Argument for the existence of God

[dream_weaver]

However, I do not think that the principle or truth to which the sentence refers is reducible to the perceptual. It does not seem possible to perceive the application of the law of identity to any and all entities.

If you think that it is, please demonstrate it.

The ball rolled when Jacob86 pushed it.

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

How do you come up with these dichotomies? The "truths" are the referents the concepts designate. Every thing you see has identity. One knows there will not be an existent to percieve without Identity because of what it means to have identity. Which meaning is ubiquitously available to validate in every perception.

I assume what you mean here is that it would be illogical for an entity to not have identity. I agree.

But how do you know that? How does your epistemology make this claim? It seems it is only possible to make the claim that "each entity which I have perceived has identity". Or have you perceived that all (even unperceived) entities must also have identity?? If so, could you please point my perception in the direction where I may perceive that all (even unperceived) entities must have identity?

[Jacob86]

The “principle or truth to which the sentence refers” is found in the words (concepts) that form the sentence. The principle is not a disembodied idea which exists independent of concepts (words) or independent of your mind or independent of reality. You cannot know-of or state a principle except by the “use” of concepts which are ultimately formed from percepts. Knowledge, meaningful, truthful knowledge, is Objective.

Again. I completely agree that "you cannot know-of or state a principle except by the use of concepts which are ultimately formed from percepts". I never denied this. I am simply asking how it is possible to reduce every bit of knowledge back to the perceptual. Not every word used, but rather that which the words are being used to signify.

Let me make a shorter example:

"All entities have identity"

You can reduce to the perceptual the individual meaning of each word in that sentence. I totally agree!

"All"-"entities"-"have"-"identity"

So we have proven that all of the words being used in the sentence are reducible to perception and therefore not "floating abstractions", etc...

However, what if one were to object that this is a meaningless combination of words? Why should these specific words be combined in this way? Have you perceived that this combination of the words is accurate? If so, please point my perception in the direction where I may also perceive it.

Edited December 1, 2010 by Jacob86

[Jacob86]

These three questions are all of the same issue: you assert that it is impossible to derive a universal from several particulars. I assert that it is possible. I have paraphrased and synopsized Rand's theory of concept formation several times, and you can go read it again in full in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology 2nd ed. If you have questions or objections to that theory, specify them.

I have read it. And until now, I did not have any major objections against it because I was reading it as an interesting (and accurate) description of Cognitive Science rather than a limiting of Epistemology to the perceptual. However, I am now seeing some major flaws which I originally passed over.

Concerning deriving a universal from several particulars, I am asking you to demonstrate how this is possible. Using your epistemology, it seems only possible to derive a "universal" concerning those particular particulars which one has perceived- I suppose it should be called a "particular perceptual universal". I am still confused as to how you assert that it is possible to derive a universal (which must apply to all particulars whether perceived or not) from the mere perception of the particulars which one has perceived. I know you are asserting that it is possible. I am asking how it is possible using only that which is reducible to the perceptual?

I'm still not sure you even recognize the scope of the issue which the problem of universals poses. It seems to be a bit of a blind spot for you. The Medieval Problem of Universals is a review of the historical development starting from the Greeks. The problem is basically "Where is the universal? In the things (intrinsicism) or in us (subjectivism)?" To follow the story into modernity, Kant's "Copernican Revolution" advocated a theory for the meanings of words as determined by a kind of social inter-subjectivity. Kant and his intellectual descendants still qualify as subjectivists. Rand did not solve the problem (by picking a winner) as much as she dissolved the problem by emphasizing consciousness is an activity, a verb not a state or substance. Thus objectivity is a relationship and a relationship cannot be meaningfully attributed to either party in isolation from the other.

Ok. I am familiar with the historical flow on the issue and I do have my own theories regarding the issue, but I honestly don't care too much about the "location" of universals in this discussion. We are talking about how one can know universals (regardless of their "location" or "source" etc...). If any particular theory on universals is proven to be wrong (or right, for that matter) in this discussion, then so be it..but that's not my point as of now.

What I am getting at is; using Oist epistemology, how can one come to know universals?

You're response seems to be "we can't go there because that implies a theory of universals which I do not agree with".

But if the knowledge of universals (and therefore all knowledge) necessitates an epistemology which implies a different theory of universals than the one you currently hold, then it seems that you will have to choose which theory you wish to reject (your epistemology or your theory on universals). That's not my problem.

The objection that "well, that implies a different view on another issue" is not an adequate objection.

So getting back at the main issue. I can see how you can develop a "particular perceptual universal" regarding those particular apples, trees, and birds which you have perceived. But I do not see how you can develop a universal applicable to those which you have not perceived. Let alone to all entities.

[New Buddha]

that which the words are being used to signify.

There is no dichotomy between the word (concept) and what the word “signifies”. We only know the signifier by means of the concept. Conceptualization is our “method” of knowledge. Concepts are not formed in a vacuum or given to us by a god, or exist in some supernatural plane – they are derived from perception. This is the bed rock of Objectivism.

[Jacob86]

There is no dichotomy between the word (concept) and what the word “signifies”. We only know the signifier by means of the concept. Conceptualization is our “method” of knowledge. Concepts are not formed in a vacuum or given to us by a god, or exist in some supernatural plane – they are derived from perception. This is the bed rock of Objectivism.

I do not claim any such vacuum or revelation. Right now I am only questioning the ability of Oist epistemology to come to know certain things.

Could you please answer the question about why that sentence is not a meaningless combination of words? How do you know that the combination of those words is accurate?

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

So getting back at the main issue. I can see how you can develop a "particular perceptual universal" regarding those particular apples, trees, and birds which you have perceived. But I do not see how you can develop a universal applicable to those which you have not perceived. Let alone to all entities.

Apparently you missed my earlier comment about concepts and Inductive propositions being ampliative. All concepts involve ascribing a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class.

There is no such thing as a "particular perceptual universal". The attribution is to an unlimited class. That is ,it always goes beyond the perceptual and extends to the unobserved members of that class.

But if the knowledge of universals (and therefore all knowledge) necessitates an epistemology which implies a different theory of universals than the one you currently hold, then it seems that you will have to choose which theory you wish to reject (your epistemology or your theory on universals). That's not my problem.

Another unwarranted dichotomy. A theory of universals IS epistemology.

Edited December 1, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

Apparently you missed my earlier comment about concepts and Inductive propositions being ampliative. All concepts involve ascribing a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class.

There is no such thing as a "particular perceptual universal". The attribution is to an unlimited class. That is ,it always goes beyond the perceptual and extends to the unobserved members of that class.

I didn't miss it...and I agree with this point. I just don't see how you can agree with it unless you are inconsistent with the epistemology which says that everything you know must be reducible to the perceptual.

Unless you have perceived that it goes beyond the perceptual and extends to unobserved members, how can you know it? Is the "applicability of a universal to all unobserved particulars" reducible to perception?

I'd also like to re-iterate a point made to newbuddah. I know and agree that each word/concept in a proposition can be reduced to perception. But can the truthfulness of the proposition be reduced to perception?

"All unperceived entities have identity"

Each individual concept is reducible to perception: "All"-"unperceived"-"entities"-"have"-"identity".

But how does one know that this combination of words is meaningful or accurate.

For instance, what if it was "Not all unperceived entities have identity". Each of these words is likewise reducible to perception. But it is a very different combination of words. Can one reduce to perception the accuracy or inaccuracy of these combinations of words?? And if one cannot reduce to perception the accuracy/inaccuracy of the combinations of words, then how (according to Objectivist Epistemology) can one know anything more than a monkey can?

Another unwarranted dichotomy. A theory of universals IS epistemology.

Very well then I suppose I am indirectly questioning your theory on universals. Regardless, my point is that I care more about the ability to know universals than I do about the location or source of universals. My point is, if your only reason for objecting is that this makes you question your position on universals, then that's not my problem and its not an adequate objection.

[dream_weaver]

I didn't miss it...and I agree with this point. I just don't see how you can agree with it unless you are inconsistent with the epistemology which says that everything you know must be reducible to the perceptual.

Unless you have perceived that it goes beyond the perceptual and extends to unobserved members, how can you know it? Is the "applicability of a universal to all unobserved particulars" reducible to perception?

If you take the concept of 'man', we started with Mom, Dad, Aunt, Uncle. Later we added the Clerk, Police Officer, and Teacher. From the perceptual, you see a 'man' that you have not previously observed, and recognize the similarity to 'man' that you established the concept formed from Mom, Dad, etc. You see another 'man' you have not seen before. You repeat the process. At some point you induce that there are 'man' that you have not perceived that are included in the universal 'man'. You continue to perceive new instances of 'man' deduce that they are similar to the other instances you have observed. The perceptual in this case is the perception of a previously unperceived 'man'. This observation of reality permits us to expand beyond the perceptual, using the perceptual to extend to unobserved members.

Very well then I suppose I am indirectly questioning your theory on universals. Regardless, my point is that I care more about the ability to know universals than I do about the location or source of universals. My point is, if your only reason for objecting is that this makes you question your position on universals, then that's not my problem and its not an adequate objection.

Questioning the Objectivist position on universals? You have a tendency to try and 'create positions on things' for others.

Jacob86 appears to be questioning the Objectivist position on universals.

Plasmatic, Grames, New Buddah and others have been patiently trying to help you understand.

[Jacob86]

If you take the concept of 'man', we started with Mom, Dad, Aunt, Uncle. Later we added the Clerk, Police Officer, and Teacher. From the perceptual, you see a 'man' that you have not previously observed, and recognize the similarity to 'man' that you established the concept formed from Mom, Dad, etc. You see another 'man' you have not seen before. You repeat the process. At some point you induce that there are 'man' that you have not perceived that are included in the universal 'man'. You continue to perceive new instances of 'man' deduce that they are similar to the other instances you have observed. The perceptual in this case is the perception of a previously unperceived 'man'. This observation of reality permits us to expand beyond the perceptual, using the perceptual to extend to unobserved members.

Yes. I understand this process. What I am asking is can you know with certainty that any 2 men plus any 2 other men will equal 4 total men? I assume your answer is "yes". Now, how is this bit of knowledge reducible to perception? How do you know that 2+2=4 regarding that which has not been perceived-- via perception?

Questioning the Objectivist position on universals? You have a tendency to try and 'create positions on things' for others.

Jacob86 appears to be questioning the Objectivist position on universals.

Plasmatic, Grames, New Buddah and others have been patiently trying to help you understand.

I DO NOT CARE ABOUT ONE'S POSITION ON UNIVERSALS in regards to their location/source/etc.. I am not "creating a position for others". The objections to my questions seemed tantamount to "but that doesn't jive with our theory of universals". My response is "what's your point?"

If anyones position on universals makes it impossible for them to answer these questions, so much the worse for them.

[dream_weaver]

Yes. I understand this process. What I am asking is can you know with certainty that any 2 men plus any 2 other men will equal 4 total men? I assume your answer is "yes". Now, how is this bit of knowledge reducible to perception? How do you know that 2+2=4 regarding that which has not been perceived-- via perception?

By the same method used to extend the concept of man beyond the perceptual, except now you are applying it to number instead.

[Plasmatic]

Jacob I have told you that neither myself or Oism rejects ampliative propositions. Why do you continue to assert then that its a problem for Oist? If ampliation is not rejected then why do you continue to ask one to justify it perceptually in the manner you mean?

Reducing a concept to the perceptual [which you claim to agree with] is not the same as making the contradictory claim that ampliative assertions need to be enumerated perceptually to be justified. NO ONE IS CLAIMING THIS!

Lets do this. Explain what it would mean to you to reduce something to perception.I'm curious.

I'm also curious about some other things. You seem to have been claiming that your belief in a god is warranted by necessity. You have made it clear that you believe you have a rational warrant for this belief and that this separates you from "non thinking " theist. I'm curious how did you discern the necessity of this entities gender? How did you find it to be necessary that it is anthropomorphic? Is your whole point that necessity is the reason for belief? Or are you on your way to claiming faith is necessary?

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

Yes. I understand this process. What I am asking is can you know with certainty that any 2 men plus any 2 other men will equal 4 total men? I assume your answer is "yes". Now, how is this bit of knowledge reducible to perception? How do you know that 2+2=4 regarding that which has not been perceived-- via perception?

The answer to the above requires that you "care" to learn about the "source" of universals. Also any further dismissal of Oist epistemology as irrelevant is question begging until we come to some sort of agreement. [im talking about your Cognitive science claim]

Jacob said:

I DO NOT CARE ABOUT ONE'S POSITION ON UNIVERSALS in regards to their location/source/etc.. I am not "creating a position for others". The objections to my questions seemed tantamount to "but that doesn't jive with our theory of universals". My response is "what's your point?"

The point is Oist theory of universals is an ampliative one! What doesn't jive is your assertion that Oist claim the opposite .

Edited December 2, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Jacob86]

Jacob I have told you that neither myself or Oism rejects ampliative propositions. Why do you continue to assert then that its a problem for Oist? If ampliation is not rejected then why do you continue to ask one to justify it perceptually in the manner you mean?

Yes. I know that you hold to this and that you also hold to the "universal" use of logic. However, this seems very inconsistent with the view that "all knowledge is/must be reducible to perception". It seems that the Oist must either reject "ampliation"/universal use of logic/etc.. or reject the premise that "all knowledge must be reducible to perception". This is because the knowledge that "concepts are ampiative to any and all unperceived entities in a particular class" and the knowledge that "logic is universally 'valid' concerning all unperceived entities" is not reducible to perception. No one can perceive the application of the laws of logic to unperceived entities. If only perception can be used to gather knowledge, then one can only know that the laws of logic are applicable to that which one has perceived.

Reducing a concept to the perceptual [which you claim to agree with] is not the same as making the contradictory claim that ampliative assertions need to be enumerated perceptually to be justified. NO ONE IS CLAIMING THIS!

I know. No one in their right mind would deny the universal application of logic. But as I pointed out above, it seems that the major Oist epistemological premise undercuts logic. I'm not saying Oists don't use logic. (Rand used it superlatively!). I'm saying it is inconsistent with this epistemological premise of all knowledge being reducible to perception.

Lets do this. Explain what it would mean to you to reduce something to perception.I'm curious.

I do not hold that all knowledge is reducible to perception. However, in order to demonstrate that "all entities have identity" is reducible to perception, one would need to perceive all entities having identity. Obviously such a feat is impossible and yet the statement "all entities have identity" is and must be true! How do we know it's true if we have not perceived all entities having identity? Because it is logically necessary... and that logical necessity is NOT reducible to perception. I cannot perceive the logical necessity of "all entities having identity", but I can know that it is true because its opposite is logically contradictory.

Therefore, I hold that there are two major ways to "know" something: 1) Logical necessity and 2) Perceptual observation combined with logic.

I'm also curious about some other things. You seem to have been claiming that your belief in a god is warranted by necessity. You have made it clear that you believe you have a rational warrant for this belief and that this separates you from "non thinking " theist. I'm curious how did you discern the necessity of this entities gender?

I have not specifically discerned the necessity of God's gender, however I have discerned the necessity of God's "person-hood" and therefore refer to God as "He" rather than "it". And I choose "He" rather than "She" merely because "He" and "masculine" pronouns are commonly used to refer to persons in general. I do not claim that He has genitalia.

How did you find it to be necessary that it is anthropomorphic?

See above concerning person-hood. Also, in general, if there is a God, wouldn't we be "theopomorphic" rather than Him being "anthropomorphic"? Meaning, wouldn't we be like Him rather than He being like us?

Is your whole point that necessity is the reason for belief? Or are you on your way to claiming faith is necessary?

To the first question; yes. To the second; absolutely not! And I will fight (and have fought) any Theist who tries to claim that faith is necessary to know that God exists...and I will prove them wrong. I would side with Atheism before I would with faith-based Theism.

[Grames]

I have read it. ... I am asking how it is possible using only that which is reducible to the perceptual?

Read it again. It is not something you should expect to fully grasp in one reading. I have had to read it several times. Rand gives examples with first level concepts "table" and "man" and the abstraction "justice". It is telling that these examples do not leap to your mind. Read it, do not skim for highlights so you can argue about it online, read it for understanding.

Ok. I am familiar with the historical flow on the issue and I do have my own theories regarding the issue, but I honestly don't care too much about the "location" of universals in this discussion.

LOL. You have probably heard that retort to people that don't believe in God, "but God believes in you". Well, you might claim not to care about the location of universals but the kind of universal you have and what you are entitled to do with it validly is entirely dependent on this issue. You are the slave of dead philosophers by just assuming you have a universal so you can get on with things. Whatever your default position is it is still a position (and an entire system of thought by implication), and very likely wrong since you haven't examined it before. You need to elevate your level of self-awareness.

We are talking about how one can know universals (regardless of their "location" or "source" etc...). If any particular theory on universals is proven to be wrong (or right, for that matter) in this discussion, then so be it..but that's not my point as of now.

What I am getting at is; using Oist epistemology, how can one come to know universals?

You're response seems to be "we can't go there because that implies a theory of universals which I do not agree with".

Au contraire, mon frere. You are the one who keeps dodging the issue of where universals come from. You want to smuggle into this discussion as hidden premises some theory of universals and I (and the others still here) am merely unwilling to let them remain hidden. If you want to get to the root of this discussion then go the most fundamental possible issue where there is a conflict, the universals.

In Objectivism, a concept is a universal. Other philosophies have used the word idea, or other terms. Universal has come to be meta-terminology abstracted from the many theories in the history of philosophy that have grappled with the problem. Don't let the generality confuse you, a universal is not some intrusive separate idea that changes the subject.

But if the knowledge of universals (and therefore all knowledge) necessitates an epistemology which implies a different theory of universals than the one you currently hold, then it seems that you will have to choose which theory you wish to reject (your epistemology or your theory on universals). That's not my problem.

The objection that "well, that implies a different view on another issue" is not an adequate objection.

LOL again. Every epistemology IS a theory of universals first and foremost. Even denying that there are universals is a theory of universals with consequences for that epistemology. I am not willing to accept whatever hodgepodge of unstated assumptions you want to use as a basis for thought and still pretend this discussion about thought get can anywhere. Time for some clarity on fundamentals. This thread is already 400+ comments of dancing around a maypole you don't want to look at. How much longer are you willing to play the role of the crank philosopher instead of genuinely seeking the truth?

[Greebo]

Jacob86 - you have presented several "examples" of knowledge that you think can't be reduced to perception and have been shown that they do, in fact, reduce to perception OR to axiomatic knowledge derived from perceptual observation.

Provide an example of knowledge that doesn't reduce and we can go further.

Otherwise, your assertion is arbitrary and not worth further consideration.

Edited December 2, 2010 by Greebo

[Jacob86]

Jacob86 - you have presented several "examples" of knowledge that you think can't be reduced to perception and have been shown that they do, in fact, reduce to perception OR to axiomatic knowledge derived from perceptual observation.

No. No one has done anything of the sort. You have not demonstrated how "all entities having identity" is perceptual. You have demonstrated how "those particular entities which you have observed have identity" through your perception, but the "ampliation" or "applicability" of this to any and all unperceived eneitites is not perceived. Therefore, from this view point of "knowledge only being reduced to perception", one cannot know that an attribute can be "ampliated" or "applicable" to anything which one has not perceived.

Provide an example of knowledge that doesn't reduce and we can go further.

-All unperceived entities having identity

-The applicability of 2+2=4 to all unperceived entities

Remember, I am not speaking about the reducibility to perception of the individual concepts. I am speaking about that which this particular combination of concepts signifies: "All unperceived entities having identity-ness".

If you don't understand this distinction, ask yourself why this particular combination of words is accurate? And can you reduce to perception the accuracy of this particular combination of words (i.e. the truthfulness of the proposition)?

Otherwise, your assertion is arbitrary and not worth further consideration.

No. This ridiculous assertion that "all knowledge is reducible to perception" is arbitrary because it cuts out the use of logic entirely. You just don't see this because you are taking logic for granted. Through perception, you only know that "a is a" regarding those things which you have perceived. If this assertion about all of knowledge is true, than "a is a" is simply a common attribute which you have perceived among those entities which you have perceived. But you you can not know that it is an attribute belonging to that which you have not perceived if you can not know anything which is not reducible to perception.

I think the reason your missing it is because it is so simple.

The only way you can project an attribute of perceived entities onto those entities which have not been perceived is by realizing the logical necessity of it being so. The reason you know all unperceived entities have identity is because it is logically necessary (i.e. logically inescapable). You cannot perceive the necessity of all entities having identity. You can observe instances of particular entities having identity. But you can only know that all entities have identity by reasoning and realizing that it must be so.

Therefore, as I said to Plasmatic above, there must be 2 ways to know something: 1)Logical necessity and 2) Perception combined with logic.

You cannot reject this without destroying the ability to use logic.. which is to destroy the ability to know anything more than a monkey.

[Greebo]

I covered 2+2=4 and your error in how you approach it. I do not recall seeing you respond to that.

[Jacob86]

Read it again. It is not something you should expect to fully grasp in one reading. I have had to read it several times. Rand gives examples with first level concepts "table" and "man" and the abstraction "justice". It is telling that these examples do not leap to your mind. Read it, do not skim for highlights so you can argue about it online, read it for understanding.

I did not skim it originally. And I read it long before I got on the forum because it interested me- not because I wanted to debate someone about it. Re-reading it will get me no where because I have realized the essential flaw in Oist epistemology: that it take logic for granted. It uses logic throughout but it explicitly undercuts the ability to use logic. It assumes the universal applicability of logic but denies the ability to know the universal applicability of logic by declaring that all knowledge is reducible to perception. This is because one cannot perceive the applicability of logic to that which has not been perceived. One can only know that it is so because they realize that it logically must be so- but the truth that it logically must be so is not reducible to perception.

LOL. You have probably heard that retort to people that don't believe in God, "but God believes in you". Well, you might claim not to care about the location of universals but the kind of universal you have and what you are entitled to do with it validly is entirely dependent on this issue. You are the slave of dead philosophers by just assuming you have a universal so you can get on with things. Whatever your default position is it is still a position (and an entire system of thought by implication), and very likely wrong since you haven't examined it before. You need to elevate your level of self-awareness.

Au contraire, mon frere. You are the one who keeps dodging the issue of where universals come from. You want to smuggle into this discussion as hidden premises some theory of universals and I (and the others still here) am merely unwilling to let them remain hidden. If you want to get to the root of this discussion then go the most fundamental possible issue where there is a conflict, the universals.

In Objectivism, a concept is a universal. Other philosophies have used the word idea, or other terms. Universal has come to be meta-terminology abstracted from the many theories in the history of philosophy that have grappled with the problem. Don't let the generality confuse you, a universal is not some intrusive separate idea that changes the subject.

LOL again. Every epistemology IS a theory of universals first and foremost. Even denying that there are universals is a theory of universals with consequences for that epistemology. I am not willing to accept whatever hodgepodge of unstated assumptions you want to use as a basis for thought and still pretend this discussion about thought get can anywhere.

Yes. I am aware of all this. I do have a functional theory of universals. My point is that I am ready and willing to scrap such a theory if it is proven to be false. And further, I am (for the sake of this conversation) suspending such a theory in order to see where logic leads. And this is my point: if one's theory on universals is proven false because it denies the ability to use logic, then one's theory on universals must be scrapped. This is what I mean by "I don't care about universals". I mean in respect to this conversation, I am ready and willing to modify, scrap, or replace any theory on universals which undercuts the use of logic. And I think you should be too. That was all I was saying.

Time for some clarity on fundamentals. This thread is already 400+ comments of dancing around a maypole you don't want to look at. How much longer are you willing to play the role of the crank philosopher instead of genuinely seeking the truth?

Obviously, I would disagree and say that this thread is 400+ comments of realizing and unearthing some flawed epistemological assumptions which you do not want to look at. Perhaps I am a "crank philosopher" (I certainly don't have a degree of any kind), but I have been genuinely seeking truth the entire time. However, I cannot and will not go in the direction of irrationality. And so far, what has been said of Oist epistemology, leads directly into irrationality. No one seems to be able to see it though.

You seem to assume that since I am the one who believes in a God, that I automatically am the one who has an entirely irrational philosophy. As I've said before, I completely understand such an assumption- given the philosophy of most Theists. However, I am asking you to suspend such an assumption and consider the rationality of what I am saying. Right now in this conversation, I am defending the use of logic. You may not see it because you take it for granted- but I am asking you to look closer. At this point in the discussion, I care very little about proving that there is a God in comparison to simply defending the use of logic.

[Jacob86]

I covered 2+2=4 and your error in how you approach it. I do not recall seeing you respond to that.

I apologize. What was the post #?

[Greebo]

Actually you did reply initially - 450,456 and then 459. 459 is the post that I believe went unanswered.

[Grames]

I did not skim it originally. And I read it long before I got on the forum because it interested me- not because I wanted to debate someone about it. Re-reading it will get me no where ...

Wrong. If you want worked out examples for your understanding and to discuss further then in ITOE you will find several, right from the horse's mouth with no possibility of distortion or misunderstanding by some random guy on the internet.

because I have realized the essential flaw in Oist epistemology: that it take logic for granted. It uses logic throughout but it explicitly undercuts the ability to use logic. It assumes the universal applicability of logic but denies the ability to know the universal applicability of logic by declaring that all knowledge is reducible to perception. This is because one cannot perceive the applicability of logic to that which has not been perceived. One can only know that it is so because they realize that it logically must be so- but the truth that it logically must be so is not reducible to perception.

It really is self-contradictory to claim you have read ITOE and then write this. Your eyes may have passed over the pages, but you comprehended nothing.

Two links between the conceptual and the mathematical fields are worth noting at this point, apart from the obvious fact that the concept "unit" is the base and start of both.

1. A concept is not formed by observing every concrete subsumed under it, and does not specify the number of such concretes. A concept is like an arithmetical sequence of specifically defined units, going off in both directions, open at both ends and including all units of that particular kind. For instance, the concept "man" includes all men who live at present, who have ever lived or will ever live. An arithmetical sequence extends into infinity, without implying that infinity actually exists; such extension means only that whatever number of units does exist, it is to be included in the same sequence. The same principle applies to concepts: the concept "man" does not (and need not) specify what number of men will ultimately have existed—it specifies only the characteristics of man, and means that any number of entities possessing these characteristics is to be identified as "men."

2. The basic principle of concept-formation (which states that the omitted measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity) is the equivalent of the basic principle of algebra, which states that algebraic symbols must be given some numerical value, but may be given any value. In this sense and respect, perceptual awareness is the arithmetic, but conceptual awareness is the algebra of cognition.

The relationship of concepts to their constituent particulars is the same as the relationship of algebraic symbols to numbers. In the equation 2a = a + a, any number may be substituted for the symbol "a" without affecting the truth of the equation. For instance: 2 X 5 = 5 + 5, or: 2 X 5,000,000 = 5,000,000 + 5,000,000. In the same manner, by the same psycho-epistemological method, a concept is used as an algebraic symbol that stands for any of the arithmetical sequence of units it subsumes.

Let those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find "manness" in men, try to invalidate algebra by declaring that they cannot find "a-ness" in 5 or in 5,000,000.

Your objections have been entirely of the nature that there is no a-ness to be found in particulars, so this applies directly to you.

Yes. I am aware of all this. I do have a functional theory of universals. My point is that I am ready and willing to scrap such a theory if it is proven to be false. And further, I am (for the sake of this conversation) suspending such a theory in order to see where logic leads.

See? You are doing it again, begging the question by assuming there is logic first and the theory of universals can be figured out later. This is wrong, backwards, out of order and contradicts the necessary and actual hierarchy that exists from universals to logic.

And this is my point: if one's theory on universals is proven false because it denies the ability to use logic, then one's theory on universals must be scrapped. This is what I mean by "I don't care about universals". I mean in respect to this conversation, I am ready and willing to modify, scrap, or replace any theory on universals which undercuts the use of logic. And I think you should be too. That was all I was saying.

Your pose is disingenuous because your argumentation is circular: you are willing to turn your back on universals and plunge onward because you know from experience that you will end up right where you started. Additionally, here now you are explicitly endorsing the method of discarding a theory because you don't like the answer it leads to.

...Right now in this conversation, I am defending the use of logic. You may not see it because you take it for granted- but I am asking you to look closer. At this point in the discussion, I care very little about proving that there is a God in comparison to simply defending the use of logic.

No, you are simply assuming logic and not defending it. Stop ducking the problem of universals.

[Eiuol]

I do not hold that all knowledge is reducible to perception. However, in order to demonstrate that "all entities have identity" is reducible to perception, one would need to perceive all entities having identity.

No, not true. Do you need to perceive ALL tables in existence to know that all tables have flat surfaces on which to place household objects and food? Do you need to perceive ALL houses in existence to know that all houses are architectural structures that people live in? Do you need to perceive ALL entities in existence to know all entities have identity? The answer to all these questions is no. Concept formation doesn't require omniscience, what is required is recognizing similarities and differences, then realizing all entities with those similarities and differences are a particular kind of entity. I just *had* to point this out because it's probably the one biggest thing that ever led to this thread being 450+ posts long. Knowledge would indeed be impossible if one had to perceive all entities to know that the law of identity is valid. I'm quite sure this is covered nicely in ITOE, I reread it a week ago even.

[Grames]

Aristotle’s Conception of Universality by Dr. Greg Salmieri. 58 pages plus 21 more of endnotes.

Wherein we learn that Aristotle likely coined the greek word katholou from which the modern catholic descends, and that what Aristotle really thought about universals may not be the same as is taught in previous accounts and which I summarized above.

[dream_weaver]

Concepts of method are formed by retaining the distinguishing characteristics of the purposive course of action and of its goal, while omitting the particular measurements of both.

For instance, the fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is logic. The distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions (actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification) and their goal (knowledge)—while omitting the length, complexity or specific steps of the process of logical inference, as well as the nature of the particular cognitive problem involved in any given instance of using logic.

Concepts of method represent a large part of man's conceptual equipment. Epistemology is a science devoted to the discovery of the proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge.

Logic is not 'out there', logic is a method the mind/consciousness must perform. The 'out there' is the given, it is the data which must be converted by the mind.

In a concept of entity - dog, cat, house, etc., we can readily confirm with one another we are using the same words to refer to the same objects.

In a concept of motion - running, walking, jumping, we can indicate the entity performing the motions, again, confirming we are using the same words to refer to the same actions.

Even the concepts of materials are relatively simple to validate.

As we move further from the perceptual, when we begin to abstract from the abstractions, the concepts begin to have more complex relationships, making them more difficult to just point to what we mean by animal, habitation, capitalism, etc.

Universal is not 'out there'. Each concept is an integration based on a relationship between consciousness and existence. Each individual must perform this integration for themselves. In this sense, you could consider it 'subjective'. As in the concepts of entities we can point to what we mean, it is pretty simple to establish agreement. In order to establish agreement with more abstract concepts - the method of concept formation has to be addressed in order to ensure that the same referents, and referents to other referents, are the same. It is this method that allows us to 'ostensibly' establish agreement.

The 'universal' is the method of maintaining the the relationship of the concept with the similarities observed in usually several percepts.

As you move into the arena of adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, pronouns and conjunctions - these contain concepts as well, many to do with how to relate concepts to other concepts in communication. It is in the concepts that 'reason' and 'logic' are 'stored'.

To try and divorce a concept from this is to generate floating abstractions, stolen concepts, invalid concepts etc.

To state you care about the 'ability to know' universals requires the 'location and source' to do so. The ability to know the universal, is the ability to trace it back to its source(s).