. Though I have been studying objectivism on my own for a number of years, and have read all of the literature and postings on the subject, I have not been able to understand how that “primary choice” is either:

-Logically generated by an individual independent of the facts and circumstances of his existence, or

-Made independent of the facts and circumstances of his existence but still attributable to him to the extent that he is responsible for it.

I will attempt (below) to explain this conflict as thoroughly as possible in the hope that the problem, as I see it, is understood and that someone may shed light on how it can be resolved. (sorry about the length, it is the only way to get the point across)

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Is “Free Will” (defined as the ability to (a) originate an ( uncoerced/independent decision among multiple open alternatives and act in accordance with that decision) compatible with the nature of the universe?

The Nature of the Universe

(x) In a

causally deterministic universe

all of existence is governed by the same laws and shares a common origin; therefore, it may be assumed, the universe will unfold in a manner determined by the previously existing state of the universe and laws of physics.

(y) In an

indeterministic universe

events unfold randomly and are not a function of the previous state of the universe or of any universal laws of physics.

The Nature of Decision Making in a Deterministic Universe

Every decision is explainable as a function of two things:

(1) Reality, defined as the facts/circumstances of which one is aware; and

(2) Biases, which are predispositions to further one’s agenda via the decision.

Biases are a function of previous decisions about one’s ends that are ultimately rooted in the circumstances of one’s existence, which is essentially an element of (1). That is, the (2) portion of a current decision (externally or internally focused) is tainted by the outcome of a previous, internally focused, decision about what (2) should be; which its self was the product of a previous decision, etc…. The origins of these biases predate one’s consciousness and are entirely a product of nature, beyond the control or responsibility of the decision maker. Thus both the facts & circumstances of which one is aware and the biases that are rooted in those same facts & circumstances are not original to the decision maker and are, therefore, beyond his responsibility.

The Free Will vs. Determinism/Indeterminism Paradox

If (x), then (a) but not (; this is because decisions are a function of reality and biases (as explained above) that are not independent or voluntary since the biases are ultimately rooted in circumstances that predate one’s ability to originate a primary bias. (the primary biases are survival reflexes like hunger, etc…)

If (y), then ( but not (a); this is because it would be impossible to truly originate any judgment that one could be held responsible for if the mental processes that led to the outcome were at all random (if a decision a function of a chance, one cannot be held responsible for the product as it is beyond their control).

Since both (a) and ( are required to have Free Will, but cannot occur simultaneously in either (x) or (y), which are exclusive of one another, it would seem that Free Will does not exist.

The Logical Fallacy of Determinism/Indeterminism without Free Will

One cannot meaningfully affirm that Free Will does not exist without contradiction because such a conclusion, in order to be validated by the proclaimer or a listener, must, by definition, be done so at a level beyond the proclaimer [(a) - not originating with him] or must be done so without his consent [( - lacking independence], in which case it is hardly a claim at all. Indeed, it would be wrong to accept as knowledge anything that lacks an identifiable origin in an indeterministic universe or to accept a claim that emanated from an unidentifiable/indistinguishable actor in a deterministic universe.

Without Free Will, there are no means by which to check the validity of a statement, therefore the difference between true and false would be arbitrary. Far from coming to any real conclusions one would have to settle for “I have been programmed to accept that…..” or “the unfolding of the universe has caused me to say that….”

The Essence of the Conflict:

The universe is causally deterministic so far as human interaction with it is concerned. However, Free Will must be held, as an axiom, in order for any analysis (prior, present & future) to have any meaning. The conflict can be summarized by noting that there are two equally atrocious alternatives:

To claim to live in the type of causally deterministic universe required to validate the decision making aspects of Free Will, but to know that Free Will is not possible in that universe (see "The FW vs. D/I Paradox" above).

To claim that the universe is deterministic (or indeterministic) and that Free Will is impossible, but to do so without any means of independently (or logically) verifying that such is the case (see "The Logical Fallacy of D/I without FW" above).

To accept the later alternative would be the end of the analysis; any additional (and prior) conclusions would lack meaning since they would amount to little more than neatly arranged observations & data upon which only meaningless calculations could be performed, and for which no judgment could be rendered. However, acceptance of the former alternative would allow for additional analysis of the universe, but any conclusions reached would be qualified in the same manner as the former alternative, which has the same effect as the latter alternative (italicized above).

Should/Must I pretend to live in a deterministic universe in which Free Will is possible in order to validate knowledge or have moral responsibility? If so, why not pretend that a God, or a “soul,” exists in order to reinforce that moral responsibility? Or, for that matter, why not invent any number of non-existent things to suit my predetermined (or random) needs?

[DavidOdden]

I have not been able to understand how that “primary choice” is either:

-Logically generated by an individual independent of the facts and circumstances of his existence, or

-Made independent of the facts and circumstances of his existence but still attributable to him to the extent that he is responsible for it.

There's a good chance that this wording of the question will get in the way. I would not at all assume that an individual's choice to focus is "logically generated independent of the facts", and the second disjunct in your question is an amplification of the first (made=generated independent of the facts, with the add-on "attributable to him"). Can you restate your puzzle?

[Thumos]

I apologize that this was not clear:

As I explain later on, I am trying to communicate that if the primary decision is generated using the logic of a deterministic universe (“based on my knowledge of the universe, my life will be better if I focus, therefore I shall focus” - the choice was made assuming causes and effects) then the choice is ultimately a product (effect) of the universe (cause) since the chooser’s means of arriving at the primary decision are ultimately rooted in the state of the universe, including his mind, just prior to his choice.

The second is not an amplification of the first: it is stating that if the cause-effect relationship of the first statement is somehow broken (to allow the chooser’s decision not to be rooted in the state of the universe prior to his choice) then the chooser (cause) cannot be responsible for the decision (effect) since the cause/effect deterministic universe has been violated.

By the way, the latter part the first sentence in the second to last paragraph of the original post should be italicized.

[DavidOdden]

Well, you say that free will is defined as the ability to originant an uncoerced / independent decision. I disupute that definition, especially the "independent" part, since it implies that, for example, a man cannot make a free choice to step out of the path of an oncoming train (his choice to move is not independent of his knowledge that there is a train coming at him). In general, that definition means than any purposeful action is not "free will", and the only actions that would count as exercise of "free will" would be definition be random actions. So you see that I wouldn't want to buy an assumption that therefore entails the denial of free will or the concept of causality. Taking out or restating the "independent of" part of the definition would help, since I don't know what you mean by "independent of".

[eriatarka]

The Nature of the Universe

(x) In a

causally deterministic universe

all of existence is governed by the same laws and shares a common origin; therefore, it may be assumed, the universe will unfold in a manner determined by the previously existing state of the universe and laws of physics.

(y) In an

indeterministic universe

events unfold randomly and are not a function of the previous state of the universe or of any universal laws of physics.

A minor correction, but an indeterminate universe doesnt mean that events are independent of the previous state. It means that events arent fully determined by the previous state - but they may still have well-defined statistical properties (eg given the same situation, you may find that outcome A occurs 80% of the time and outcome B occurs 20%. So the probability distribution of the next state is fully determined by the current state, even though the particular outcome isnt). In this case, you may find out the laws of physics work perfectly well because all the indeterminateness 'cancels out' once you go above a certain level, and after a point the universe behaves as if it were fully deterministic and predictable. This is the essence of certain interpretations of quantum physics - indeterminism at the lowest level may approximate determinism at higher levels because all the randomness gets averaged out.

(Not that I think this is directly related to free will)

Edited July 7, 2008 by eriatarka

[Thumos]

But this is precisely the problem: If you take (1) reality [an approaching train…perhaps the comet] and (2) an inherited bias [toward self-preservation], then how is the resulting decision [to get out of the way] any different than a reflex, or a plant turning toward the sun….the same goes for a decision to focus.

I could substitute some other word for independence but the problem would still exist: if I am operating in a cause & effect universe and my decisions are a function of my knowledge and my biases, which are ultimately a function of inherited biases, at what point could the decision be (independently, uniquely, separately) my own? How is it not just a small portion of the script for the entire universe that happens to play out in my mind?

[Thumos]

A minor correction.... laws of physics work perfectly well because all the indeterminateness 'cancels out' once you go above a certain level, and after a point the universe behaves as if it were fully deterministic and predictable. ....

Good point eriatarka, I was a bit too brief in my definition. I also agree that the subatomic randomness that is postulated in contemporary quantum physics is not applicable to Free Will vs. Determinism. I think this is a reasonable assumption since (from what I have read) the chemical reactions that govern the decision making processes take place primarily at the “whole atom” level and are therefore unaffected by any subatomic randomness (which would not change the composition of a chemical compound or affect an electrical signal).

[aequalsa]

But this is precisely the problem: If you take (1) reality [an approaching train…perhaps the comet] and (2) an inherited bias [toward self-preservation], then how is the resulting decision [to get out of the way] any different than a reflex, or a plant turning toward the sun….the same goes for a decision to focus.

A problem in the common discussion of freewill that (I think) David is alluding to, is that the concept of free choice in the way you are using it is somewhat invalid, in that the correct view is that a free choice presupposes choosing between two different alternatives, both of which exist and therefore have an effect on the chooser. To require free choice to exist outside the bounds of the universe, or at the least, independent of the items being chosen, is to turn it into a floating abstraction. Choosing is not totally independent of the universe or without regard to the actual choice in question.

Determinism breaks down in the same nonsensical way for me because causality does not equal determinability. The choosing mechanism(brain/mind) is a part of the universe it resides in and goes about making choices based on its accumulated knowledge and the particular issue at hand. It is the determining factor, so to speak.

As with most paradoxical quagmires, the issue dries up once you look to reality and treat the problem through induction, rather than deductively.

[eriatarka]

A problem in the common discussion of freewill that (I think) David is alluding to, is that the concept of free choice in the way you are using it is somewhat invalid, in that the correct view is that a free choice presupposes choosing between two different alternatives, both of which exist and therefore have an effect on the chooser. To require free choice to exist outside the bounds of the universe, or at the least, independent of the items being chosen, is to turn it into a floating abstraction. Choosing is not totally independent of the universe or without regard to the actual choice in question.

Determinism breaks down in the same nonsensical way for me because causality does not equal determinability. The choosing mechanism(brain/mind) is a part of the universe it resides in and goes about making choices based on its accumulated knowledge and the particular issue at hand. It is the determining factor, so to speak.

As with most paradoxical quagmires, the issue dries up once you look to reality and treat the problem through induction, rather than deductively.

The problem is that all parts of the human body (eg your arm) are ultimately physical systems made up of atoms, and the behavior of atoms is governed by the known laws of physics. If the atoms in your arm are in some state at a particular time, then their states at all times after this are fully determined, in the same way as the atoms making up a book or a gas (ignoring quantum pathologies). In order for the strong version of free-will-as-physical-indeterminism to be true, you have to assume that either a) pretty much the whole of atomic theory is wrong, some quantum weirdness is at play, although this is arbitrary and unsuported by evidence, or c) atoms which happen to make up parts of the human body literally obey different physical laws than atoms making up anything else in the universe. Although c) is an unfashionable belief, I don't think it's unreasonable but it is a very strong claim that most physicists/neuroscientists would reject as supernaturalism. I dont think you can just dismiss the controversies/issues here by appealing to the distinction between determinism and casuality - yes, the brain does have casual powers but it's also a physical system made up of atoms, so if the brain acts in a non-deterministic manner then so do all the things its made of (atoms, neurons, etc).

As far as I can tell, the classic idea of free will implies that at some point, an individual atom is going to have to do something which goes aganst the known laws of physics as a result of human choice, since if this wasnt the case then your behavior would be determined in advance, since the movement of all the individual atoms making up your body is determined by physical law. Even though I believe in free-will, claiming something like that makes me a bit uncomfortable. It might be true, but if it is then physics as we know it is either wrong or radically incomplete.

Edited July 7, 2008 by eriatarka

[Grames]

A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole (or even of every proper part). The argument that if the brain consists only of neurons, molecules and atoms none of which have free will, then the brain as a whole cannot have free will is an instance of the fallacy of composition.

The converse of the fallacy of composition is the fallacy of division when one infers that something true of a whole must be true of all or some of its parts. The arguement that if a person has free will then some of his neurons or even atoms must then have free will is instance of this fallacy.

The two fallacies identified above are sufficient to demonstrate the falsehood of the idea of determinism. One further step remains to be taken, a demonstration of the validity of volition. The only possible demonstration which avoids all logical paradoxes is an appeal to your power of perception. You feel your own power to choose and no logical arguments can interpose themselves between your power to choose and your perception of your own power to choose.

Because the "billiard ball" idea of causality and determinism has such a powerful hold on the imaginations of people, I have added this additional thought.

Determinism should not be understood as simple. There have been many claims made about the nature of deterministic systems, their predictibility and calculability. I would direct your attention to the n-body problem (where n is much greater than 3), and then claim that not only is the realm of crude materialism not practically calculable for real systems but it is not even theoretically calculable. Mind you that the example given at Wikipedia is just gravitational attraction; in the real world everything that exists is simultaneously bombarded by gravity, electrostatic, magnetic, electro-magnetic, strong nuclear and weak nuclear forces originating thoughout the whole volume of the universe. The idea of determinism as billiard balls whose positions, velocities, and masses if perfectly known are theoretically predictable, is a fantasy realm which is not even a correct understanding of determinism.

Edited July 7, 2008 by Grames

[DavidOdden]

But this is precisely the problem: If you take (1) reality [an approaching train…perhaps the comet] and (2) an inherited bias [toward self-preservation], then how is the resulting decision [to get out of the way] any different than a reflex, or a plant turning toward the sun….the same goes for a decision to focus.

Because in the later cases, there is no choice and no involvement of a mind, which exists with free will. If you approach the question from the standpoint of observed behavior / environmental conditions, you can never understand what free will is.

[DavidOdden]

How is it not just a small portion of the script for the entire universe that happens to play out in my mind?

BTW, another note here. A script is some kind of sequence of events described by a consciousness in advance of any realization; a "script for the entire universe" entails a god, which as you know Objectivism rejects. Did you mean what you said, or did you have in mind something else?

[aequalsa]

Determinism should not be understood as simple. There have been many claims made about the nature of deterministic systems, their predictibility and calculability. I would direct your attention to the n-body problem (where n is much greater than 3), and then claim that not only is the realm of crude materialism not practically calculable for real systems but it is not even theoretically calculable. Mind you that the example given at Wikipedia is just gravitational attraction; in the real world everything that exists is simultaneously bombarded by gravity, electrostatic, magnetic, electro-magnetic, strong nuclear and weak nuclear forces originating thoughout the whole volume of the universe. The idea of determinism as billiard balls whose positions, velocities, and masses if perfectly known are theoretically predictable, is a fantasy realm which is not even a correct understanding of determinism.

Thank you, Grames. This is precisely what I meant by the lack of determinability. 'Theoretically possible using a computer larger than the universe, ' is not the same as actually possible. Well put, by the way.

It's interesting to me that both sides of the debate are usually couched in terms which require a supernatural belief of some kind to be accepted and are easily attacked(even though they are straw men of sorts.) Making a free choice happens at a certain macro scale within a certain place and is perceptually self-evident. I assume this is because many of the scholars who have dealt with the issue historically have been religiously influenced. For the most part, it seems that they were busy continuing the discussion of predestination.

[Thumos]

A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole (or even of every proper part). The argument that if the brain consists only of neurons, molecules and atoms none of which have free will, then the brain as a whole cannot have free will is an instance of the fallacy of composition....

Grames, how so? It is only false if the inference is wrong. (Your definition of the fallicy is correct, but you don’t support an assertion that this is an instance of the fallacy.)

It seems to me that “composition” is a safe assumption; it is a direct route:

-My decisions are determined by my biases

-My biases were determined by previous decisions about my ends

-My ends were determined by survival & pleasure seeking reflexes

-Those reflexes are determined by my DNA

-I did not choose my DNA

(obviously a simplified version)

You feel your own power to choose and no logical arguments can interpose themselves between your power to choose and your perception of your own power to choose....

My perception is only that I have made a choice (input, thought process, output). I do not perceive that I have arrived at the choice independent of the “direct route” above.

It may also be useful make sure your perception is not an illusion. Try searching videos for “free will experiment;” there is some interesting (though not at all conclusive) evidence that our brains are just adding a “feeling of free will” to the end of our decisions.

[Thumos]

..."script for the entire universe" entails a god, which as you know Objectivism rejects. Did you mean what you said, or did you have in mind something else?

It is a metaphor David…like an actor in a play, where the facts/unfolding of the universe are the storyline. I suppose that could imply an author…apologies.

[Grames]

Grames, how so? It is only false if the inference is wrong.

The reason why composition is a fallacy is that it assumes there is no difference between a term in the distributive (referring to every member of a class) and collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense. Your argument commits this fallacy because it asserts that a persons' DNA is that person.

[DavidOdden]

It is a metaphor David…like an actor in a play, where the facts/unfolding of the universe are the storyline. I suppose that could imply an author…apologies.

I understand that it's a metaphor. Metaphor is a sloppy refugee in a philosophical discusion, whose purpose is to clarify concepts, not obscure them. Metaphors, unfortunately, substitute for reasoning in philosophical argumens too often. I was trying to encourage you to think about what you meant, and then actually say that literally.

[Thumos]

....Your argument commits this fallacy because it asserts that a persons' DNA is that person.

I am not asserting that you are your DNA, I am asserting that your DNA (or more broadly, the circumstances of your origin) was the determining factor in your first decisions. All future decisions are determined by previous decisions.

Perhapps you could address the portion of my original post entitled: "The Nature of Decision Making..." (I think it is what we are both tugging at) Does this seem accurate to you?

[Thumos]

...Metaphor is a sloppy refugee in a philosophical discusion...

I disagree, a metaphor can be a useful aid to communication, but I appreciate your directness.

I have not come to this forum to prove objectivism wrong (indeed, life seems rather unexceptional/unimportant without free will). I would like to understand how the model I outlined does not apply to “focus,” or how the model is wrong.

[Grames]

I am not asserting that you are your DNA, I am asserting that your DNA (or more broadly, the circumstances of your origin) was the determining factor in your first decisions. All future decisions are determined by previous decisions.

Perhapps you could address the portion of my original post entitled: "The Nature of Decision Making..." (I think it is what we are both tugging at) Does this seem accurate to you?

You make the mistake of reductionism, a man is nothing more than his parts, the sum his circumstances, his DNA, and whatever other antecedent factors you choose to include, even the prior events of a man's life, his history and memory. But the whole is not the parts, and the parts are not the whole. It is fallacy to think otherwise. All the premises you put forward could be true, they will not support your concusion.

Edited July 9, 2008 by Grames

[Thumos]

You make the mistake of reductionism, a man is nothing more than his parts, the sum his circumstances, his DNA, and whatever other antecedent factors you choose to include, even the prior events of a man's life, his history and memory. But the whole is not the parts, and the parts are not the whole....

Again, I am trying to understand how what you have said is true in the case of decision making? Allow me to restate:

-My decisions are determined by my biases

-My biases were determined by previous decisions about my ends

-My ends were determined by survival & pleasure seeking reflexes

-Those reflexes are determined by my DNA

-I did not choose my DNA

Which of these reductions is illogical? As you go from bottom to top, at what point can/does a decision transcend its determining factors? If so, how?

[DavidOdden]

-My decisions are determined by my biases

-My biases were determined by previous decisions about my ends

-My ends were determined by survival & pleasure seeking reflexes

-Those reflexes are determined by my DNA

-I did not choose my DNA

Your derivation doesn't go through. I have no idea what you mean by "bias" so I'll just treat that as an unanalyzable variable. You decisions (or biases, you decide given whatever you think biases are) are also determined by your knowledge, which is determined by your experiences (which are largely non-genetic, or determined by the genetics of a dog that terrorized you as a child). Your ends are not determined by survival & pleasure seeking reflexes, in fact you don't have survival & pleasure seeking reflexes. The nature of your sensory experiences is determined in part by the (general) structure of your sensory organs, partly by stuff external to you, and partly by things that you do which affect your organs (e.g. how many beers). The structure of your sensory organs is not determined exclusively by your DNA: what Mom ate and drank during gestation also has an effect, and your behavior after birth has an effect.

[Grames]

Again, I am trying to understand how what you have said is true in the case of decision making? Allow me to restate:

-My decisions are determined by my biases

-My biases were determined by previous decisions about my ends

-My ends were determined by survival & pleasure seeking reflexes

-Those reflexes are determined by my DNA

-I did not choose my DNA

Which of these reductions is illogical? As you go from bottom to top, at what point can/does a decision transcend its determining factors? If so, how?

At the level of conceptual consciousness.

There are no necessitating factors that determine a conceptual consciousness to make a particular choice . Consciousness is awareness, and it exists in the present tense. All of ones biases and previous decisions are in the past, presented to consciousness via memory. Consciousness is finite and so can only be aware of a certain number of mental objects at once, whether these be memories, perceptions, or the products of imagination. As mental objects present to the mind, these are all of the same status (equal before the law, so to speak). None of these mental objects have the power to conjure themselves into awareness, consciousness has to go get them by searching into memory, being alert to what is perceived, or concentrating on imagining. Being passive, mental objects have no power to determine anything.

Any particular "determining factor" can be thwarted by not paying attention to it. The preferred way to not pay attention to something is to attend to something else. Consciousness is finite, so it is possible for any particular mental object to be blocked from consciousness altogether, at least temporarily.

Is this what you are looking for?

Edited July 11, 2008 by Grames

[Thumos]

Your derivation doesn't go through....you don't have survival & pleasure seeking reflexes. The nature of your sensory experiences is determined in part by the (general) structure of your sensory organs, partly by stuff external to you, and partly by things that you do which affect your organs (e.g. how many beers). The structure of your sensory organs is not determined exclusively by your DNA: what Mom ate and drank during gestation also has an effect, and your behavior after birth has an effect.

Yes, as I explained at “The Nature of Decision Making…” in my original post (the derivation was a summary), I agree that decisions are a function of both biases (I am using the word to mean a tactical level of my ultimate ends) and knowledge (from experiences). Since, ultimately, one does not originate either of those two things it is hard for me to see how a decision to focus can be made with free will.

BTW, we do have survival and pleasure seeking reflexes: our adrenal system become active when we are in a predator/prey situation (blood rushes to your torso, etc...) and our brains are wired to treat dopamine (from sex, drugs, etc…) as "good".

[Thumos]

....None of these mental objects have the power to conjure themselves into awareness, consciousness has to go get them by searching into memory, being alert to what is perceived, or concentrating on imagining. Being passive, mental objects have no power to determine anything.

I agree that consciousness is finite & active and that mental objects are passive, but it would seem that whatever discretion the brain uses during the “searching” process would fall back into that damned deterministic process; and to the extent, if any, that there is not discretion (random searching) there cannot be free will.

Any particular "determining factor" can be thwarted by not paying attention to it. The preferred way to not pay attention to something is to attend to something else. Consciousness is finite, so it is possible for any particular mental object to be blocked from consciousness altogether, at least temporarily.

But what I choose to pay attention to or ignore would also be “determined” in the same manner.