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"How do I know I'm not in the matrix?"

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Why must we make such assumptions? What happens if we do not?

More importantly, if there is some purpose for knowledge (and one with inescapable requirements), wouldn't it make more sense to evaluate it by how well it furthers or hinders that purpose?

 

Because it is either this or that - one way or another, it has to be something. We have to assume something about what we are dealing with or suspend judgement by not dealing with it at all. In the latter case, it would mean that dealing with it serves no purpose. If there is a purpose, then reason - not the purpose - should guide our assumption.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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We have to assume something about what we are dealing with or suspend judgement by not dealing with it at all. In the latter case, it would mean that dealing with it serves no purpose. If there is a purpose, then reason - not the purpose - should guide our assumption.

You misunderstand. The purpose I had in mind was not any concrete, goal-oriented action, but any action and every action; action-as-such.

If the purpose of knowledge is action then good knowledge is that which allows for deliberately effective action, with full awareness of its consequences. Which type of knowledge that is, stems directly from where we act: that which corresponds to reality.

That last point can be proven empirically. If we attempt to drive a car, should we choose those actions according to a working knowledge of cars and traffic laws, according to the diet of the Prime Minister of France or according to any given roll of a pair of dice? We can try several strategies out and judge whether their results correspond to our expectations.

And if we were to do so, over any number of conceivable strategies, I submit that we would find the most effective source of knowledge (that idea of "truth" which allows the best kinds of actions), without the slightest ambiguity, to be "reason" in the Objectivist sense.

And one part of that scheme for learning demands that what you call "actual" knowledge is the self-evident and irrefutable knowledge of the senses, but that what you call "potential" knowledge must also count as true knowledge- as TRUTH -because while it may ultimately be discovered to be false, it is the best guess that we can currently make.

We cannot currently know more than we know, nor may we allow ourselves to ignore that which we currently know, so the best guess that we can make- from those facts that we do know -must be the "truth"; which means it must be suitable to ACT on, for the time being.

Compare this to what scientists practice.

I doubt this actually contradicts what you currently think, other than the shifted definitions, but if it does then I invite you to test it for yourself. :thumbsup:

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold

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From the earlier reference I find:

"If so, it couldn't even be said that two people are really receiving the same object in different forms. It would be "what is an entity to you, isn't an entity to me". Two people might not be talking about the same objects."

 

While the latter reference, in a similar vein has:

Observe that whether we are talking about perceiving apples or just single atoms - it seems we can never actually know for certain whether what we perceive as an "entity" through our senses is actually a coherent object independent of our senses. The "entity-effect" produced by the interaction of external objects with our senses might theoretically be caused by multiple and completely separate objects. In other words, from a multitude of sources all bombarding our senses at once, so the result just happens to be "a tree" while in reality, there are five, six, or a hundred external objects involved that produce that "tree" in interaction with our senses.

 

There's a short scene where Rama-Kanda almost answers this addressing Neo about love.

. . . it is a word. What matters is the connection the word implies. I see that you are in love. Can you tell me what you would give to hold on to that connection?

 

How does Rama-Kanda even answer "yes" or "no" to my observations?

 

And I don't know if anyone realizes what it implies for Objectivism's whole foundation of individual rights. If what we call "separate biological organisms" obtains its status of "entities" only as a product of object-sense interaction, but otherwise - independent of our senses - may be multiple, completely loosely spread incoherent objects...

 

What would that mean? What if someone else simply perceives a tribe as an entity? Or a race? Or a certain gender? Not in conceptual terms, but really just on the perceptual level? To him it would mean that this (the tribe, the race etc.) is the unit of perception that seems to strive towards self-preservation and therefore needs to be pursued. Not some individual.

 

Or the other way round: If I'm the only one who perceives myself as an entity, why would other people have to protect my individual rights, if they don't even perceive me in the form of an entity, not to talk of as a human being?

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Scratch Rama-Kanda. Apparently I'm not getting the gist of your question yet.

 

What does it mean to perceive a group of entities (such as a tribe) as an entity, if not in conceptual terms?

 

Well, quite simple actually. There is a certain group of objects out there that we perceive in the form of multiple entities, multiple people. We abstract among those people and call them a "tribe".

 

Now supposing someone else perceives the same group of objects. But when those objects act on his senses, what comes out of it is just a single entity. Not multiple people to abstract a tribe from. But just a single entity.

 

I would say he is perceiving the tribe, but not in conceptual terms, just as a percept. But that thing to him is an entity and he can only observe how that entity seems to have a tendency to preserve itself. Which is normally what he should observe. Because if every member of the tribe preserves itself, then the side effect is that the tribe preserves itself, too. So he must conclude that the tribe is a unit of reality and the basis of morality. That an action is moral only if it serves the tribe.

 

Or anything about that make no sense?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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DJoy said:

Or anything about that make no sense?

Most of it....

Discover, are you familiar with the Objectivist position on the arbitrary?

Edit: you are equivocating on object-entity in your imagination derived contrivance.

Edited by Plasmatic

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DJoy said:

Most of it....

Discover, are you familiar with the Objectivist position on the arbitrary?

Edit: you are equivocating on object-entity in your imagination derived contrivance.

 

Its arbitrary to assume that there is a God, for example, so yes.

 

The topic this has led to is what morality should be founded on. For this we need an Objective basis. A basis that is and will always be true, independent of the observer. So we have to find one that is immune to every potential possibility. Even to the one I described. Or don't we?

 

And I thought I had done my best to keep objects and entities apart in my posts.

 

Again:

 

We perceive objects (things external to our senses) through certain means (our senses) in certain forms (entities).

 

How could this be any more distinguished?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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Or anything about that make no sense?

You are essentially asking "What if I perceived a group as a unit?" It's not a strange or weird question, even if the example is more or less a scifi one. It's not arbitrary, in the sense there is a reason to ask. Still, -if it is a unit-, then treat it as such. Such a "tribal entity" wouldn't operate under any known biological processes, so of course it doesn't follow principles we have about morality. I don't see what it has to do with the OP's question, though.

 

If what we call "separate biological organisms" obtains its status of "entities" only as a product of object-sense interaction, but otherwise - independent of our senses - may be multiple, completely loosely spread incoherent objects...

To be clearer, all things are "completely loose" in the sense nothing is metaphysically singular and irreducible. An entity according to Rand is something we perceive as whole, rather than a metaphysically singular sense-independent object. That isn't to say nothing exists independent of perception, it means that what exists isn't outlined into entities prior to your perception of anything. An entity isn't a product of your mind, as your mind is doing the outlining but it is also outlining parts of reality that are able to be outlined. Entities play a role in epistemological development, so that's why it's not important if something is made of multiple objects.

Edited by Eiuol

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Louie said:

To be clearer, all things are "completely loose" in the sense nothing is metaphysically singular and irreducible. An entity according to Rand is something we perceive as whole, rather than a metaphysically singular sense-independent object. That isn't to say nothing exists independent of perception, it means that what exists isn't outlined into entities prior to your perception of anything.

This is all false and not remotely the Oist position on "the only metaphysical primaries", entities Edited by Plasmatic

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Discover said:

We perceive objects (things external to our senses) through certain means (our senses) in certain forms (entities).

I was referring to calling collective nouns like a tribe an entity when I spoke of equivocation. (I could have been more clear) Object and entity are synonyms, they are not two different things. The metaphysical basis for "Individual" rights is exactly that man is a living, metaphysical singular, a bounded particular-entity, independent of any mans desire to call one a cell of the organism of some super entity. That is the objective fact behind the fundamentality of entities in Oist epistemic hierarchy. Edited by Plasmatic

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Louie said:

This is all false and not remotely the Oist position on "the only metaphysical primaries", entities

I knew you'd misunderstand. I didn't say entities aren't metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't make anything in particular a metaphysically singular AND irreducible atomic primary. A book, for example, is not a metaphysically outlined object of reality. The aspect of reality a book consists of is part of reality exists independent of your awareness, and -this- is what an entity is made up of. But a thing is only known as an entity thanks to your perception.

 

EDIT: I don't know what you mean by a metaphysical primary, nor do I know of Rand saying the phrase "metaphysical singular" or "metaphysical primary". If she says those words, would you show me where?

Edited by Eiuol

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Louie said:

I knew you'd misunderstand.

I knew my past decisions to let let you have the last word would lead to you thinking you understood what you were talking about and I didn't....

Louie said:

I didn't say entities aren't metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't make anything in particular a metaphysically singular AND irreducible atomic primary

Yes you did but words for you have the consistency of a bowl of jello on a trampoline in an earthquake... ;)It's clear you dont know what a primary is.

Your statements:

To be clearer, all things are "completely loose" in the sense nothing is metaphysically singular and irreducible [...]A book, for example, is not a metaphysically outlined object of reality.

Is a repudiation of the objectivity of particulars and the Objectivist metaphysics on entities as causal primaries. Not to mention an embrace of an infinite regress.

Louie said:

thing is only known as an entity thanks to your perception.

How one knows what an entity is has no bearing on the the factual basis of entity-ness.... Your letting your Kantian side show again.

Louie said:

EDIT: I don't know what you mean by a metaphysical primary, nor do I know of Rand saying the phrase "metaphysical singular" or "metaphysical primary". If she says those words, would you show me where?

How it is that you claim you havent read Ms. Rand on this issue is beyond me. I have quoted her saying this while correcting your missunderstanding of Oism on entities before.

ITOE said:

if by “simple” you mean metaphysically primary, then only entities are metaphysical primaries. [...]

In asking yourself whether any concept is of a metaphysical _primary,,you have to ask yourself: to what does that concept refer? [...]

The first concepts man forms are concepts of entities—since :__entities are the only primary existents.

Louie said:

A book, for example, is not a metaphysically outlined object of reality. The aspect of reality a book consists of is part of reality exists independent of your awareness, and -this- is what an entity is made up of.

No clue what you are saying. Unless you are on the Kantian track again and claiming that particars are caused by my awareness. (That Kantian "structure" your so fond of?) Edited by Plasmatic

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"I knew my past decisions to let let you have the last word"
Usually I don't have a clue what your point is, it's hard to understand you, especially since you don't often expand on little words like "metaphysical primary", which would immensely help understanding without needing to open up ITOE every single time to explain.

"Is a repudiation of the objectivity of particulars and the Objectivist metaphysics on entities as causal primaries."

Let's be specific. What do you mean by "entities as causal primaries"? In one sense that absolutely makes sense and I'm not denying that they are necessarily. Of course there is an infinite regress, but there is no metaphysical point in which to stop delineating reality. I don't see a problem there, as it has no bearing on what an entity is. A book has a clear and definite boundary in terms of being a specific aspect of reality, but we pick a particular boundary by our own perceptual capacities. I'm attempting to point out a difference between a boundary defined by perception, and what that boundary consists of. There are boundaries of a book. That isn't some Kantian premise where the "consists of" is the thing "in-itself", and my perception somehow interferes with apprehending the thing-in-itself.

"How one knows what an entity is has no bearing on the the factual basis of entity-ness"
Right, but it has bearing on the validity of a tribal entity, which there is none, especially since it wouldn't even have an apprehendable boundary.

" Unless you are on the Kantian track again and claiming that particars are caused by my awareness. "
What? I said that the book exists independent of your awareness. It's not caused by your awareness.

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I looked back in the thread a bit more, at Discoveryjoy's first post.

First part: There's a difference between a momentary sensation, and an automatic process of putting those sensations into a whole group of integrated sensations. Those wholes you perceive are entities. If you want to get into more detailed reasons to think this, think of how you see a book as a whole, complete and bounded object. You see the book as an entity, not merely a color, or merely a certain height. This isn't conceptual, your eyes and brain do it all automatically. How it happens isn't so important. The fact is, you see the world as made up of entities, as wholes.  

My discussion with Plasmatic I think is a misunderstanding between the two of us is that I'm trying to distinguish that an entity exists independent of your perception, but an entity is what in particular you perceive. There are really an infinite number of ways reality consists of objects, but because of perception, you only will see some of reality as an -entity-. An atom is real as a book, but you wouldn't see an atom as an entity without a microscope. I'm not aware that Rand uses object and entity as synonyms.

A: Look up "sense data theory". It's not the Objectivist position, but it's similar to what you're saying. But it's not sense data that matters, it's that it is put into a whole form, to apprehend part of realty. Sense data theory is Bertrand Russel's view.

B: I don't know what "some whole that could not be reduced to any composition of sense data" means. I think you mean that it just so happens you can't reduce some entities more. So what? If you had microscope eyes, of course you can reduce more. There's no advantage to speak in terms of sense data as primary, except to be worrying how reduced we are, therefore all sorts of brands of reductionism.

Are perceptions "just" sensations because they can be reduced? Is the mind "just" neurons? Is an organism "just" a collections of atoms?

That should answer your tribal entity idea, too. Think of how you aren't only what your cells do. If you wanna talk more about a "superorganism" tribal entity, well, make a new thread. I'd participate, at least, if you want to reason out about individualism!

C: If you were in the Matrix, it would only mean that you're still in part of reality, albeit a simulations, as if it were The Sims. So that's why the thread started on the topic of "arbitrary" and "possible".

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Given the most recent posts on "object vs entity" in this thread, I'm not sure who now represents Objecitivsm better. So I gather the following:

 

Something acts on our senses. Whatever it is independent of our senses, whether a metaphysically coherent object or not, it is still something. The sum of all of its parts or whatever else it may be.

If that something interacts with our senses in such a way that it produces a single entity, we call that something "an object". This is justified in the same sense like we could call any scattered amount of computer data "tied" together by a coherent graphical visualization a "data object".

If that something interacts with our senses in such a way that it produces multiple entities, we call that something "multiple objects".

 

So the question still remains:

 

If the same something produces just one biological entity by interaction with one person's senses, but multiple biological entities by interaction with another person's senses, where is really the objective basis for individual rights?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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There are people that are color-blind. Whether totally color-blind, or across some spectrum, they are recognized as such.

A person who is deaf can often feel music, especially at elevated volumes and pitch ranges. Others have difficulty hearing certain frequencies.

There are people that see colors when hearing music, distinguished as having chromesthesia or synesthesia for some who feel, taste or hear color.

 

Cross-eyed folk see one object as two.

 

What is the basis for seeing multiple objects as a single entity, and if an individual or two did happen to experience this, why wouldn't it just be classified as a sensory anomaly?

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Given the most recent posts on "object vs entity" in this thread, I'm not sure who now represents Objecitivsm better. So I gather the following:

It's always a matter of figuring it out for yourself who is right. But I'm not sure my point was understood, I only said that what we call entities are objects which are identified as whole. Plasmatic equated objects to entities. Entities are objects; atoms are objects; books are objects. Atoms aren't entities. Entities are -not- mental objects created by perception, they're real objects, perceived as wholes. I happened to reread ITOE just earlier this week, and made sure that I didn't contradict anything. Rand uses both terms, but not identically I'd say (words have different senses even, so not even every use of the word "entity' is identical). She didn't define "object" as I saw, but object isn't a strange word.

The error in your description though is that our senses produce an entity, and if it's singular, it's called an entity. First, that's backwards - objects are more "basic" (my term), and then come entities.

Second, it's the sort of error Plasmatic seems to think I am making, that entities are literally created by the mind distinct from reality itself. It's like sense data theory, where we only consider sensory objects created with our senses, not concrete objects. Sense data theory is wide open to the "Matrix" question because if we create sensory objects rather than apprehend objects with perception, we could just create some sensory objects with no way to distinguish between sensing a real object or sensing an object created by software. Similarly, there'd be no way to distinguish a hallucination from a real thing, because as sensory objects, both are identical. They're the same "data objects" as in your analogy.

The thing is, sensations don't really need to be seen as stuff "tied together". They're not just tied together, they're seen as wholes. For Oism in particular, we apprehend concrete objects directly. The sensory organs may establish perceptual wholes, but they're not creating objects which we then look at or interpret. We just see the objects, presented as they are in reality.

 

If the same something produces just one biological entity by interaction with one person's senses, but multiple biological entities by interaction with another person's senses, where is really the objective basis for individual rights?

 

You'd have to look deeper and say whether the supposed "singular entity" could really have all its parts work together as a whole. Imagine gluing a unicycle to a stool. You'd possibly see it as a whole, especially if the color blends seamlessly. But the unicycle and stool really have nothing to do with each other, like the Dada art it is.

 

Further you'd be describing a wholly different type of entity which isn't simply a sum of parts. Your heart has standards to function, and has requirements of its own distinct from your whole body. If a group of people really can be seen as whole, and the group had its own standards for function, it doesn't erase individual needs. Your need to further your life doesn't contradict your heart's operation any more than a "superentity"'s needs contradicts the needs of its parts. I'm a bit lost on what it has to do with the Matrix questions, though.

 

Edited by Eiuol

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Louie said:

. But I'm not sure my point was understood, I only said that what we call entities are objects which are identified as whole. Plasmatic equated objects to entities. Entities are objects; atoms are objects; books are objects. Atoms aren't entities. Entities are -not- mental objects created by perception, they're real objects, perceived as wholes. I happened to reread ITOE just earlier this week, and made sure that I didn't contradict anything. Rand uses both terms, but not identically I'd say (words have different senses even, so not even every use of the word "entity' is identical). She didn't define "object" as I saw, but object isn't a strange word.

Wow!

ITOE said:

The (implicit) concept “existent" undergoes three stages of development in man’s mind. The first stage is a child’s awareness of objects, of things—which represents the (implicit) concept “entity.” The second and closely allied stage is the awareness of specific, particular things which he can recognize and distinguish from the rest of his perceptual fleld—which represents the (implicit) concept “identity.” The third stage consists of grasping relationships among these entities by grasping the similarities and differences of their identities. This requires the transformation of the (implicit) concept “entity” into the (implicit) concept “unit.” When a child observes that two objects (which he will later learn to designate as “tables”) resemble each other, but are different from four other objects (“chairs”), his mind is focusing on a particular attribute of the objects (their shape), then isolating them according to their differences, and integrating them as units into separate groups according to their similarities. This is the key, the entrance to the conceptual level of man's consciousness. The ability to regard entities as units is mans

I could go on...

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Wow!

How do I even know you understand what I'm communicated? You haven't shown what you understand what I said. I already said I just re-read ITOE. I read that quoted part in particular several times even. All I can say is thanks for quoting the portion that supports what I am saying. If I'm wrong, use your own words, because Rand's words here are exactly part of my reasoning.

It says "awareness of objects, of things - which represents the (implicit) concept 'entity.' " That's as I said, they're objects perceived as wholes. To be aware of an object is to be aware of an entity. To be aware of an entity is for perception to differentiate. Notice the next sentence, which talks about awareness of particulars as distinguished from the rest of a perceptual field. That's what I mean by entities being identified, "carved from reality" in a sense. Before worrying about that metaphor, remember, I'm saying that regardless of what I see as a whole, the entity is independent of my awareness. But calling an object which you can't perceive as whole - e.g. an atom - entity is strange term when Rand's view says an entity is represented by awareness of things.

Further on in the quote, entity is equal to an object. But it's fine, because entity is subsumed by object already.

So, yeah, as long as sensory objects aren't primary, or any other mental object, there is no Matrix problem. Or at least, it's one of many angles to get over that skepticism.

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Given the most recent posts on "object vs entity" in this thread, I'm not sure who now represents Objecitivsm better.

None of the posts on this page (except, of course, for yours) are really better representations of Objectivism than any other. DreamWeaver's point about colorblindness was really good and so were all of Eiuol's posts. Plasmatic's question, though cryptic, was intended to make what's really the most important point, here. The post that departed the most from Ayn Rand's writings was my last one, and even that was meant to make the same point from a radical direction.

As far as Plasmatic's dispute with Eiuol, I don't believe either position is the more or less "Objectivist" one.

So the question still remains:

If the same something produces just one biological entity by interaction with one person's senses, but multiple biological entities by interaction with another person's senses, where is really the objective basis for individual rights?

Is there such a thing?

If breathing was murder then we could sit here for the next decade, asking each other how we could justify it. But it's not, so it's a really pointless question to ask. That, by the way, is what Plasmatic was driving at when he (and I) mentioned the Objectivist position on the arbitrary.

If there is no such thing then you're just wasting our time.

Please do not do that. :thumbsup:

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Louie said:

How do I even know you understand what I'm communicated? You haven't shown what you understand what I said. I already said I just re-read ITOE.

I didnt quote that for your benefit but the guest who might be mislead by rationalistic contortions. Your post is nearly the same to the previous protestations about "attributes are epistemelogical". You repeated that you (paraphrased) "already read all that" and "stop quoting and make and argument!" no matter how many times you read Ms. Rand say in different ways what amounts to the fact that attributes are metaphysical. You lugged that confusion around for years until I told you that the quotes came from the section in ITOE titled "Attributes as Metaphysical". Now, If you had pulled ITOE out instead of shooting from the hip and spent some time chewing what you are going to post, you might have discovered that for yourself.... I know you read it and I know you don't understand it. Just as you held what amounts to the denial of the metaphysical basis for attributes, you are now denying the metaphysical fact of multiplicity.

Louie said:

It says "awareness of objects, of things - which represents the (implicit) concept 'entity.' " That's as I said, they're objects perceived as wholes.

There is no such thing as a object that is not a whole in the primary sense

Louie said:

To be aware of an object is to be aware of an entity.

Thats because they are the same thing...

To be aware of an entity is for perception to differentiate.

To be aware of anything requires differentiation. No exceptions. Your mistake is related to not integrating this fact....

louie said:

Notice the next sentence, which talks about awareness of particulars as distinguished from the rest of a perceptual field. That's what I mean by entities being identified, "carved from reality" in a sense. Before worrying about that metaphor, remember, I'm saying that regardless of what I see as a whole, the entity is independent of my awareness

And now we are to the crux of your misunderstanding. You think "as a particular" is describing a sensory integration of entity qua entity. You are wrong. "Particular" here is referring to the "recognition" of the entity in question as the same as previously seen. Ms. Rand is saying that, where previously it was just generic "entity", now you identify this entity as itself as against other entities . A child sees just "things"-entities-objects moving until it begins to identify these generic beings as a particular and distinct from others. That is the "identity" stage.

You are equivocating the "entity" stage with the "identity" stage because you think she means generic entity by "particular things" but one already has "entity" prior to this stage. What you are saying makes no sense whatever.

Louie said:

The thing is, sensations don't really need to be seen as stuff "tied together". They're not just tied together, they're seen as wholes. For Oism in particular, we apprehend concrete objects directly. The sensory organs may establish perceptual wholes, but they're not creating objects which we then look at or interpret. We just see the objects, presented as they are in reality.

You are doing it here again. Presentationalism -direct realism is about "seeing things as they are"!

You "see entities as a whole" because they are wholes. There is no such thing as an object that is not a whole and the perceptual mechanism that identifies this does not add anything to that fact. You are trying to differentiate perception of objects from perception "establishing" wholeness. This is exactly what Kant tried to do, give a reason for wholeness apart from the fact that the "thing in itself" is a whole.... Entities are bounded particulars. Wholeness is really there. Thats what it means to be objective. You are doing nothing less than making wholeness observer dependent even though you keep trying to also say the entity is "out there". Part of your confusion is because your poor grasp of primary concepts. Entity is axiomatic and thats why one cant talk about it without using synonyms. "Entity is at the base" because "there is nothing else to perceive" and thats why they are "the only metaphysical primaries". That is the objective basis of the first level status of entities. Existence is a concept that economizes the need to list the particulars that the concept refers to. What is really out there is entities.

Louie said:

But calling an object which you can't perceive as whole - e.g. an atom - entity is strange term when Rand's view says an entity is represented by awareness of things.

This is nonsense. You are talking out of both sides of your mouth. You are here completely disregarding the whole point made about "the primary sense of entity as against the derivative. You do not know what "primary" means in metaphysics. Instead you are doing what Kant did by claiming that the "manifold of sensation" is what cause awareness of wholes. She cant say anything about awareness of primary entities with out a synonym and you take this as some type of class distinction made possible by this manifold.

Your confused.

Louie said:

Further on in the quote, entity is equal to an object. But it's fine, because entity is subsumed by object already.

This is clear demonstration of your lack of understanding what a primary is. How could this alleged subclass making entity a species of the genus object be what she is saying when "there is nothing else to observe" other than the entities which "constitute the content of the world men perceive"?

Louie said:

So, yeah, as long as sensory objects aren't primary, or any other mental object, there is no Matrix problem.

WTF is a "sensory object" that can be said to be an "other" "mental object"? How could anything sensed be a sensation of a non-primary? You keep doing this. One senses wholeness because it is objective-not created by the form of sensation. You are trying to have mind independent objects and eat sense data too.....

Edited by Plasmatic

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you are now denying the metaphysical fact of multiplicity.

How so? Please answer by paraphrasing my reasoning/position.

 

There is no such thing as a object that is not a whole in the primary sense

You aren't understanding me. I said perceived as a whole. I don't see atoms as whole, although atoms are whole. An object is a whole object, yeah, but that's not the sense of whole I'm talking about. I'm clearly not talking about "wholes in the primary sense". But, for clarification, can you tell me what you mean by "whole in the primary sense"?

 

Thats because they are the same thing...

How so? You said they're the same, I say they're not the same, i.e. identical. Why have both words?

 

To be aware of anything requires differentiation.

Yeah, I didn't contradict that. A (awareness of objects) requires B (awareness of an entity), B requires C (differentation). Therefore, A requires B and C. That fact is literally part of what I said.

 

 You think "as a particular" is describing a sensory integration of entity qua entity.

I don't think that. I use "particular" as synonymous with "thing" or "object". The rest of what you said I already agree with and consistent with what I said. You're getting confused when I use the term "entity".

 

 You are trying to differentiate perception of objects from perception "establishing" wholeness.

Considering you failed to comprehend the above parts of my view, I can see why all the things you think I'm seeing looks so wrong to you. You already got my view wrong. You equivocated my use of the word "whole" with a different sense of the word "whole". So of course, it looks like you're attacking my argument, but my argument is actually on another side of the ballpark.

 

Instead you are doing what Kant did by claiming that the "manifold of sensation" is what cause awareness of wholes.

Nope, you just didn't understand my argument. You can't say I'm confused when you are confused by what I'm arguing anyway. If I'm making errors, first get right what my view is.

 

WTF is a "sensory object" that can be said to be an "other" "mental object"? How could anything sensed be a sensation of a non-primary?

No idea how to parse the first sentence. Sensing a primary is weird wording. Do you mean "how can we be aware of anything besides objects, which are primary?". You can't. That's why sense data theory is wrong. Mere sensations aren't primary at all.

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"A (awareness of objects) requires B (awareness of an entity), B requires C (differentation). Therefore, A requires B and C."

 

Wrote it wrong. Should say "entails" not "requires"; A without C is impossible.

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What do you mean by "objective basis"?

 

I mean independent of the viewer. An objective basis would be:

 

"There is a coherent object in reality that exists independent of anyone viewing it. It is a coherent object, and that coherence is not produced by any interaction with my or anyone else's senses, but the object is coherent in and of itself. If it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of an entity. Many such sense-independently coherent objects exist, I perceive them in the form of human biological organisms. I can therefore claim that they have individual rights that are objective. Maybe someone else perceives them also in the form of human biological organisms, perhaps in different colors etc., but that's not so important. The important thing is he perceives them as such entities. If he does, he can understand and accept my claim for their objective individual rights. If he does not and the coherent objects are all lumped together into just one single human organism in his perception, he can claim what he wishes, but obviously he is wrong to ascribe individual rights to what he perceives for the moments he is not perceiving it. Because what he is perceiving has no coherence and self-sustainance while he sleeps."

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