On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[jonkc]

I'm not going to bother reading or replying to anything in this thread that doesn't have to do with Volition

First of all we both know what you just wrote is untrue, you may not respond but of course you will read this. Second, I was on topic, I was writing about nothing but Volition. Third, I always find it amusing when people on the net write a lot of off topic comments and then say it should all end here and nobody should rebut my off topic comments with their own off topic comments, just let me have the last word. Fourth, it’s true, I do seize on the tiniest points to attack and I invite others to do the same with my ideas, or try to; I think that process is the best way to find the truth. And fifth, if you want me to respond only in private Email then you should not have posted a message but sent a private Email.

John K Clark [email protected]

[isaac]

Well, ya got me Jon. You win.

Now, GCS, CapitalismForever, AshRyan, I'm really interested in continuing. Can one of you read my last (on-topic) post and respond? I'm curious as to your thoughts on it. Thanks.

[Capitalism Forever]

Far from implying that man is a powerless pawn to outside factors, these facts imply that a man has nearly total control over his life, his character, and his choices.  (After all, these things are determined by his attributes, and he IS his attributes.)

Well, which is it now, are these things determined by him, or are they predetermined? If something is predetermined--if the choice has already been made--then it isn't up to me.

Predetermination implies that all events in the universe are ultimately caused by a single authority (which some call "Ms. God" and others just say it's the properties of matter / the laws of nature). Volition means that the story of the universe is shaped by volitional beings (who make their choices as time passes) AS WELL AS the laws of nature (which are constant over time).

A predetermined universe is like a book written by a single author, where all the characters do what the author wants them to. As a reader, you have no influence on the plot, as the plot is already fixed at the moment you start reading the book.

On the other hand, a universe inhabited by volitional beings is like an interactive role game. There are a set of rules for playing the game, but the plot is not predetermined by the rules, as the rules allow the players to make their own decisions. Thus, the actual plot is determined both by the rules AND by the players.

[isaac]

Well, which is it now, are these things determined by him, or are they predetermined? If something is predetermined--if the choice has already been made--then it isn't up to me.

See, that's where you're all making the mistake. Because if something is predetermined, and it is caused by your nature, then it IS up to you.

The idea of causation is getting confused here somewhat. To review:

All actions are actions of entities.

The nature of an action is determined by the nature of the entity acting.

Let's say that an apple falls on the ground, and the seeds inside start growing, and it grows into another tree. What was the cause of that tree? Was it the apple falling? Or the seeds growing? Or the fact that a seed had fallen earlier, turned into a tree which produced the apple that turned into another tree? Or should we say that the cause of that new tree was the first apple tree to produce a seed?

Clearly, without any of these things, the new tree wouldn't exist. To a certain extent, all had a hand in "causing" the new tree. Ultimately, however, the cause of *this tree* is "the nature of the seed/soil/etc. that created the new tree." (To prove this point, try planting a rock. No tree will grow. QED.) The earlier things may have caused the nature of the seed to be what it is, and so it is only by extension that they caused the new tree. For an apple seed, the nature of the seed is 100% determined by the nature of the entities that created it, and you can say with 100% certainty, "If this seed came from a healthy tree, and has not been adversely modified in any way since its creation, and I plant it in suitable soil, an apple tree will grow." Or, to put it simpler, "I know what caused this seed to exist, and I know that its nature does not change significantly over time, and thus, I know its nature, or at least, what is relevant to this question. Knowing this seed's nature, I know that it will cause a tree to grow."

With a human, it's not so simple, but it is somewhat similar.

Evolution/culture/upbringing/etc. may have a hand in making you what you are. However, you are the cause of your actions. That is, your actions are caused by your individual nature at that particular moment when you choose. In addition, you have the ability to volitionally change the attributes that make you what you are. There is thus a sort of "cyclical causation." As a man learns and grows, he changes his attributes - he changes himself - and thus changes the way in which he causes other actions. Since so much of the mind is so highly self-modifiable, it's nearly impossible to trace the cause of any given choice down to a single attribute or set of attributes. For all intents and purposes, the cause of the choice is "irreducible," simply because it's so subtly dependent on so many of your aspects.

If it were possible to know all of the attributes of me, and all of the ways that all of those attributes may cause action, well, then, you'd know what I'd do. This sort of near-omniscience is not even required most of the time. How many times has a friend that you know well done something that was totally un-surprising to you? Even if you knew what he would do, that doesn't detract from the fact that he chose - his nature (his attributes, that is to say HE) determined the outcome, and you are familiar enough with his nature to predict with a fair degree of accuracy what that will be. (That's not to say that friends never surprise one another. Hell, sometimes we even surprise ourselves!) In fact, the more rational and healthy a person is, the more that they cleanse their mental workings of any contradictions or evasions, the more predictable they become. Thus, as many philosophers have commented, healthy rational people tend to resemble one another. (However, no two people are ever 100% identical, of course.)

Any attribute of your character, any given characteristic that makes you you had to come from somewhere. It may be that the trait was something inherited, or something that you chose to develop, or just an unpredictable combination of biochemical whatevers in your brain. These specifics are a task for neuroscience, not philosophy - philosophically, it doesn't matter where they come from. However, philosophy tells us that you have identity - ie, your attributes are what they are and are non-contradictory. Since you determine your choices, and you are a certain way, your choice will turn out a certain way. You have the power to choose, but you don't have the power to choose that which it is not in your nature to choose. That would mean that you have the power to choose to do that which you choose not to do! (Iow, the power to make A = !A. This reminds me of the problem with an omnipotent deity creating a rock so heavy he can't lift it.)

Thus, the actual plot is determined both by the rules AND by the players.

If I'm understanding your metaphor correctly, then in this case, the players ARE the rules (an entity is its attributes.)

To say that predetermination means that "something else chooses" is to place consciousness before existence. There is no "choice" until there is a self-conscious self-modifying entity to choose. How can "god" or "the laws of reality" choose "for" you? That's as nonsensical as saying that your nature "forces" you to do something. All that predetermination asserts is that your choice will result in a particular action, *because you, having identity, will cause a particular action*.

[isaac]

Just wanted to add one small point:

What was the cause of that tree? Was it the apple falling? Or the seeds growing? Or the fact that a seed had fallen earlier, turned into a tree which produced the apple that turned into another tree? Or should we say that the cause of that new tree was the first apple tree to produce a seed?

The issue I'm getting at here is that actions are caused by the nature of the entities acting, not by earlier actions. (I.e., actions don't cause actions, entities do.) That's a big error in thinking that leads lots of good people astray.

[Capitalism Forever]

If I'm understanding your metaphor correctly, then in this case, the players ARE the rules (an entity is its attributes.)

My point was exactly that the players are distinct from the rules.

The rules are devised by somebody, or they just develop over time, and then at the beginning of the game the players agree to follow the rules. At this point, the rules are fixed and known, but the outcome of the game isn't, as the rules don't specify a particular outcome but make it up to the players' choices. Thus, the outcome isn't predetermined by the rules. It is possible to play two games using the same set of rules and have two entirely different plots. The individual elements of the plot only become known over time, as the players perform their acts.

So, here, the rules are one influence on the plot, and each of the players is another influence on the plot--whereas in a static book, the book's author is the only influence on the plot. In the one example, the plot is determined by a single authority, while in the other one, it is determined by the interaction of several authorities.

To say that predetermination means that "something else chooses" is to place consciousness before existence.  There is no "choice" until there is a self-conscious self-modifying entity to choose.

This is what I wrote:

Predetermination implies that all events in the universe are ultimately caused by a single authority (which some call "Ms. God"  and others just say it's the properties of matter / the laws of nature).

It would have been more appropriate for me to write "determined" instead of "caused," so please read the sentence with that substitution. What I am describing here is two possible forms of a predetermined view of the universe, both of which I disagree with: a theistic one (which indeed puts consciousness before existence) and a materialistic one (which doesn't put consciousness anywhere). I disagree with both of them for the same reason: namely, that they posit a single ultimate source for all events in the universe.

The theistic one posits an omnipotent God and views the rest of the universe as mere agents of God. The materialistic one posits a universe that is a single non-volitional entity, with all its components (including humans) being mere agents of that single entity.

An analogy might help you understand what I mean when I say "agents of that single entity" : When you lift your finger, all the molecules in your finger move. The motion of each individual molecule is caused by that molecule--but the molecules cannot help moving, as their nature does not allow them to choose whether or not they will obey you. There is a force acting on them, and they are bound to react to that force in a particular way--so, once that force is present, the molecules' behavior is predetermined.

The molecules of your finger are subentities of your finger, and their actions are merely reflections of your finger's actions. They do not act on their own initiative.

Nor does your finger act on its own initiative; it is your agent. You are a composite entity made up of many parts and the actions of your parts are simply reflections of your actions. Since you determine your actions, your parts don't get to determine their own actions.

The matierialistic view of a predetermined universe sees everything in the universe as a mere agent of the universe--including humans.

[isaac]

capforever, you're making this more complicated than it has to be, and missing my main point.

The choice comes from somewhere, right? You make the choice, I think that we agree on that.

What I am saying is that "you make the choice" is equivalent to "your attributes determine the outcome of the choice." An entity is its attributes.

The next step in my argument is that you either have or lack any attribute or set of attributes, and not both. (Man has identity.)

Therefore, you will either choose A or not-A, but only one choice will actually happen.

It may be correct, beforehand, to say that either one is "possible," since we may have had some information to support the prediction of either outcome, but not enough to say for certain what you would do. However, the implication of this argument is that words like "possible," "probable," and so on, refer to an epistemological status, not metaphysical status. Metaphysically, what will happen will happen, period, because even choosers have identity, and even the actions of choosers are determined by their nature.

That is the meat of my argument. What follows is just miscellaneous stuff...

You're right, molecules or fingers or any other parts of a man are not volitional in any meaningful sense. Volition only applies to a conscious entity. Similiarly, saying that my attributes determine the outcome of my choice doesn't imply that any of my attributes are volitional - that is a propery of the whole, not of any of the individual parts. (Let's not commit the composition or division fallacies here!)

If you want to really attack this argument, here are a few ideas:

1) You could try showing that volitional beings somehow lack identity, and can both have and lack some properties at the same time and in the same respect. (Good luck!)

2) You could try to show that the actions of volitional beings are not determined by their attributes. (I will counter by saying that this means that there's nothing "free" about "free will," since that would reduce it to a form of indeterminism.)

3) You could posit some "spooky attribute" that can possibly cause both P and !P. You could go out further on that limb, and state that only Man has this spooky attribute. (I will counter by saying that this is a violation of the law of causality. Actions are caused by the nature of the entities acting. This sort of spooky attribute would cause an action that has no identity. This is a fallacy I like to call the "Heisenburg Fallacy," because it blurs the division between epistemology and metaphysics, and states, "Because we can't know its nature, it doesn't have one." This is the standard Objectivist stance, as I understand it.)

4) You could point out where I have misinterpreted or misapplied the law of identity/causality. Since I don't believe that I have, I can't really be of much help on this one, but it would be the only valid rebuttal, if it is possible.

These arguments, however, hold no weight at all:

1) But, that means that we don't have any choice! (Insert re-hash of OPAR here.) (This is invalid because it is a strawman.)

2) The way that you put it, it's fine, but that approach opens up the door for all sorts of "bad" determinists to get in. (What they say has nothing to do with me. Guilt-by-association. You can't attack my argument based on your aversion to some other argument.)

3) You were so rude to Jon KC! How can we believe what you have to say? (Ad hominem. One thing has nothing to do with the other.)

Clearly we DO have a choice in our actions. We all agree about that. What's not at all obvious, however, is the implication that a predetermined universe, in which every entity (including Man) is bound strictly to the law of causality, is in conflict with that fact in any way. If you believe that it is, I invite you to prove it to me by showing that my argument is flawed.

However, if you do not believe that my argument is flawed, then the next step, of course, is unpacking what that would imply about choice, moral agency, rights, life, the universe, and everything. It is a subtle restructuring at a very deep level, to be sure. But truth cannot ever contradict truth. I put stock in the law of non-contradiction, and resolve these problems using logic. If it's unsettling, well, that just means that there's work to be done.

[jonkc]

It is clear that we do not know enough about how the human mind works to say specifically which attribute(s) cause one's choice to go one way or the other.

That’s true, but so what? If it has a cause then it is mechanistic.

In fact, since so much of the brain's activity is on a microscopic - even subatomic level, it seems to me that the limits set by the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle imply that it is impossible to ever say exactly what those characteristics are.

And if it doesn’t have a cause then it is random.

John: Despite the mystics in modern physics, the HUP does NOT show that things ever happen for no reason. That was Heisenberg's interpretation of his principle. The principle is true - his interpretation is invalid.[...]Do not be so arrogant as to confuse an epistemological limitation with a metaphysical fact.

Einstein thought as you do, till the day he died in 1955 he thought that the only reason some things appear to be random is that there are hidden factors we haven’t discovered yet influencing them. In 1964 a way was proposed to test if he was right or wrong and about 10 years later the experiment was actually performed, it’s called Bell’s Inequality. Because of that experiment we now know with certainty that Heisenberg was right and Einstein was wrong; this is how it works:

When a photon of undetermined polarization hits a polarizing filter there is a 50% chance it will make it through. For many years physicists who disliked the idea that God played dice with the universe figured there must be a hidden variable inside the photon that told it what to do. By "hidden variable" they meant something different about that particular photon that we just don't know about. They meant something equivalent to a lookup table inside the photon that for one reason or another we are unable to access but the photon can when it wants to know if it should go through a filter or be stopped by one. We now understand that is impossible. In 1964 (but not published until 1967) John Bell showed that correlations that work by hidden variables must be less than or equal to a certain value, this is called Bell's inequality. In experiment it was found that some correlations are actually greater than that value. Quantum Mechanics can explain this, classical physics or even classical logic can not.

Even if Quantum Mechanics is someday proven to be untrue Bell's argument is still valid, in fact his original paper had no Quantum Mechanics in it; his point was that any successful theory about the world must explain why his inequality is violated. I will attempt to show how to find the inequality, show why it is perfectly logical, and demonstrate that nature refuses to be sensible and just doesn't work the way you'd think it should.

I have a black box, it has a red light and a blue light on it, it also has a rotary switch with 6 connections at the

12,2,4,6,8 and 10 o'clock positions. The red and blue light blink in a manner that passes all known tests for being completely random, this is true regardless of what position the rotary switch is in. Such a box could be made and still be completely deterministic by just pre-computing 6 different random sequences and recording them as a lookup table in the box. Now the box would know which light to flash.

I have another black box. When both boxes have the same setting on their rotary switch they both produce the same random sequence of light flashes. This would also be easy to reproduce in a classical physics world, just record the same 6 random sequences in both boxes.

The set of boxes has another property, if the switches are set to opposite positions, 12 and 6 o'clock for example, there is a total negative correlation, when one flashes red the other box flashes blue and when one box flashes blue the other flashes red. This just makes it all the easier to make the boxes because now you only need to pre-calculate 3 random sequences, then just change every 1 to 0 and every

0 to 1 to get the other 3 sequences and record all 6 in both boxes.

The boxes have one more feature that makes things very interesting, if the rotary switch on a box is one notch different from the setting on the other box then the sequence of light flashes will on average be different 1 time in 4. How on Earth could I make the boxes behave like that? Well, I could change on average one entry in 4 of the 12 o'clock lookup table (hidden variable) sequence and make that the 2 o'clock table. Then change 1 in 4 of the 2 o'clock and make that the 4 o'clock, and change 1 in 4 of the 4 o'clock and make that the 6 o'clock. So now the light flashes on the box set at 2 o'clock is different from the box set at 12 o'clock on average by 1 flash in 4. The box set at 4 o'clock differs from the one set at 12 by 2 flashes in 4, and the one set at 6 differs from the one set at 12 by 3 flashes in 4.

But I said before that that boxes at opposite settings should have a 100% anti-correlation, the flashes on the box set at 12 o'clock should differ from the box set 6 o'clock by 4 flashes in 4 NOT 3 flashes in 4. Thus if the boxes work by hidden variables then when one is set to 12 o'clock and the other to 2 there MUST be a 2/3 correlation, at 4 a 1/3 correlation, and of course at 6 no correlation at all.

A correlation greater that 2/3, such as 3/4, for adjacent settings produces paradoxes, at least it would if you expected everything to work mechanistically because of some hidden variable involved.

Does this mean it's impossible to make two boxes that have those specifications? Nope, but it does mean hidden variables can not be involved and that means something very weird is going on. Actually it would be quite easy to make a couple of boxes that behave like that, it's just not easy to understand how that could be.

Photons behave in just this spooky manner, so to make the boxes all you need it 4 things:

1)A glorified light bulb, something that will make two photons of unspecified but identical polarization moving in opposite directions so you can send one to each box. An excited calcium atom would do the trick, or you could turn a green photon into two identical lower energy red photons with a crystal of potassium dihydrogen phosphate.

2) light detector sensitive enough to observe just one photon. Incidentally the human eye is not quite good enough to do that but frog's can, for frogs when light gets very weak it must stop getting dimmer and appear to flash.

3)A polarizing filter, we've had these for a century or more.

4)Some gears and pulleys so that each time the rotary switch is advanced one position the filter is advanced by 30 degrees. This is because it's been known for many years that the amount of light polarized at 0 degrees that will make it through a polarizing filter set at X degrees is [COS (x)]^2; and if x = 30 DEGREES then the value is .75 If light is made of photons that translates to the probability any individual photon will make it through the filter is 75%.

The bottom line of all this is that there can not be something special about a specific photon, some internal difference, some hidden variable that determines if it makes it through a filter or not. Thus the universe is either non-deterministic or non-local, that is, everything influences everything else and does so without regard for time or space. One thing is certain, whatever the truth is it's weird.

John K Clark

[Capitalism Forever]

However, if you do not believe that my argument is flawed, then the next step, of course, is unpacking what that would imply about choice, moral agency, rights, life, the universe, and everything.  It is a subtle restructuring at a very deep level, to be sure.  But truth cannot ever contradict truth.  I put stock in the law of non-contradiction, and resolve these problems using logic.  If it's unsettling, well, that just means that there's work to be done.

Oh, but I am predetermined not to believe your argument!

Kidding aside,

If you want to really attack this argument, here are a few ideas:

[...]4) You could point out where I have misinterpreted or misapplied the law of identity/causality.

Here:

3) You could posit some "spooky attribute" that can possibly cause both P and !P.  You could go out further on that limb, and state that only Man has this spooky attribute.  (I will counter by saying that this is a violation of the law of causality.  Actions are caused by the nature of the entities acting.  This sort of spooky attribute would cause an action that has no identity.

Why would it? This is a non-sequitur. Once the entity has caused the action, the action has identity. When I decide to buy a vanilla ice cream, I begin performing a specific action, and my action has a perfectly well-defined identity: namely, it is the action of buying a vanilla ice cream.

It is only until the entity has begun acting that the action has no identity (given that the action simply doesn't exist yet). BTW this is just as true for non-volitional actions as for volitional ones.

Clearly we DO have a choice in our actions. We all agree about that. What's not at all obvious, however, is the implication that a predetermined universe, in which every entity (including Man) is bound strictly to the law of causality, is in conflict with that fact in any way.

How would you define "choice" ?

[isaac]

Surely, CapForever, things that don't exist don't have identity. (Existence is identity, entity is its attributes, without attributes, it doesn't exist, yadda yadda.)

The "spooky attribute" theory is specious because it seems to get around the alleged contradiction between predetermination and free will, but only by creating an exception to the law of causality. All actions are caused by the nature of the entity acting. (Another way to put this would be to say that their identity is determined by the identity of the acting entity. 6 of one, half-dozen of the other.) The spooky attribute says, "This action is caused by the nature of the entity acting, but the identity of the action is not determined by the identity of the acting entity." Ie, the entity has some attribute(s) that can cause either P or !P. Which is to say, the identity of the action is not determined by the identity of the acting entity. (But we just said it was, so, it's a contradiction - hence, "spooky".)

Choice

The act of determining, generally in advance, the nature of an action that the chooser will take, when the action is caused by a mental process on the part of the chooser.

Unpack that a bit with a real-world example:

(A lot of this is still rough and very much off-the-cuff, so please don't be too nitpicky! )

Let's say that I am going to buy a car. (We'll take for granted that I've already chosen to buy a car in the first place, whatever that entailed.) I'm in the lot, looking at different models. I'm not sure which car I am going to buy, although I know that I will buy one of them. The action (buying a particular car) will be determined by my nature. More specifically, it will be caused by a mental process. (It doesn't make much sense to say that things caused by me, but not as a result of a mental process, are really "chosen" per se. When I'm out in the sun, I don't burn quickly. That's caused by my nature, but there's no "choosing" about it, really.) However, at this point in time, I'm not sure which car I'm going to end up buying.

I weigh the options, the price, etc., visit a few different dealerships, take a few test drives. I then determine (maybe subconsciously, and certainly not in so many words!) that the car which it is most in my nature to buy is an Acura RSX Type S. I have thus chosen a type of car to buy.

I also consider other things, as well. Am I going to buy the car now, or wait until I've saved some more money? Am I going to finance, buy outright, or lease? Leather, or no? Etc, etc, etc. (In this real-world case, I determined that no other car would satisfy me like the RSX, and since I cannot yet afford it, I'm driving my roommate's green boat to work for the time being. )

All of the actions that I take (including, in this case, delaying my purchase until a later date) are caused and determined by my nature. However, in advance (prior to choosing) I did not know what would happen. (Here's where it gets really interesting!) Normally my ignorance wouldn't matter - even if I don't know that I won't burn in the sun, it's still not a choice I make. However, in this case, the action is caused by a mental process, and so, before I determine what my choice will be, nothing happens at all. (In many cases, there is a "default" that will take effect in the absence of a choice. In others, not making a choice is a choice in itself, of sorts.)

Choices can also be made implicitly - that is, without a fully explicit conscious process, even though the action is a result of a "mental process". (This covers the "not making a choice is a choice of sorts" situations I mentioned.) The choice to focus/think or to evade is an implicit choice of this sort. It is caused by a mental process (meaning simply, my height and weight and whatnot probably have nothing to do with it.) My choice is the act of determining the outcome. In this case, however, once I know what the outcome will be, well, the outcome is. This differs from the car example because, with the car, I make my decision about the action, and then, later on down the road, I actually take the action. The deciding and the acting may be separated from one another in time. However, with choosing to think, the choice is performed sub- or "pre"-consciously (since it is the choice to be or not to be conscious.) Once the choice is made, the action is taken.

You have a lot of choices involving how you make your choices as well! Are you going to consider your own wellbeing as the criteria of your decision, or are you going to use the wellfare of others as your rule? Are you going to judge based on the immediate outcome, or based on the long-term effects, or some combination of both? Are you going to weigh options according to a process of logical evaluation, or will you simply accept uncritically whatever others/your emotions tell you? All of this is included in the "choice to think." That choice includes the choice of how to think. (To paraphrase Peikoff, the mind is not a lightbulb that is simply turned on or off. It takes work.) In other words, the nature of the action - the outcome and quality of the choice and the resulting action - is determined by the nature of the entity acting.

This sounds really complicated the way that I've written it out here, but that's simply due to my excited rush to respond before fully ironing out all the details in my explanation. My main point is that, once you properly distinguish the epistemological from the metaphysical (ie, what we know from what is,) the rest is basically busywork - ie, not brain surgery, and a situation where you can apply the earlier conclusions one after another and chug through the concepts and end up with a cogent explanation. But that explanation might not be quite what you expected to get. It's like Newton's laws. The axioms are stupid-simple, but applying them consistently is not always immediately obvious. Like any other concepts, they must be internalized and automatized and concretized, etc, etc.

One could say that choosing is, quite literally, "realizing one's destiny," in two different senses. First, "realize" in the sense of "to discover," because it is the moment when we discern what is in our nature to do. Second, "realize" in the sense of "to make real," because, prior to choosing, what existed was an entity with a specific nature - not an action or a plan. (Even though the future event was implicit in the nature of all the entities involved in the action, the implicit is an epistemological concept, not a metaphysical one. Metaphysics only cares about what IS. "Might be" is not a metaphysical concept, and neither are "implicit" or "possible.")

Well, sorry for the length and the rambliness of this. I'm sure that I've given you all plenty of meat to tear into, and I'll probably have to rephrase every concept over again more carefully Maybe I'll just edit it when the urge strikes me again. (It is my destiny, after all )

Have fun.

[John]

I have a question about the study from the original post. Could it be that the brain activity that caused certain actions was the subconscious? As I understand it the subconscious produces those automatic responses that the study is describing. Also the subconscious is programmed by conscious values (or it could default to emotions). So the article only proves that the subconscious exists. I think it would be great to see a study on how the conscious programs the subconscious.

[isaac]

I think it would be great to see a study on how the conscious programs the subconscious.

Isn't that the whole science of psychology?

[Capitalism Forever]

All actions are caused by the nature of the entity acting.  (Another way to put this would be to say that their identity is determined by the identity of the acting entity.  6 of one, half-dozen of the other.)  The spooky attribute says, "This action is caused by the nature of the entity acting, but the identity of the action is not determined by the identity of the acting entity."  Ie, the entity has some attribute(s) that can cause either P or !P.  Which is to say, the identity of the action is not determined by the identity of the acting entity.

Your argument is based on juggling with the words "nature," "identity," and "attribute," so let's take a closer look at their meaning.

The nature of an entity describes the way it is and the way it acts; it may indeed be thought of as the "sum" of its attributes. However, we do not say that the nature of an entity causes the entity's actions; we say that the entity causes its actions. The entity's nature only constrains the kinds of actions the entity may cause.

For example, an entity may be constrained by its nature to cause action A (and not action B or action C); in this case, the entity is bound to cause action A. But it is also possible for the entity's nature to constrain it to cause action A or action B (but not action C); this means that the entity will either cause action A or it will cause action B. Since its nature does not constrain it tightly enough for it to invariably follow a specific course of action, this entity gets to choose, within the constraints of its nature, what exactly it does.

The concept identity captures the notion of sameness (the word comes from the Latin phrase "idem idem" ; "idem" is Latin for "same"). It doesn't make much sense to say that "the identity of an action is determined by the identity of the acting entity" ; again, this is just a way to inject an unrelated proposition into the fact that actions are caused by entities. "The identity of an entity" is a conceptual handle to distinguish the entity from other entities; it has nothing to do with how tightly an entity's actions are constrained.

"Argument by injection!"

[isaac]

"Argument from Injection" is another way to say that I'm dropping context. Let's start at the beginning, and hopefully you can tell me at which point you think I'm dropping context....

p1: An entity is its attributes.

p2: An entity is the cause of its actions.

p1 + p2 => c1: Actions are caused by the attributes of the acting entity. (Law of causality.)

p3: An entity cannot both posess and lack the same attribute at the same time in the same respect. (Law of identity.)

p3 <=> p4: An entity either posesses or lacks any given attribute in any given respect at any given time, but not both. (Restatement of LoI.)

p4 + c1 => c2: An entity cannot both cause and not cause the same action at the same time in the same respect.

c1 + c2 => c3: On a metaphysical level, an entity cannot hold the potential for both causing and not causing the same action at the same time in the same respect. (Either it posesses the attribute(s) relevant to causing the action, or it does not, and not both.)

There are, essentially, 2 ways to rebut an argument.

1) Show that one or more of the premises are untrue. (Note that p1-p4 are held as axiomatic in Objectivism.)

2) Show that one or more of the conclusions do not follow from the premises.

I've given you all you need. If there's an error there, let me know.

There is no point in continuing until we agree on this much.

[Capitalism Forever]

"Argument from Injection" is another way to say that I'm dropping context.

What I meant is that you build a formalistic framework and you frame it so as to make it possible for you to "prove" your proposition. It's a bit like saying that God must exist because he is perfect and existence is implied in perfection. (Stretching that latter one a bit further, our feminotheist friend John might even prove that GOD is a gorgeous blue-eyed blonde and SHE wants to be his girlfriend.)

This is where you sneak your desired result into your formalism:

p1: An entity is its attributes.

p2: An entity is the cause of its actions.

p1 + p2 => c1: Actions are caused by the attributes of the acting entity.

These statements are simply prose for the following formal deduction:

e = A

c = e

therefore c = A

The entity equals its attributes and the cause of the action equals the entity, therefore the cause of the action equals the entity's attributes. Very nice, very clever--too bad it has nothing to do with objective reality. In reality, an entity (isn't that a singular?) does not "equal" its attributes (isn't that a plural?). To say that it does is more than mere context-dropping; it is what I like to call framing.

You can use the above formalism to "prove" predetermination, but you can also use it to "prove" a lot of other things, including nihilism. Here we go:

p1: An entity is its attributes.

p2: "Attributes" is a set.

p1 + p2: => c1: An entity is a set.

p3: Sets are abstractions; they do not exist in reality.

c1: An entity is a set.

p3 + c1: => c2: An entity is an abstraction; it does not exist in reality. nothing exists -- Q.E.D.

Have I convinced you to become a nihilist? If not, what is wrong with the above argument?

You haven't convinced me to become a predeterminist for the same reason I haven't convinced you to become a nihilist.

[isaac]

Here's where that argument makes a mistake, and it has nothing to do with what you cite as my mistake.

p3: Sets are abstractions; they do not exist in reality.

c1: An entity is a set.

p3 + c1: => c2: An entity is an abstraction; it does not exist in reality. nothing exists -- Q.E.D.

Abstractions still refer to reality. Here's a more revealing use of the same mistaken reasoning:

Sets are abstractions, they do not exist in reality.

The New York Yankees is a set of baseball players.

The New York Yankees do not exist. (Hope you haven't bought season tickets!)

See? In the first premise, it's saying that a set does not have its own independent metaphysical status. But in the conclusion, it applies that property to all of the members of the set (fallacy of division.) In addition, the sense of the word "set" is changed, and thus, there is a fallacious equivocation at work, as well. In the first premise, you're saying something about sets qua abstractions - however, in common usage, when I refer to a set, I'm using it as shorthand to refer to all of the members of that set. (That's the purpose of the abstraction, after all.) So, removing the equivocation leaves us with this:

Sets of entities are abstractions, they do not exist in reality. What exists are the members of the set.

"The New York Yankees" is a name given to a set of baseball players.

All of the members of The New York Yankees do not exist.

While you may not be able to point at a single individual entity that is "The New York Yankees," you can point at all the members of the set - which DO exist in reality. Even if something is an abstraction, if it is a valid abstraction, it refers to some unit that exists in reality.

However, I'm not doing that with my argument. I say that an entity is a set of attributes, yes. However, I also have endeavored to make clear throughout this thread that the set of attributes is indivisible. It may be treated as a group of individual items for the purposes of our reasoning, but in truth, an attribute is only separable epistemologically. I did not state this again in the synopsis of the argument because I think that it is obvious, and a synopsis should not state the obvious more than necessary.

Attributes only exist as a "set" - i.e., as an attribute of some entity. An entity is inseparable from its attributes, just as attributes are inseparable from an entity, and for the same reason. When I say that an entity is its attributes, I mean, ALL of its attributes. (That's not to say that every aspect of an entity is relevant to every action that the entity takes.)

In reality, an entity (isn't that a singular?) does not "equal" its attributes (isn't that a plural?)

Back a few pages in this thread, someone (gcs, i think) gave a reference to IToE. I'd recommend checking those pages. Rand goes over this quality of concepts of attributes, and does state, unequivocally, that an entity is its attributes, in a very real and literal sense. In fact, her little discussion there brilliantly supports my argument. I suggest you take a look at that.

Note that a set of abstractions may well exist or not, depending on context. In this case, the members do not exist independently, but the set does. We can take an entity, and divide it up epistemologically, and be left with a set of abstractions. That's what's meant by "An entity is its attributes." Yes, one is plural, and one is singular. So what? One is a set of abstractions that compose an entity - the other is the entity itself. No errors there.

Thus, your analogy is not apt.

The prize money is still on the table. Thanks for playing, please try again.

[John]

our feminotheist friend John might even prove that GOD...

Hey I'm John! Don't you mean jonkc (the one who made that post)?

Isn't that the whole science of psychology?

umm...yeah your right. I thought it was funny at the time because the article was trying to show that some other thing determined our actions.

[GCS]

I don't really want to get involved in this debate again, and I certainly don't want to discuss anything further with Isaac, who is quite obnoxious. But in case any one else is following this it may be worth making a few observations.

Isaac's C3 does not follow from his C1 and C2 (nor is his C3 true). It does not follow from the principle of non-contradiction that nothing can have two contradictory attributes *potentially*. The contradictory of "potentially a" is "not potentially a", not "potentially not a". For example, because it is pliable, a piece of clay is potentially a sphere and potentially a cube. So the same piece clay is a potential sphere and a potential non-sphere, for exactly the same reason, that it has the potential to take on a variety of shapes.

There are a number of other problems with Isaac's argument and the whole style of arguing as CF has pointed out. The problem that's most likely to confuse an intelligent reader can be best raised with a question: Where does Isaac get the premise that the law of identity or of causality says that entities have act in *exactly* one way in one set of circumstances. All that the law of causality says is that it has to act in accordance with it's identity, and there's no reason why the identity of some things can't be such that they act in a non-predetermined way -- that they choose. In fact the nature of people is that we do act this way. Because we have the power of choice people have the potential to make any one of a number of contradictory choices.

It is also a mistake to assume, as Isaac has been, that because an entity is the sum of its attributes and its actions express its identity that each action needs to be reducible to some set of attributes. An entity is more than a *collection* of attributes. It is a *unity* that can be analyzed into attributes. But it's actions are determined by the whole not by the parts taken in isolation.

(It is also worth noting that in his previous post where he claims that on his view our actions are "up to us", they are only up to us in the sense that it is "up to a tree" whether or not to sprout leaves. But that amounts to saying that it isn't up to us at all.)

[jonkc]

Isaac Wrote:

There are, essentially, 2 ways to rebut an argument.

1) Show that one or more of the premises are untrue. (Note that p1-p4 are held as axiomatic in Objectivism.)

2) Show that one or more of the conclusions do not follow from the premises.

There is a third way, show that you have used another axiom besides the 4 listed, namely that all events have a cause. You even mentioned it another post and called it “The Law Of Casualty”; however it is not a law just an empirical observation that some events have a cause. We’ve suspected for 80 years and known with certainty for nearly 40 that some events have no cause and are random.

I mean, I liked Atlas Shrugged as much as anyone but if Ayn Rand tells me one thing and experiment tells me another it’s no contest; I’m a rational man so I have to go with experiment. Personally I think it would be pretty neat if the universe was totally deterministic, it would be pretty neat if the sun went around the earth too, but that’s just not the way things are.

John K Clark

[AshRyan]

We’ve suspected for 80 years and known with certainty for nearly 40 that some events have no cause and are random.

I mean, I liked Atlas Shrugged as much as anyone but if Ayn Rand tells me one thing and experiment tells me another it’s no contest; I’m a rational man so I have to go with experiment.

GCS and CF have done a good job of pointing out (a few of) the holes in isaac's arguments for determinism. I would hope that no one would even take jonkc's arguments for indeterminism seriously, but just for the sake of clarity it should be noted that the above statement of his is just false. There are many different interpretations of the expirements to which he is alluding, so it is not correct to say that we know with certainty that indeterminism is true (he acts as though it is an uncontroversial fact, but nothing could be further from the truth). Furthermore, causality is an axiom (see chapter one of OPAR), whether he wishes to recognize it or not, and so any interpretation of any expirements that rejects causality is not only a non sequitur, it is demonstrably false.

Indeterminists are not the kind of people we need on this board, and I am going to recommend that jonkc be banned.

[Capitalism Forever]

Here's where that argument makes a mistake, and it has nothing to do with what you cite as my mistake.

You didn't get my point. I didn't specifically cite anything related to sets as your mistake. What I did cite as your mistake was that you built a formalistic framework and tried to fit reality into it, rather than going the other way around. Specifically, that you put an equals sign between "the entity" and "the entity's attributes" and proceeded to use the two phrases as if they were universally interchangeable.

I only brought up sets in my reduction ad absurdum, demonstrating that putting an equals sign between "the entity" and "the entity's attributes" (which happens to be a set) and using the two as if they were universally interchangeable can lead to absurd results.

So, my critique of your argument has nothing to do with sets. My point is that your formalism does not refer to reality, and this is what I was hoping you would address.

Play again.

[Capitalism Forever]

Hey I'm John! Don't you mean jonkc (the one who made that post)?

Of course I mean him. He signs his posts as "John K Clark," so I suppose there is an "h" in his real name ... or that he is a dyslexi-feminotheist.

[isaac]

I'm sorry to have offended you, GCS. It was never my intention, and I have endeavored to be as friendly as possible in this discussion. I have enjoyed reading your posts, and it's too bad if they don't continue.

My argument is that, from a metaphysical point of view, "potential" is either meaningless or trivial. The reason that we have such a term is that we don't know what will happen. In fact, ALL terms relating to likelihood only have meaning in a certain context: in the mind of a being whose knowledge about the world is limited.

Just to make it simpler, take this example.

We have a machine that will turn a lump of clay into either a sphere or a cube, depending on which button is pressed. I press a button, and insert a lump of clay. Without telling you which button I pressed, I ask you whether a cube or sphere will come out. Your proper answer is, "Either is possible." However, only one actually will happen. From my context of knowledge, exactly one is possible - because I know what will happen. From the machine and the clay's point of view... well, they don't have a point of view. Exactly one thing will result - either a sphere or a cube, and not both.

Why is that?

Your set of knowledge includes the nature of the machine, that either a spherre or a cube will be created, depending on the button that is pushed. However, your context of knowledge does not include which button was actually pushed. Neither outcome would contradict your knowledge, and either is possible. (Supported by some evidence, but not certain.) You know the nature of the thing well enough to know that only one shape will result - however, your knowledge of the nature of the machine at this particular moment is not sufficient to say which will be created.

My context of knowledge DOES include which button is pushed. (Because I pushed it.) Hence, only one outcome would not contradict my context of knowledge. Therefore it is certain (to me) which will be created.

It simply makes no sense to say that something can have a nature such that its actions are not dependent upon its nature. Metaphysically, "potential" has no meaning. (Unless we're talking about electromagnetism.) Exactly one outcome is the only "potential" as far as existence is concerned. However, since every knowledgable entity has a finite consciousness, and must forecast the future according to their context of knowledge, we use words like "potential" to designate uncertain events.

I only brought up sets in my reduction ad absurdum, demonstrating that putting an equals sign between "the entity" and "the entity's attributes" (which happens to be a set) and using the two as if they were universally interchangeable can lead to absurd results.

But, CF, you didn't show that. Your reductio ad absurdem was not an apt analogy, as I showed already. An entity really IS its attributes.

[AshRyan]

My argument is that, from a metaphysical point of view, "potential" is either meaningless or trivial.  The reason that we have such a term is that we don't know what will happen...

I think that this is a mistaken understanding of the concept "potential." Potentiality was discussed some in an earlier thread, here.

[Capitalism Forever]

Isaac's view of potentiality WOULD be correct IF every event in the Universe were predetermined. In that case, it would be true that something can happen if and only if it does happen.

Of course, an argument that relies on the assumption of predetermination is not a valid one when you are trying to prove predetermination.