Focus

[Hairnet]

I am having trouble sorting out exactly what Peikoff means in the section "The Primary Choice as the Choice to Focus or Not" in OPAR. This section starts at page 55.

I am going to start out with some quotes to give context to my questions. I am going to have a whole lot of them, I don't expect one person to answer all of them. These quotes start on page 59 of OPAR.

"The choice to focus, I have said, is man's primary choice. "Primary" here means: Irreducible presupposed by all other choices and itself irreducible."

"Nor can a primary choice be explained by anything more fundamental. By its nature it is a first cause within its within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors."

"Nor can one explain the choice to focus by reference to a person's own mental content".

"There can be no intellectual factor which makes man decide to become aware or which even partly explains such a decision: to grasp such a factor, one must already be aware." (

(Emphasis his)

"In short, it is invalid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such 'why'. There is only the fact that man chose: he chose the effort of consciousness, or he chose the non-effort and unconsciousness " (emphasis his again, page 60 of OPAR).

So far, we have can gather that Peikoff's and Rand's position on the machinery of free will revolve around the idea of focus, that is the choice to raise one's level of awareness.

There is no explanation for the choice to focus or not focus.

More quotes. Page 59 of OPAR

"The exertion of such effort, according to Objectivism, never becomes automatic. The choice involved must be made anew in every situation and in regard to every subject a parson deals with. The decision to focus on one occasion does not determine other occasions; in the next moment or issue, one's mind has the capacity to go out of focus(...)"

I have inferred from this quote and the previous ones that essentially in every situation, a man can not focus or focus, and there isn't any explanation as to why that is so. No ideas (or things based off of ideas such as values or emotions) can fundamentally affect the primary decision to focus.

QUESTIONS.

1) Is my inference wrong?

2) Once someone focuses, does it require an active effort to focus, which can be unraveled at any time, or does the decision to focus or not only appear every once and awhile?

3) Once someone has focused, do their intellectual contents become factors in later choices regarding "raising their level of awareness?".

For example lets say someone chooses to focus at the first tier of awareness. This is unexplainable (by anything more fundamental). However, once someone is aware at "tier one", they get "tier one knowledge", so can the decision to be raised to "tier two" awareness be affected by "tier one knowledge"?

4) If the choice to focus is unexplainable by anything more fundemental, can psychology only explain the behavior of someone who has already chosen to focus?

5) Is the ethical status of people who do not choose to focus (who remain at really "low tiers" of awareness) neutral because there is no reason to focus?

6) The idea of "Evasion" to make sense, must allow for some intellectual content to affect the choice of a man to drop his awareness correct?

7) If free will is axiomatic, then why do we need to explain it mechanically? Does Objectivism fundamentally rely on this explanation of free will "focus or not to focus"?

8) Is the amount of awareness one can muster limited by circumstance such as by illness, or lack of energy?

Edited July 15, 2010 by Hairnet

[dream_weaver]

QUESTIONS.

1) Is my inference wrong? It is a choice.

Effort must be exerted to focus, and that effort must be willed, as it is not automatizable.

2) Once someone focuses, does it require an active effort to focus, which can be unraveled at any time, or does the decision to focus or not only appear every once and awhile?

To remain focused requires the active effort to remain so. Some things are easier to remain focused upon than others.

3) Once someone has focused, do their intellectual contents become factors in later choices regarding "raising their level of awareness?".

For example lets say someone chooses to focus at the first tier of awareness. This is unexplainable (by anything more fundamental). However, once someone is aware at "tier one", they get "tier one knowledge", so can the decision to be raised to "tier two" awareness be affected by "tier one knowledge"?

4) If the choice to focus is unexplainable by anything more fundemental, can psychology only explain the behavior of someone who has already chosen to focus?

5) Is the ethical status of people who do not choose to focus (who remain at really "low tiers" of awareness) neutral because there is no reason to focus?

No. As a choice, the moral choice is to focus, the immoral is to evade that effort.

6) The idea of "Evasion" to make sense, must allow for some intellectual content to affect the choice of a man to drop his awareness correct?

7) If free will is axiomatic, then why do we need to explain it mechanically? Does Objectivism fundamentally rely on this explanation of free will "focus or not to focus"?

[Grames]

I have inferred from this quote and the previous ones that essentially in every situation, a man can not focus or focus, and there isn't any explanation as to why that is so. No ideas (or things based off of ideas such as values or emotions) can fundamentally affect the primary decision to focus.

QUESTIONS.

1) Is my inference wrong? Yes. The assertion that there is no explanation means that the choice was not necessitated by antecedent ideas, not that the ideas cannot have any effect. The inference you put forward entails that it would be useless to study philosophy or Objectivism if no idea could ever effect the choice to focus.

2) Once someone focuses, does it require an active effort to focus, which can be unraveled at any time, or does the decision to focus or not only appear every once and awhile? Continuous.

3) Once someone has focused, do their intellectual contents become factors in later choices regarding "raising their level of awareness?". Yes.

4) If the choice to focus is unexplainable by anything more fundemental, can psychology only explain the behavior of someone who has already chosen to focus? No because either alternative will entail predictable results (within a range).

5) Is the ethical status of people who do not choose to focus (who remain at really "low tiers" of awareness) neutral because there is no reason to focus? No. There is always reason to focus. This does not entail that one must always be in focus, people need to rest.

6) The idea of "Evasion" to make sense, must allow for some intellectual content to affect the choice of a man to drop his awareness correct? I agree.

7) If free will is axiomatic, then why do we need to explain it mechanically? Does Objectivism fundamentally rely on this explanation of free will "focus or not to focus"? It is important to locate just where is the freedom in free will. Free in what sense? It can't be freedom from facts or from metaphysical principles such as the Law of Identity. Objectivism does fundamentally rely on identifying the locus of free will as mental, as epistemological.

8) Is the amount of awareness one can muster limited by circumstance such as by illness, or lack of energy? Yes, that can be true.

[Hairnet]

1) Is my inference wrong? Yes. The assertion that there is no explanation means that the choice was not necessitated by antecedent ideas, not that the ideas cannot have any effect. The inference you put forward entails that it would be useless to study philosophy or Objectivism if no idea could ever effect the choice to focus.

5) Is the ethical status of people who do not choose to focus (who remain at really "low tiers" of awareness) neutral because there is no reason to focus? No. There is always reason to focus. This does not entail that one must always be in focus, people need to rest.

Thanks for the explanations.

1) How can ideas have an effect but not necessitate anything?

2) Wouldn't one have to spend a little effort towards being aware first without knowing why he should spend that effort?

[Grames]

1) How can ideas have an effect but not necessitate anything? By not being sufficient to cause focus by themselves.

2) Wouldn't one have to spend a little effort towards being aware first without knowing why he should spend that effort? Being awake meets that threshold.

[Mindy]

I am having trouble sorting out exactly what Peikoff means in the section "The Primary Choice as the Choice to Focus or Not" in OPAR. This section starts at page 55.

I am going to start out with some quotes to give context to my questions. I am going to have a whole lot of them, I don't expect one person to answer all of them. These quotes start on page 59 of OPAR.

"The choice to focus, I have said, is man's primary choice. "Primary" here means: Irreducible presupposed by all other choices and itself irreducible."

"Nor can a primary choice be explained by anything more fundamental. By its nature it is a first cause within its within a consciousness, not an effect produced by antecedent factors."

"Nor can one explain the choice to focus by reference to a person's own mental content".

"There can be no intellectual factor which makes man decide to become aware or which even partly explains such a decision: to grasp such a factor, one must already be aware." (

(Emphasis his)

"In short, it is invalid to ask: why did a man choose to focus? There is no such 'why'. There is only the fact that man chose: he chose the effort of consciousness, or he chose the non-effort and unconsciousness " (emphasis his again, page 60 of OPAR).

So far, we have can gather that Peikoff's and Rand's position on the machinery of free will revolve around the idea of focus, that is the choice to raise one's level of awareness.

There is no explanation for the choice to focus or not focus.

More quotes. Page 59 of OPAR

"The exertion of such effort, according to Objectivism, never becomes automatic. The choice involved must be made anew in every situation and in regard to every subject a parson deals with. The decision to focus on one occasion does not determine other occasions; in the next moment or issue, one's mind has the capacity to go out of focus(...)"

I have inferred from this quote and the previous ones that essentially in every situation, a man can not focus or focus, and there isn't any explanation as to why that is so. No ideas (or things based off of ideas such as values or emotions) can fundamentally affect the primary decision to focus.

QUESTIONS.

1) Is my inference wrong?

2) Once someone focuses, does it require an active effort to focus, which can be unraveled at any time, or does the decision to focus or not only appear every once and awhile?

3) Once someone has focused, do their intellectual contents become factors in later choices regarding "raising their level of awareness?".

For example lets say someone chooses to focus at the first tier of awareness. This is unexplainable (by anything more fundamental). However, once someone is aware at "tier one", they get "tier one knowledge", so can the decision to be raised to "tier two" awareness be affected by "tier one knowledge"?

4) If the choice to focus is unexplainable by anything more fundemental, can psychology only explain the behavior of someone who has already chosen to focus?

5) Is the ethical status of people who do not choose to focus (who remain at really "low tiers" of awareness) neutral because there is no reason to focus?

6) The idea of "Evasion" to make sense, must allow for some intellectual content to affect the choice of a man to drop his awareness correct?

7) If free will is axiomatic, then why do we need to explain it mechanically? Does Objectivism fundamentally rely on this explanation of free will "focus or not to focus"?

8) Is the amount of awareness one can muster limited by circumstance such as by illness, or lack of energy?

Kudos to the questioner for working out all these implications!

Relevant to the issue is that perception is, of course, automatic. Consciousness at that level does not require volitional "focus." Learning at the animal level of association and conditioning is also automatic, as are "perceptual abstractions" that allow us, and animals generally, to react to types of things, where the type can be distinguished perceptually.

This takes us quite a way in cognition. It does not embrace the use of language. Up to a certain point, we are more or less passive, after that point intellectual life loses its automatic quality. And it is there that volition comes into play.

Volition did not evolve. In the technical sense, it might be said to be a capacity man created in himself, like language. The intelligence that makes language possible evolved, the tool, language, is man-made. If language-use moves man radically out of the category of a being of a completely evolved nature, there is a kind of "freedom" that naturally attaches to his wielding that tool.

I suggest that that distinction is helpful in understanding "free will," or "volitional choice." Unfortunately, it may also raise some conflicts with extant Objectivism. (I think any such will be terminological only.)

-- Mindy

[Vik]

The assertion that there is no explanation means that the choice was not necessitated by antecedent ideas,

I think this needs to be clarified.

You aren't saying that lack of evidence for determinism *proves* that we aren't determined.

You're just saying that we have *no objective basis* for believing in determinism due to the way we experience consciousness.

[Grames]

I think this needs to be clarified.

You aren't saying that lack of evidence for determinism *proves* that we aren't determined.

You're just saying that we have *no objective basis* for believing in determinism due to the way we experience consciousness.

No, I'm saying that an explanation that succeeds in explaining anything, or in other words a sufficient explanation, must show how the effect necessarily follows from the cause, or in other words how the cause is sufficient to produce the effect. Neither the mere possession of an idea or being aware of an alternative is sufficient to compel acting on the idea or choosing that alternative. However it is true that one cannot willfully and volitionally act or choose that which is wholly unknown. Thus, being aware of an alternative has the effect of making possible the choice of it while that awareness is not sufficient to compel a choice.

[Mindy]

If there can be no explanation of why a man behaved with honor, for example, a denial of character is implied. We do explain human choices and actions. It is a large part of life.

We rely on people of reputation, believing that their character has been proven, and that it will continue to be what it has been, at least under normal circumstances. That means we are comfortable predicting what their choices will be, which way their volition will take them. Isn't that right?

I'll just state, for the record, that I do believe in volitional choice. I also believe in "the self-made soul." And I think that soul involves how one wields one's volition.

My partial solution to this conundrum is that choices to focus or think, at a given moment, must be interpreted in terms of the fundamental values the person understands to be at stake. Also, and as a necessary corollary, once a person's priorities are set, rationally, they are are permanent. This leads to the conclusion that there is not a great deal of variability in how an individual makes his choices, but, also, that new insights can bring about a radical change.

I welcome comments or criticism on this "conundrum" and my proposed solution.

-- Mindy

[Mindy]

No, I'm saying that an explanation that succeeds in explaining anything, or in other words a sufficient explanation, must show how the effect necessarily follows from the cause, or in other words how the cause is sufficient to produce the effect. Neither the mere possession of an idea or being aware of an alternative is sufficient to compel acting on the idea or choosing that alternative. However it is true that one cannot willfully and volitionally act or choose that which is wholly unknown. Thus, being aware of an alternative has the effect of making possible the choice of it while that awareness is not sufficient to compel a choice.

Since volition pertains only to one's cognition, would you agree that introspective knowledge is required before volitional choices can be made? One must be aware of the alternative of focussing, of thinking, and those are concepts of mental events or actions, and thus are introspective.

-- Mindy

[Vik]

No, I'm saying that an explanation that succeeds in explaining anything, or in other words a sufficient explanation, must show how the effect necessarily follows from the cause, or in other words how the cause is sufficient to produce the effect. Neither the mere possession of an idea or being aware of an alternative is sufficient to compel acting on the idea or choosing that alternative. However it is true that one cannot willfully and volitionally act or choose that which is wholly unknown. Thus, being aware of an alternative has the effect of making possible the choice of it while that awareness is not sufficient to compel a choice.

Oh, well it's implied by the nature of sufficiency. If the determinist can't explain free will, he can't objectively say that what we call "choice" is determined. All he can do is say that some causal process is responsible for "compelling choice".

But if *that* process is what we call the act of choosing, it would still remain true that it isn't awareness or external circumstance that "compels" choice.

[Leonid]

The concept of focus represents central part of Objectivist philosophy of mind. Focus means the state of a goal-directed mind committed to attaining full awareness of reality. Focus is also defined as primary choice on which all other choices depend.

In the book on Objectivism Dr.Peikoff wrote: “The choice to focus is man’s primary choice. Until a man is in focus his mental machinery is unable to think, judge or evaluate. The choice to throw the switch is thus the root choice on which all the other choices depend” (1)

This proposition represents some logical contradiction. Presumably a man who has to make this primary choice is not in focus-otherwise he wouldn’t need to make such a choice. To choose volitionally to be in focus, one has first to recognize his condition-to be aware that he’s not in focus. Then one has to understand that this condition is undesirable and he would be better off if he’s in focus. This is value-judgment. Then he has to be willing to change this condition and to decide to be in focus. This is the decision-making process. Then he makes a volitional mental effort and thus becomes in focus. All those actions require a very high level of awareness. The obvious question is how the person, who’s out of focus and hasn’t made his primary choice yet, would be able to perform such a formidable feat. It would be as the drunk in the middle of an alcohol induced mental fog would suddenly decide not to drink anymore. To make a volitional decision to be in focus a man has to be in full focus already. Therefore this act cannot be primary volitional choice.

This proposition also contradicts the collection of empirical data about human mental development.

It’s well known fact that the most acute mental focus we have as infants and toddlers. In just few years we acquire and process enormous amounts of knowledge. By age 3-4 most children learn to speak fluently meaning they’re able to form concepts. However it would be bizarre to claim that infants and toddlers make the conscious volitional primary choice to be in focus.

I propose to resolve this contradiction by suggesting that focus is not a volitional choice but a property of consciousness like red colour is the property of tomatoes. To be aware is to be aware of some thing. Without focus there cannot be any consciousness. Volitionally man can only unfocus himself, “to throw of the switch” so to speak, but even that he cannot do completely without the help of drugs or alcohol. Otherwise how such an “unfocused” person is able to go about his daily life? Even simple activities like shopping, driving a car and holding the most simplistic job require abilities to make choice and value-judgment.

Focus is inherent in the consciousness and we only can volitionally change its degree (to be more in focus or less).If it's so then how can we call this condition primary choice? To make any choice (including to be in focus) one already has to have some degree of focus and that sounds like circular argument.

Infants who unable to speak and function on perceptual level cannot make any volitional choices. However they are observable in very high focus from practically day one of their life. During first 2 years of life a child absorbs and process more information then during the rest of his life. For example an infant can learn numerous languages without difficulty-a task which is very difficult in adult life. Infants obviously conscious beings but I don't believe they can make volitional (even implicit) choice to be in focus. Only when they become older they able volitionally to alter the level of their focus

I think that volitional choice is always teleological one-one want to achieve certain goal. When such a choice is made then level of focus will adjust itself to the requirement of the needed action. This adjustment not necessary has to be volitional. What I mean that if one makes volitional choice to be in focus he has to have already quite high level of awareness.

The focus itself has two properties: Intensity and selectivity. Observe animal behavior: for them (especially for hunted animals) to be in focus is a question of survival and not of choice. The level of animal focus intensity is high but selectivity is low-they aware of every thing all the time. The animal with higher level of awareness has better choice to survive and transfer this trait to it offspring. Evolutionally it may be the way to reach the level of human consciousness. Adult humans cannot be focused on every thing all the time. Their focus thus becomes selective. Our sub consciousness may adjust the intensity level of the focus needed to obtain some particular goal. Obviously the level of the focus needed to get ice-cream is different from the one needed to write philosophical treatise. In other words intensity of the focus is determined by the chosen purpose. The choice of the purpose is the primary choice. Volitionally man can only unfocus himself and also not for a long time if he wants to live.

Volition is a faculty of consciousness which enable as to make choices. Animals and small children don’t really make any choices-they however may pursue certain goals on preconceptual level. ”The preconceptual level of consciousness is non-volitional; “Volition begins with the first syllogism” (2) The act of focusing one’s consciousness is volitional. “Existentially the choice to focus or not is the choice to be consciousness or not” (3)

Therefore the act of focusing is volitional act and cannot be done on preconceptual unconscious pre-focus implicit level. That why I claim that focus cannot be primary choice since choice requires conceptual focused level of consciousness as its follows from the above quoted statements. My proposal is that focus is an attribute of any consciousness and its intensity and selectivity is a function of the goal or purpose needed to be achieved. Goal-driven behavior is not necessarily conceptual but the choice to focus qua choice has to be.

Animals don't make any choices but they do face life and death alternatives. Their actions are goal-driven when survival is the primary goal. The difference between goal and purpose is that purpose is consciously chosen goal. Infants who act on preconceptual level also don't make any choices. They have desires which are driven by pleasure-pain mechanism. Their behavior is also goal-driven: to avoid pain and to obtain pleasure.

As we have established, both animals and infants have the ability to focus without choice. What than the mechanism of focus of preconceptual mind? In my opinion it is a goal itself; the implicit desire to achieve something activates focusing. In adult humans unfocused mind is also functioning on preconceptual level. Unfocused mind is unconscious mind in human conceptual sense. Such a mind doesn't possess volition. Therefore prefocused non-volitional mind unable to make any choices, let alone any primary choice.

It's no such a thing as implicit choice since choice presupposes reasoning. Only desire or goal setting can be implicit. One may feel implicit desire for ice-cream but when one has to choice which ice-cream to buy one has to employ his conceptual faculty.

In conclusion: I’ve shown that unfocused mind acts on preconceptual level and doesn't possess the faculty of volition. Volition and choice are attributes of conceptual mind. Therefore in logic unfocused mind cannot make the choice to be in focus

This is definition of choice from Brainy Dictionary:" Choice-Act of choosing; the voluntary act of selecting or separating from two or more things that which is preferred; the determination of the mind in preferring one thing to another; election. “Choice’s characterization of action is that it's a volitional action.” Aside from involuntary responses, such as bodily reflexes, all human actions, mental and physical, are chosen by man. As Leonard Peikoff once observed, the man who is completely out of focus has abdicated his power to choice. Choice to focus is not reflex and qua choice it has to be volitional action. To say that this choice is prerequisite to all other choices is like to say that volitional action is prerequisite of volitional action which is infinite regress.

Choice has to be volitional. This is metaphysical base of free will and freedom. Non-volitional choice is contradiction in terms .Precisely because one cannot choose without choosing something, focus cannot be primary choice. The concept of primary choice belongs to the category of concepts known as primary or first cause-like primary mover, intelligent design, Big Bang, God etc…First cause allegedly causes everything of its kind or everything at all. However this concept has intrinsic contradiction. If primary cause is the cause of everything, then it has to be the cause of itself and that leads to infinite regress. If primary choice is the cause of all other choices then what will be the cause of primary choice? Evidently it has to be another primary choice and so on ad infinitum. Since infinite regress is logical fallacy, the concept of primary choice cannot be valid.

Suppose X="Choice"

Y="Choice to focus"

It is clear that Y is included in the genus X. X(X1,X2,X3.......Xn) and therefore cannot be prerequisite of X since Y is part of X. Actually the proper way to express it would be X=choice; X(f)=Choice to focus. X(f)<X and cannot precede X.

If X (f) is cause of X then X (f) is cause of X (f) since X (f) is part of X and that means infinite regress. If X (f) is not part of X then A is not A which is violation of the Law of Identity. In both cases we face irresolvable contradictions.

The only way to resolve this contradiction is to postulate that primary choice is axiomatic like existence or consciousness. But this also cannot be validated since primary choice qua choice is not metaphysically given. It’s man-made act of human volition.

Focus is not matter of choice but intrinsic attribute of human consciousness. Every man possesses focus and maintains the level of its intensity by choosing his goals.

The possible trigger of the process of focusing is goal-setting. In other words focus is teleological, goal-driven concept. That can explain how animals and infants are focusing. That also may explain how unfocused adult human mind which functions on preconceptual level become focused.

Volition is ability to set or reset goals according to their priorities. Conscious mind is always in focus in various degrees Degree and selectivity of his focus is secondary to man's goals. Without goal or purpose man needs neither focus nor consciousness.

I claim that focus cannot be primary choice, prerequisite of all other choices-for the obvious reason I've described above.

This is the summary of my position:

a. The concept of primary choice is invalid since it leads to infinite regress

.

b. Focus is not a choice; it is prerequisite of any choice.

c. Focus is inherent, inalienable property of human consciousness and qua focus doesn’t require prerequisite.

d. Volition is ability to set or reset goals by choice according to man's priorities.

e. Focus has properties: intensity and selectivity which are goal-driven.

References

1. Leonard Peikoff “Objectivism: The philosophy of Ayn Rand” 1991, pg 59

2. Ayn Rand “For the New Intellectual”, 9; pb14.

3. Ayn Rand” The Objectivist ethics, Virtue of selfishness”, 13pb21.

1.

[Grames]

Since volition pertains only to one's cognition, would you agree that introspective knowledge is required before volitional choices can be made? One must be aware of the alternative of focussing, of thinking, and those are concepts of mental events or actions, and thus are introspective.

-- Mindy

Good question.

I think I will again resort to the distinction between possessing a concept and possessing the referents of the concept. One does not need to possess the concept of volition or focus in order have the faculty of volition or focus. No one chooses to focus for the sake of focusing before they have the concept of focus, they focus in order to grasp reality. Several such acts taken together lead to the abstraction of focus. Reifying focus as a virtue and then choosing to be in focus in order to be virtuous is wrong, it is a hierarchy error akin to the stolen concept.

On the other hand, once one possess the concept of focus it is certainly helpful in that it empowers further self-regulation. Introspection definitely aids volition.

[Mindy]

Good question.

I think I will again resort to the distinction between possessing a concept and possessing the referents of the concept. One does not need to possess the concept of volition or focus in order have the faculty of volition or focus.

Response: Just want to note a logical error here. Your "...possessing the referents of the concept, ["focus"]...is not equivalent to "hav[ing] the faculty of...focus."

No one chooses to focus for the sake of focusing before they have the concept of focus, they focus in order to grasp reality.

Response: While you have used two terms here, "focus" and "grasp reality," they are cognate and semantically equivalent. Technically that makes that statement self-contradictory. To focus is to try to see and to hear, to attend to the details of a proposal, to analyze the conflict between your secretaries, etc. People who are blind don't try to see what made the sound they just heard. It is in appreciation of the cognitive function that seeing is one instance of that they try to see. They may not have an actual concept, "to see," but they know the difference between seeing and not seeing. ---- Where would you place that knowledge in the hierarchy of concepts (and their referents?)

Several such acts taken together lead to the abstraction of focus. Reifying focus as a virtue and then choosing to be in focus in order to be virtuous is wrong, it is a hierarchy error akin to the stolen concept.

Response: I don't think you mean "reifying." Maybe "deifying?" Let me re-state the second sentence, "Declaring that focus is a level of functioning that maximizes life, and then choosing to be in focus in order to be at the level of functioning that maximizes life is wrong...

On the other hand, once one possess the concept of focus it is certainly helpful in that it empowers further self-regulation. Introspection definitely aids volition.

Response: We agree it aids. I would put it much more strongly.

-- Mindy

Edited July 25, 2010 by Mindy

[Grames]

Response: Just want to note a logical error here. Your "...possessing the referents of the concept, ["focus"]...is not equivalent to "hav[ing] the faculty of...focus."

It is only an error if you and I have different sets of referents in mind for the concept of focus. To me focus is an action, an exercise of a power or faculty, and thus no error. Do you think it is something different?

Response: While you have used two terms here, "focus" and "grasp reality," they are cognate and semantically equivalent. Technically that makes that statement self-contradictory.

We must have very different ideas of what focus refers to. Focusing as an action is distinguished from the object the action. Even if I conceded they were semantically equivalent, since when are tautologies self-contradictory?

To focus is to try to see and to hear, to attend to the details of a proposal, to analyze the conflict between your secretaries, etc. People who are blind don't try to see what made the sound they just heard. It is in appreciation of the cognitive function that seeing is one instance of that they try to see. They may not have an actual concept, "to see," but they know the difference between seeing and not seeing. ---- Where would you place that knowledge in the hierarchy of concepts (and their referents?)

If a blind person once could see but lost the faculty of sight then there is still direct memory of what sight was and so they know the meaning of "to see" in the same way the sighted do. The blind from birth can only know "to see" as an abstraction. I do not understand why you segued from a discussion of focus to the blind. The blind cannot focus their eyes, but they can still focus their minds.

Response: I don't think you mean "reifying." Maybe "deifying?" Let me re-state the second sentence, "Declaring that focus is a level of functioning that maximizes life, and then choosing to be in focus in order to be at the level of functioning that maximizes life is wrong...

No, I meant reifying, a particular way to commit the error of dropping context. Reified virtues are intrinsically good, not good for any end.

First comes existence. Then there is consciousness. Lastly there is self-consciousness. Trying to be virtuous as an end in itself is at the level of self-consciousness (and a mistake). Focus is achieved at the level of consciousness, and is virtuous by the objective standard of life for man qua man whether there is self-knowledge of that or not.

[Mindy]

It is only an error if you and I have different sets of referents in mind for the concept of focus. To me focus is an action, an exercise of a power or faculty, and thus no error. Do you think it is something different?

We must have very different ideas of what focus refers to. Focusing as an action is distinguished from the object the action. Even if I conceded they were semantically equivalent, since when are tautologies self-contradictory?

7-25 Response: If focus is an action, or the exercise of a faculty, it is not that faculty. But you said it was the faculty. Your point was that there is an allowable disjunction between having referents for a concept, and having that concept. All well and good. You applied it, however, to the disjunction between having a faculty and knowing you have it.

The proper disjunction is between having noticed individual actions of that faculty, and conceptualizing the faculty. Possessing the faculty cannot, logically, be interchanged with having noticed instances of its functioning. The significance of that error is that you imply that possessing the faculty is enough to lead us to conceptualize it. The fact is, though, that we have to identify the instances of the faculty's use before we can turn them, collectively, into a concept of functioning of that sort. But, if all that were laid out, you'd be required to explain how we grasp that the instances of focus were just that, were mental. That requires introspection. The effect is to dispense with the role of introspection in forming the concept of focus.

If a blind person once could see but lost the faculty of sight then there is still direct memory of what sight was and so they know the meaning of "to see" in the same way the sighted do. The blind from birth can only know "to see" as an abstraction. I do not understand why you segued from a discussion of focus to the blind. The blind cannot focus their eyes, but they can still focus their minds.

7-25-2010 Response: I mentioned that a blind person doesn't make efforts to see. Animals and infants do. He behaves to optimize hearing, which animals and infants also do. He possess a full-blown concept of knowledge, of which hearing is the major part. His making efforts to hear clearly is, in him, an effort to gain knowledge. Why isn't the same behavior, in animals and infants, evidence of some, however rudimentary, grasp of the phenomenon of knowing?

No, I meant reifying, a particular way to commit the error of dropping context. Reified virtues are intrinsically good, not good for any end.

7-254-2010 Response: No, you said, "reifying focus as a virtue..." Now, focus is already reified, in the sense that is a functional aspect of an organism. It would be nice if you would read my re-write of your statement. There is no fault of reification there, and it is something you passed on responding to. Where does your complaint of "reifying focus as a virtue" come from--in anything I have written?

First comes existence. Then there is consciousness. Lastly there is self-consciousness. Trying to be virtuous as an end in itself is at the level of self-consciousness (and a mistake). Focus is achieved at the level of consciousness, and is virtuous by the objective standard of life for man qua man whether there is self-knowledge of that or not.

Do you not[/i agreed that you have to recognize an alternative to make a choice? And that implies introspective knowledge.

The returns on our exchanges are fast-dwindling, I'm sure you agree.

-- Mindy

[Grames]

7-25 Response: If focus is an action, or the exercise of a faculty, it is not that faculty. But you said it was the faculty. Your point was that there is an allowable disjunction between having referents for a concept, and having that concept. All well and good. You applied it, however, to the disjunction between having a faculty and knowing you have it.

Unstated premise: There is no "knowing about focus" without forming the concept for it. Problem solved.

7-25-2010 Response: I mentioned that a blind person doesn't make efforts to see. Animals and infants do. He behaves to optimize hearing, which animals and infants also do. He possess a full-blown concept of knowledge, of which hearing is the major part. His making efforts to hear clearly is, in him, an effort to gain knowledge. Why isn't the same behavior, in animals and infants, evidence of some, however rudimentary, grasp of the phenomenon of knowing?

It is.

Where does your complaint of "reifying focus as a virtue" come from--in anything I have written?

I was influenced by that other long post by someone else reeking of intrinsicism, but which I did not want to respond to. Sorry for the confusion.

Do you not agreed that you have to recognize an alternative to make a choice? And that implies introspective knowledge.

The alternatives recognized need not be found introspectively, all of the alternatives can be entirely external. Choosing implies some internal standard was applied, but 'implies' is weak tea. "Existence exists" is implied in everything we do but no one need review metaphysics before making breakfast. Similarly, no one need "know about vision" explicitly and conceptually before choosing to look at the objects lying about and no one need "know about focus" explicitly and conceptually in order to focus.

The returns on our exchanges are fast-dwindling, I'm sure you agree.

-- Mindy

I disagree.

[Mindy]

This is your, unstated premise, right? Are you repudiating it, to solve the problem I brought up? Additionally, this overturns the process of concept-formation. Concepts don't precede knowing the particulars they conceptualize.

This is your response to my saying that trying-to-see behavior in animals and infants implies a rudimentary grasp of "focus." So you are now agreeing?

The purpose of this thread is to discuss what underlies our explicit concept of knowledge, focus, etc. Here, you are denying there is anything underlying it? Or, it is abstracted from other concepts? All mental terms are introspective knowledge. "Knowledge" and "focus" are introspective terms. They summarize introspectively-known particulars.

I find you don't understand what I've said, and I have strongly suspected that you don't recall with precision what you yourself have declared.

-- Mindy

Edited July 25, 2010 by Mindy

[Grames]

This is your, unstated premise, right? Are you repudiating it, to solve the problem I brought up? Additionally, this overturns the process of concept-formation. Concepts don't precede knowing the particulars they conceptualize.

It is my unstated premise, and I affirm its truth and that it bridges the gap you objected to. The formula "There is no 'knowing about X' without forming the concept for X" merely restates the distinction between having a concept and having the referents. You can have a multitude of would-be referents on hand and not integrate them into concept X, so there would be no knowledge about X until that integration was made.

This is your response to my saying that trying-to-see behavior in animals and infants implies a rudimentary grasp of "focus." So you are now agreeing?

That depends on the interpretation attached to the word 'rudimentary'. Infants and animals have some sense of self but do not have enough self-consciousness (or access to language!) to form concepts about their own mental operations, even though their mentalities certainly are operating well enough to grasp particulars. Ayn Rand had the idea of the 'implicit concept' to refer to the state of possessing the constituents of what may be later integrated into a concept. If 'rudimentary grasp' encompasses the implicit stage of concept formation we can agree. Although Ayn Rand would deny that animals could have implicit concepts on the grounds that they could never complete the process of concept formation and come to regard particulars as units of a concept, they do appear to operate on some level of preconceptual awareness of types. For examples, pets do not require being taught what food is all over again each time the food bowl is refilled. You used the term "perceptual abstractions" earlier in this thread for what I take to be the same phenomenon.

Quote

The purpose of this thread is to discuss what underlies our explicit concept of knowledge, focus, etc. Here, you are denying there is anything underlying it? Or, it is abstracted from other concepts? All mental terms are introspective knowledge. "Knowledge" and "focus" are introspective terms. They summarize introspectively-known particulars.

No, that would be this other thread: Prerequisites for the Concept of Knowledge

Actually you kicked off this discussion with the following question in post #10: "Since volition pertains only to one's cognition, would you agree that introspective knowledge is required before volitional choices can be made? One must be aware of the alternative of focussing, of thinking, and those are concepts of mental events or actions, and thus are introspective."

My answer to that is no, navel-gazing is not a prerequisite to choosing and acting even though it certainly helps when done correctly. Introspection is not a requirement, as you proposed. Now, I would agree that the normative case could be made that one should introspect in order to live the flourishing life of man qua man but no one is born with this skill and quite a bit of time passes between birth and the first attempts at introspection, and in that interval there is volitional acting.

[Mindy]

Rudimentary means primitive, un-developed, "an unfinished beginning," my dictionary offers, nicely. No special meaning of the term was used or needed. Your phrase, "preconceptual awareness of types" will suffice. My position is that the behavior of animals and infants, in which they orient themselves so as to see or hear better, implies at least a "preconceptual awareness of types" regarding seeing and/or hearing.

Since the type in question is mental actions, the preconceptual awareness is awareness of mental actions. We categorize awareness and knowledge, rudimentary or not, of mental actions as introspective.

(Incidental note: Rand didn't originate the idea of implicit knowledge.)

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Yes, the same material involved here and there led me to confuse the two.

"Navel-gazing?" Is that a slur on introspection? What is your reason for discrediting it?

Whether it is or not is the question at issue. You don't get to assert your conclusion and use it in the discussion, until the argument is done. There's a name for that...

These are just claims. How do you know that humans are not born with the "skill" to introspect, in the same rudimentary sense as they are said to be born with the "skill" to form percepts and then concepts? The sense-orienting behavior of animals and infants is offered as evidence to the contrary.

How do you know when the first, rudimentary attempts at introspection occur? How do you know volitional choices precede that point?

You also have not addressed the argument that the choice to focus is, in logic, a matter of introspective knowledge, since "focus" is an introspective term.

Less than a trickle, I'd say.

-- Mindy

[Grames]

These are just claims. How do you know that humans are not born with the "skill" to introspect, in the same rudimentary sense as they are said to be born with the "skill" to form percepts and then concepts? The sense-orienting behavior of animals and infants is offered as evidence to the contrary.

How do you know when the first, rudimentary attempts at introspection occur? How do you know volitional choices precede that point?

I have made the distinction between having a concept and having the referents of a concept, now I will make the point more emphatically. Logically and chronologically the referents must be on hand before they can be integrated into a concept. There can be no introspection until there are experiences and memories to introspect about. There can be no awareness of volition until there are first several instances of volition that can be discriminated from the background of other mental activity and united by a certain similarity.

The primacy of existence principle applies even within consciousness; there can be no awareness of volition unless volition already exists prior to and independently of the awareness of it.

If you have to be aware introspectively of volition before you can be volitional, then how does the first act of volition ever come about? If the introspective awareness or knowledge of volition cannot be derived in a natural way from an unselfconscious non-introspective original act of volition then it must come from innate knowledge. Your entertaining of the notion of being born with a "skill" for forming percepts, forming concepts or introspecting is an appeal to the doctrine of innate knowledge. I hope you come to refudiate this bit of Kantianism you have permitted to creep into your thought.

I do not use the word skill in scare quotes because it is not a metaphor for something else. Skill is exactly what I mean. No one is born with any skill, not even in rudimentary form. All skills are learned starting from zero. Reflexes are not skills. In vision, the response of the rods and cones of the retina to incident light is efficient causation not skill. The existence of the optic nerve is a fact given by biology not a skill. The default structure of an infant's brain is the product of a sequence of cellular growth not a skill. Skill at perception accrues over time from discriminating between several responses to the same stimuli. The requirement for stimuli makes innate skill impossible because there is inadequate stimuli before birth, and because stimuli originate externally to an organism not internally.

You also have not addressed the argument that the choice to focus is, in logic, a matter of introspective knowledge, since "focus" is an introspective term.

I'm not contesting it because it is obviously true. What is less obvious (to you) is that there can be no introspection without there first being content to introspect upon.

[Mindy]

"If you have to be aware introspectively of volition before you can be volitional, then how does the first act of volition ever come about?" Grames, previous post.

Notice that if you take the term, "introspection" out of your statement, you get: "If you have to be aware of volition before you can be volitional, ...how does the first act of volition ever come about?"

Down-grading the role of introspection has been your tact in this discussion. It isn't a logical alternative, which you now accept. The fact is, treating introspection as a respectable source of information/knowledge provides the solution to this logical dilemma.

As I've been trying to show, even animals and infants experience the vagaries of sense-perception, much of which is caused by the movement of objects in their environment. Long before they are able to form concepts, they have experiences of the interruption of perception, etc. that would be sufficient to distinguish between being conscious of a specific something and not being. Their behavior, in voluntarily orienting themselves so as to be able to see or hear better, is evidence of a rudimentary grasp of that difference. Awareness of a difference, and even behavior to attain or sustain one of those different states does not,however,constitute a choice in the sense that volition does.

What an infant (animal) pursues depends on their organismic state and appetites, etc. The baby trying to see is not actually choosing between seeing or not seeing. He is trying to see because seeing is preferred, is satisfying, etc. Even when a baby acts to ignore something, they are acting to avoid a "positive" nuisance. The value/disvalue they act on is set by organismic, evolutionary, possibly learned, factors, all at the pre-conceptual level. The baby doesn't choose whether to see or not. He desires to see, and acts to be able to do so. His specific, structured action shows he is aware of the difference between seeing and not. However, that level of discrimination is not the same as a choice made in contemplation of explicit alternatives.

Only when man reaches the fully volitional state does he choose between explicit, simultaneously-considered alternatives. Only when man chooses between explicit, simultaneously-considered alternatives is he at the volitional stage.

Introspection at this lower level may be abstracted over, combining hearing and seeing and recognizing, etc., and thus creating the awareness of a type of difference that, when conceptualized, provides the alternatives "in focus" and "not focussed" that allow volition proper.

Infants prefer to see (for the most part,) and they realize, in a primitive sense, that they could see, and they act to be able to see. They are grasping mental states and preferring certain ones, and acting so as to achieve the preferred state. This is the pre-conceptual level that provides the content to bring the child to conceive the actual choice of seeing or not seeing, knowing or not knowing.

It is introspective knowledge all the way.

-- Mindy

Edited July 27, 2010 by Mindy

[Mindy]

Ayn Rand defines knowledge as: "a mental grasp of fact(s) of reality, reached by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation".

Do you still want to affirm that premise?

-- Mindy

[Grames]

Notice that if you take the term, "introspection" out of your statement, you get: "If you have to be aware of volition before you can be volitional, ...how does the first act of volition ever come about?"

Down-grading the role of introspection has been your tact in this discussion. It isn't a logical alternative, which you now accept. The fact is, treating introspection as a respectable source of information/knowledge provides the solution to this logical dilemma.

My statement is just as deadly an objection in this version. The primacy of existence principle mandates that introspection should be downgraded in a particular way. Introspection is not a respectable source of information when it becomes primacy of consciousness. Innate knowledge is primacy of consciousness.

As I've been trying to show, even animals and infants experience the vagaries of sense-perception, much of which is caused by the movement of objects in their environment. Long before they are able to form concepts, they have experiences of the interruption of perception, etc. that would be sufficient to distinguish between being conscious of a specific something and not being. Their behavior, in voluntarily orienting themselves so as to be able to see or hear better, is evidence of a rudimentary grasp of that difference. Awareness of a difference, and even behavior to attain or sustain one of those different states does not,however, constitute a choice in the sense that volition does.

What an infant (animal) pursues depends on their organismic state and appetites, etc. The baby trying to see is not actually choosing between seeing or not seeing. He is trying to see because seeing is preferred, is satisfying, etc. Even when a baby acts to ignore something, they are acting to avoid a "positive" nuisance. The value/disvalue they act on is set by organismic, evolutionary, possibly learned, factors, all at the pre-conceptual level. The baby doesn't choose whether to see or not. He desires to see, and acts to be able to do so. His specific, structured action shows he is aware of the difference between seeing and not. However, that level of discrimination is not the same as a choice made in contemplation of explicit alternatives.

Only when man reaches the fully volitional state does he choose between explicit, simultaneously-considered alternatives. Only when man chooses between explicit, simultaneously-considered alternatives is he at the volitional stage.

So all you've got is the "No true Scotsman" fallacy? "It is not really volition, the true and genuine volition rightly considered and properly understood unless you know it is volition." This is a loser. And how disappointing to find that you are a member of the "babies are automatons" brigade of rationalists.

Introspection at this lower level may be abstracted over, combining hearing and seeing and recognizing, etc., and thus creating the awareness of a type of difference that, when conceptualized, provides the alternatives "in focus" and "not focussed" that allow volition proper.

Infants prefer to see (for the most part,) and they realize, in a primitive sense, that they could see, and they act to be able to see. They are grasping mental states and preferring certain ones, and acting so as to achieve the preferred state. This is the pre-conceptual level that provides the content to bring the child to conceive the actual choice of seeing or not seeing, knowing or not knowing.

This is as close as you come to dealing with the hierarchy problem your theory has. If the mental content at this pre-conceptual level leads to forming the concept, then they are referents of that concept. If one set of referents is used to form a concept and then once the concept is in hand those referents are excluded, that is a contradiction which is a version of the stolen concept.

Ayn Rand defines knowledge as: "a mental grasp of fact(s) of reality, reached by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation".

Do you still want to affirm that premise?

Yes. I suppose you think I am asserting all knowledge is conceptual. That is false. 'Focus' and 'volition' are concepts so the premise applies as I stated it.

[Mindy]

Grames, I'm tired of chasing you around instead of progressing with the discussion. You ignore most of my arguments. You pronounce without proof. You mis-state yourself and me. The most benevolent interpretation of all of this is that you aren't too bright.

"There is no knowing about X without forming the concept for X." Grames, July 25, 7:37. Grames, July 27: "Yes. I suppose you think I am asserting all knowledge is conceptual. That is false. 'Focus' and 'volition' are concepts so the premise applies as I stated it."

"Focus" and "volition" are concepts. Focus and volition are not. They are mental phenomena. We do know about them before we conceptualize them, just as we know about palm trees before we conceptualize them.

I'm applying the highest standards from here on out to any response you might make. If not competent, I won't bother to respond.

-- Mindy