Easy Truth

Yes, the fear of being discovered by others goes away which helps a lot.
There is also, the disgust at oneself that can go away too. An apology is an indication of change due to knowledge. It helps to reset one's relationship with others and the world.
In some cases, an apology has to be accompanied with a promise not to do it again. Sometimes it even requires more. An attempt to fix what was broken. Like "I am sorry I broke your window, I will have it fixed and I assure I won't play ball in your area anymore". Assuming it is carried through. one is not looked at with suspicion and trade and betterment of life is maximized.
Finally, there is the issue of psychological visibility, being seen as you are and not a hateful entity. It is with an apology that one removes the ugliness that others were seeing. It opens the door for both people, the one apologizing and the one accepting it.

It takes serious guts to face the fact of your own mortality. Most people never really do; "death" doesn't mean the same thing to a Christian that it does to an atheist. However, anyone who spends their life waiting for its epilogue will never get the chance to know what slipped through their fingers. And that's universal.

People have led happy and productive lives for centuries before Rand. Objectivism can set the context, integrate practices, explain why some things are right, and make it all work so much more smoothly, but it will never substitute for the best-practices. And, these best practices for human happiness are ancient. 
A philosopher might put it this way: man is a rational animal; not just rational, but rational animal. Man has not simply ditched all the attributes that continue to be present in dogs and tigers and deer. Man can be transfixed in headlights, or he can act with violent overkill, or he can grab at something like he's starving now without concern for the consequences of tomorrow. That's all part of being a rational animal (perhaps that should be hyphenated "rational-animal").
Formal psychology is a much younger field than philosophy, and much of it has been useless junk or even politically-motivated cynical malevolence about a human need for power and so on. Too much of it seemed to ignore the rational, and dwell on man as if he were just an emotional animal. However, I think that's changed now. There's recently been quite a bit of work on cognition: the process, the flaws etc. One can read most of this work cynically and conclude: rationality is impossible. However, the right conclusion is that one has to work at rationality consciously, and not just by thinking, but also by developing certain habits, avoiding certain practices, tuning oneself to potential flaws and short-cuts in thinking, etc.
There are a fair number of popular books on this. I recommend "Influence" by Cialdini, "What makes your Brain Happy..."  by DiSalvo, and (slightly more theoretical) "Thinking Fast and Slow" by Kahneman. I'm sure there are many similar books out there, but these are ones I've read. Other self-help books -- that focus on specific topics -- can be useful too.
 

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Here are some writings on seeing aspects of self by mirrors of self—particularly by mirrors of self in others—these writings being before Objectivist nonfiction writings on psychological visibility. 
Plato Alcibiades 1 132e–33c
–Richard Sorabji, translator
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Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar
Cassius: Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?
Brutus: No, Cassius; for the eye sees not itself / But by reflection, by some other things.
Cassius: ‘Tis just; / And it is very much lamented, Brutus, / That you have no such mirrors as will turn / Your hidden worthiness into your eye, / That you might see your shadow. . . . And, since you know you cannot see yourself / So well as by reflection, I, your glass, / Will modestly discover to yourself / That of yourself which you yet know not of.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)
If for human’s instinct must disappear, “then precisely thereby the human being receives ‘more clarity’. Since he does not fall blindly on one point and remain laying there blindly, he becomes free-standing, can seek for himself a sphere for self-mirroring, can mirror himself within himself” (82).
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Hölderlin’s Hyperion (1794)
“Where is the being that knew her as mine did? in what mirror did the rays of this light converge as they did in me? was she not joyfully frightened by her own gloriousness when she first became aware of it in my joy?”
“. . . when the dear being, more faithfully than a mirror, betrayed to me every change in my cheek . . . .”
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
We the Living (1936 edition) 
In the first meeting of Kira and Leo: “Her face was a mirror for the beauty of his (58).”
“He looked into her flaming eyes with eyes that were like mirrors which could reflect a flame no longer” (445). The setting is Kira urging Leo to continue the struggle for a free life, even though he no longer desires such life.
 
The Fountainhead. (Page citations are from the 1943 first edition; all emphases are mine.)

The steel frame of Howard Roark’s house for Austen Heller has been erected. On site the workers notice that Roark’s hands “reach out and run slowly down the beams and joints.” Workers say “‘That guy’s in love with the thing. He can’t keep his hands off’.” Absorbed in work at the site, Roark’s “own person vanished,” but “there were moments when something rose within him, not a thought nor a feeling, but a wave of some physical violence, and then he wanted to stop, to lean back, to feel the reality of his person heightened by the frame of steel that rose dimly about the bright, outstanding existence of his body at its center” (138). 
Of Roark the morning after first time with Dominique: “In some unstated way, last night had been what building was to him; is some quality of reaction within him, in what it gave to his consciousness of existence” (231–32).
Of Dominique’s visits to Roark’s room and bed. “In his room, there was no necessity to . . . erase herself out of being. Here she was free to resist, to see her resistance welcomed by an adversary too strong to fear a contest, strong enough to need it; she found a will granting her the recognition of her own entity . . . . / . . . . It was an act of tension, as the great things on earth are things in tension. It was tense as electricity, the force fed on resistance . . .” (301).

On their last time, before they are separated for years, Roark says “‘I love you, Dominique. As selfishly as the fact that I exist. . . . I’ve given you . . . my ego and my naked need. This is the only way you can wish to be loved. This is the only way I can want you to love me’” (400). 

Roark and Dominique are definite entities, definite selves, exposed to each other. Their tensed sexual occasions heighten awareness of their selves, awareness of each to own-self and to other-self. (Cf. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 1943, 505–14 in the translation by Hazel Barnes.)

In her marriage to Keating, Dominique is a non-entity. (No tension, strength, resistance, or ecstasy in bed.) Keating is a non-entity in most of his existence. Most all of his desires and candidate desires and most all of his opinions receive their value to him by their potential for impressing others. Dominique is a mirror to him, and she makes herself not more than a mirror (452–55). She says to Keating: “‘You wanted a mirror. People want nothing but mirrors around them. To reflect them while they’re reflecting too. You know, like the senseless infinity you get from two mirrors facing each other across a narrow passage. . . . Reflections of reflections . . . . No beginning and no end. No center and no purpose’”(455).
Of Wynand and Dominique: “She sat at her dressing-table. He came in and stood leaning against the wall beside her. He looked at her hands, at her naked shoulders, but she felt as if he did not see her; he was looking at something greater than the beauty of her body, greater than his love for her; he was looking at himself—and this she knew, was the one incomparable tribute” (537–38).
 
Atlas Shrugged (1957, page – first edition)
“. . . her pride in herself and that it should be she whom he had chosen as his mirror, that it should be her body which was now giving him the sum of his existence, as his body was giving her the sum of hers” (957).
 
 

This is an example of a return on investment example. Isn't that based on consequences?
If an action causes you to loose your commitment to your moral perfection, the loss/consequence is immense. Your lack of virtue will come against your achieving your ultimate aim. As a consequence, it may cause reconsideration.
You don't maintain your virtues in a vacuum (without consequence in mind). There has to be a reason, a final cause. One may say that the nature of man requires virtues. But the nature of man requires survival and it is survival that requires virtues. Virtues do not require survival, they help cause it.
Bottom line, virtues are not the final cause, they are necessitated by the final cause.

The nature of certainty, I believe, is something which needs to be explored further. I think that many folks (Objectivist and other) are looking for some permanent, final fix, such that whatever ideas or opinions they hold, they never need be challenged again, or subject to error, or revisited. I guess I understand the emotional motivation, but I question the pursuit overall, and I think its fruits rotten.
Once someone reaches the point that they no longer are willing to entertain the possibility of their being mistaken, they are cut off from further rational discourse. If we read this as me talking about, oh, religionists, then we within the Objectivist community will typically have a reaction of "oh, of course!" or similar. We would advise a religionist to "check his premises," even if he considers himself quite certain of the truth of his beliefs, and if he is not willing to do so, we would recognize that he will never be in the position to correct his errors. But if we read this as me talking about people within the Objectivist community, then all sorts of defenses are typically activated: what's this about "possibility" (and how does it relate to the "arbitrary"), and aren't some things proven beyond the point of doubt (and aren't the axioms immune), and what specific Objectivist ideas do I find questionable, and etc.
Yet there are a plethora of debates within the Objectivist community (to which this forum stands testament), and on that basis alone, we should not be insensitive to the need to continue to examine and re-examine our own ideas, to "check our premises" even against our own experience of certainty (which, again, needs further exploration). We all seem to consider ourselves "certain" -- even when and where we disagree with one another. Without what you describe as "an openness to seemingly untrue ideas," we are all sunk. We rely on that openness from people outside of the Objectivist community, if we mean to spread our ideas (without an openness to seemingly untrue ideas, I would never have read Ayn Rand in the first place); and we must recognize it as virtuous in ourselves, as well, if we mean to continue to eliminate the errors in our thinking.
I think no one has the obligation to try to convince another person of the truth of any given position (except as is necessitated by the pursuit of one's own values). So we all have the right to communicate, or not, as best suits our individual lives.
But it is a separate question as to when we may justly conclude that another person cannot be reached by reason. (And, further, to distinguish this from failures in communication; I may present a sound argument well or poorly, in a given context, and if I present my argument poorly, it may not be your "fault" if you reject it.)
It's a tricky question, especially since I've found that some people may be quite rational with respect to certain subjects, and highly irrational or dishonest or evasive or etc., with respect to others. In general, I try to extend the "benefit of the doubt" as far as I can, and to keep all of the relevant context in mind; some people are very bad at expressing themselves (and we all struggle at times), and in my experience there's great potential to confuse such poor communication with moral failure.
This does not even begin to touch the subject of the process by which people discard bad ideas and adopt good ones; I have again found that "coming to truth" is a process which plays out over time, and it does not always proceed in a clear, straight line, or instantaneously. Some people express confusions honestly, or are mistaken honestly, or take (sometimes large amounts of) time to process ideas, and the ability to distinguish this from someone who is fundamentally irrational is... hard won, at best.
And then: people can change.
But, as above, I think we can recognize approaches that are not conducive to reasoning, and work on improving our own mental (and social) habits.

If we go by the definition of Consequentialism as: "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences."
Consequentialism can end up having different meanings, concretized differently. The definition is vague, therefore it can end up turning into contradictory philosophies. There is a continuum. From irrational consequentialist to rational consequentialist.
Some consequentialist philosophies include: Utilitarianism, Hedonism, Epicureanism, Egoism, Asceticism, Altruism, etc.
I think that at the core of Rand's objection to pragmatism is that one could be a consequentialist and believe that contradictions exist in reality.
The irrational versions reject absolute truth, the primacy of existence, self-interest.
It goes without saying that a rational version of any philosophy rejects the existence of contradiction.
A rational/comprehensive version of consequentialism is compatible with Objectivism if life is the ultimate consequence.
If "a consequentialist" considered consequences as part of causality, its absoluteness, I don't see any conflict.
Therefore, I think that one can say that Objectivism is a type of rational consequentialism, which means a type of consequentialism.
 

I will NEVER drive a self driving car in anything other than manual driving mode.  I will not give up my control and judgment, especially if car manufacturers are making cars which will "decide" to sacrifice me for any reason.

I would go so far as to say almost all values (I am adhering here to the objective theory of values) in fact ARE instrumental, imho all but one value is instrumental, instrumental to the only value which is at once both an end in itself and a choice: life.

I would say that virtues are values but not an end in themselves. 
When I was researching what 2046 was saying regarding instrumental vs. constituent means, (if I understood it properly), what you are saying would be that virtues constitute what values are. I could easily be wrong on this one. That virtues do not necessarily cause values (not instrumental), they in a sense are values.
The problem is that virtues can be both. I value the virtue of rationality. I FEEL safer when I have a rational explanation for something strange. I want it. I prefer it. But it will cause a better easier life. If it caused a worse life, the virtue of rationality would be thrown away. Therefore the key to its "valuable-ness" is its instrumentality, its ability to cause, not what it is on its own.
 

DA:
I'm not certain why, but this discussion of your has lead me see a sort of asymmetry... there are different kinds of consequences being considered. 
 
As Objectivists we hold that acting morally (toward the correct end according to the proper standard) as a finite, fallible, non-omniscient man, is based on anticipated consequences of those actions.
If a consequentialist only looks ex post facto at actual consequences (including some unforeseeable by a finite, fallible, non-omniscient man) that is a completely different thing.
 
As Objectivists we know that moral action is moral when a decision has been made to act, it is also moral at the time the action is taken, i.e. morality is not solely an exercise post mortem... it is entirely based on anticipated consequences.
It would appear that a Consequentialist, IF bound to the law that only actual outcomes determine morality of action, can never actually BE moral when making a decision to act, nor while acting, because the outcomes of the action are not yet known.  In other words Consequentialists cannot act morally, only their actions can be judged as moral or not, and only after the actual consequences are known.  Of course this seems incredibly silly, but it would seem to be the case. 

If we go by the definition of Consequentialism as: "the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged solely by its consequences."
Consequentialism can end up having different meanings, concretized differently. The definition is vague, therefore it can end up turning into contradictory philosophies. There is a continuum. From irrational consequentialist to rational consequentialist.
Some consequentialist philosophies include: Utilitarianism, Hedonism, Epicureanism, Egoism, Asceticism, Altruism, etc.
I think that at the core of Rand's objection to pragmatism is that one could be a consequentialist and believe that contradictions exist in reality.
The irrational versions reject absolute truth, the primacy of existence, self-interest.
It goes without saying that a rational version of any philosophy rejects the existence of contradiction.
A rational/comprehensive version of consequentialism is compatible with Objectivism if life is the ultimate consequence.
If "a consequentialist" considered consequences as part of causality, its absoluteness, I don't see any conflict.
Therefore, I think that one can say that Objectivism is a type of rational consequentialism, which means a type of consequentialism.
 

Objectivists are people, too. Best case scenario is that their philosophy is superior, but even that is not a given - do they practice what they preach? Even with a superior philosophy, have they been able to translate that into life success? Can they get along with others? That is, do they have value to trade?
People are people, too. They're not explicitly rational by choice, they don't explicitly pursue their own personal interests, but in practice, most do live this way most of the time. They are Objectivists to degrees and have translated that into life success, and have a lot of value to offer and trade.
The world will never, ever present itself to you as the polar choice illustrated in Atlas Shrugged. People are fluid, choosing to change or not change. Atlas Shrugged is meant to crystalize principles, allowing you to make better day to day choices for yourself. It's an exaggeration which will never be a reality, because people have the ability to choose and change, and few of them are all evil or all good. Even more so today, a "band together and separate" fantasy shouldn't be given a fleeting thought, when everyone carries around pocket computers representing perfectly all the value the world has to offer to trade, the world's largest country is heading in the right direction, poverty is low, etc. etc. Why would anyone want to run from that? The world's never been better.

The first Post starts with a question. 
According to other definitions brought up, it seems to
I would be interested in knowing what you define "consequentialism" to be?
At some point, you're brought up that it means that Any Means are Justified which to me renders it irrational so I am assuming you mean something other than what I understood.

When you say "not just because the consequences are better", then what is the alternative? Some other way (to know) is better? or ...
better is not what matters?
How can you "ever" make consequences irrelevant?

People have to learn to handle their subconscious premises, and they can make innocent mistakes about it. Thus it doesn't follow that someone with an unbreached rationality will be perfectly integrated in his psychology. Conversely, it doesn't follow that someone who feels an out-of-context desire has been irrational somewhere. The long-term ideal of the rational man is to achieve perfect integration between conscious and subconscious, and this needs to be striven for. But its lack at any given time is not a sure sign of irrationality, and it doesn't defeat the virtue of actions based on explicit moral principle.

Ayn Rand agreed with me:
http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/psychologizing.html#order_4
In Atlas Shrugged, Rand also had her supremely ideal man, John Galt, relate an instance in which he experienced an out-of-context desire while observing Hank Rearden. That he felt that desire did not make him immoral.
A consequence of the view that you ascribe to Rand would be that psychology is an illegitimate profession: It would just be a sanction of irrationality: a cover that allows the irrational to pretend that they're rational. Any rational man would have his psychology completely figured out and integrated, with no conflicts. (The most we might say a psychologist would be useful for would be to hear about the patient's emotional conflicts and then condemn him for his bad premises. The psychologist would merely act as a form of punishment for a perpetrator of irrationality. But then this wouldn't require any specialized training, only philosophical education.)

I've no comment on Nozick, whom I have not read, but I'd like to challenge this initial notion -- because I think it is a common error among Objectivists.
"Libertarianism," as such, is not a philosophy to be contrasted against Objectivism. It is an approach to politics specifically, and delimited to that sphere. Thus when you say that Objectivism bears the "obvious similarity" of aligning to laissez-faire capitalism, as libertarianism does, that is as much as saying that "Objectivism is libertarian." Which is correct.
The mistake is trying to ascribe a full philosophy to "libertarianism" as such, then finding no agreement among "libertarian philosophers" (including Ayn Rand, even if she rejected the label) and decrying libertarianism for having contradictions. Or finding a self-described libertarian who offers no moral defense for capitalism and then saying that, therefore, libertarianism has no moral defense for capitalism. But it does. Ayn Rand provided it.
Libertarianism is not a specific philosophy, but it is a category of political philosophy, and Objectivism fits within it. Though a particular man may be "libertarian" and irrational, subscribing to mystical notions or other errors in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and etc. -- and though we can recognize that this will ultimately prove fatal to his understanding/application of even those political concepts he professes to endorse (such as "liberty") -- this does not make Objectivism anything other than libertarian.
It is rather like the person who says (and I've met more than one), "Oh, I'm not Christian... I'm Catholic." But Catholics are Christians and Objectivists are libertarians.

I hesitate to participate in this thought exercise because immortality is not even possible.
How many memory cells do we have in our brain? 
When will the limit be reached?
More importantly, the current nature that we have now will not allow the tolerance of immortality.
If you are immortal, you will not be able to kill your self. It may be something you will wish to do.
Our current makeup is that we end up with satiation.
Like drinking water, you drink so much until you are done.
Life also will have a point when you are done with it.
If you are forced to drink water when you are not thirsty at all, you will vomit.
The mental equivalent state of satiation is called boredom.
There may be a specific threshold, let us say 153.3 thousand years.
Anything past that threshold will be boring and eternal boredom is a terrible fate.
We currently don't have protection against eternal boredom.
Eventually, everything will be experienced and it will be abstracted.
"Been there done that" will become been at that type of place and experienced it.
To be immortal certain modification will have to be made to our Psychology.
We will not be human anymore.
Philosophically death is part of the definition of life.
Psychologically death does give meaning to life.
Even if, life just "is".
 

After giving you and Nicky a hard time, I figured the least I could do was sort of get back on topic.
Death doesn't give life meaning. Life gives life meaning. Death gives life a purpose, though, which is to stay alive--usually.
I could be wrong.

This is totally dismissive about the field of psychology!
Human psychology refers to the nature of the human mind. One's psychology is a different concept than psychology the nature of human thought.
Now, at least value pertains to seeking some end by choice - and it is part of human nature to actively seek those ends by choice. What psychology shows, Kyary, is that people have an innate capacity to recognize scarcity. Scarcity is a major basis to decide value, because it is so easy and notable to recognize. As far as philosophy, this doesn't say -why- life should or does have meaning.

Ayn Rand declared 'Life' to be the standard of value, but I highly doubt her account was survivalist. A key idea in Galt's speech is that a moral man is primarily motivated by the desire to gain values, not by the desire to avoid of suffering, i.e. his ultimate goal is pleasure derived from things that enhance his life, rather than from momentary pleasures that will kill him in the long run. 
Imagine a fictional world where all things that preserved us - food, sleep, exercise and so on - gave us pain rather than pleasure. Would that be a life worth preserving? I believe Ayn Rand would not hesistate to say that what makes life worth living is happiness, not survival at any price. If the pain-body mechanism was skewed like that, life would cease to be a value. Galt's talk about commiting suicide over losing Dagny strongly suggests that Rand did not regard all life as worth preserving, only a life where happiness is possible.
Here's where I agree with Rand: human beings have a vast array or needs, physical and psychological. Some of them are unique to us (art, philosophy, variety, challenge) and some are common in the animal world (food, sunlight). But here's where I disagree: her trying to box-in every human need into either the 'preservation of body' or 'preservation of consciousness' category.
My objection springs from a point of view that is not popular with objectivists, namely that human beings, like all animals, are genetically programmed to feel pleasure from things that enhance both survival and reproduction. Sex, romantic love and child rearing are utterly useless for your survival, but produce intense pleasure and spiritual fulfillment within people. Why? Because that's the nature of your body.
Does this view contradict Rand? This view denies that all human needs are tied to survival. However, it does not contradict the essence of what Rand is saying, namely that man's moral purpose is happiness. Rand went to great lenghts to point out that life is the standard of value, not happiness, because only a course of life-preserving values will actualy lead to happiness. But the point remains that happiness and pleasure are the stars of the game, and that the entire reason why we pursue life at all, is because life is very fun to live. If happiness requires struggle, then that struggle becomes eclipsed by how amazing happiness is.
In other words, if we replace 'Life' as the standard, with 'Happy life' as the standard, we get closer to what Rand herself meant, but her view that reproduction is merely 'a characteristic' of living organisms, and that every single human need serves a survival role, only confuses this part of her ethics.

That is the fundamental observation here, that Vladimir doesn't take into consideration. A statement of possibility is a positive assertion, because all statements of fact are positive assertions. And all positive assertions must have some fact or piece of evidence to tip the balance to their side (otherwise it couldn't be a positive assertion).

An arbitrary statement is outside right or wrong statements; it simply is outside of reality altogether and has no basis on which to even be evaluated. That is the case with the "matrix" scenario -- it is not possible (if it is, show how), but is arbitrary (there is no basis for determining its truth or falsehood, and as such it must be thrown out together with all other infinitely many arbitrary statements). It should be stressed again, that the "matrix" scenario is not wrong, but arbitrary, which are two different things. There is basis on which to consider and evaluate wrong statements; there is none for arbitrary ones.

This thread is in serious need of definitions for the words: "faith," and "arbitrary."

"Faith" is a belief held without reason. To say that we accept the evidence of the senses "on faith" is a stolen concept. Faith would be accepting something without evidence. In the case of the evidence of the senses, well, did you happen to notice that word, "evidence" in there?!?

"Arbitrary" is the category for claims that have no evidence for being true, but also cannot be proven false. Dr. Peikoff correctly argues that the arbitrary is not to be treated as possible, but to be utterly ignored. The arbitrary is that which could exist, but does not have a shred of evidence to suggest that it does exist. To accept, or even entertain, the arbitrary would be an act of faith, since it would be acting without evidence.

Your friend has it completely backwards: he is the one operating on faith, not you.

If you operate under the premise of giving thought to the arbitrary, I could think of a million billion arbirtary assertions and keep you eternally occupied. ("There is an invisible dragon on the far side of the moon." "Every time you belch, you give birth to a tiny, undetectable galaxy in an alternate universe.")

Are you familiar with the "Flying Sphagetti Monster" argument?

For the wrong audience, "failure in practice" carries the implication that it would be "good in theory" if only people were "virtuous enough" or "selfless enough", etc.  Thus, the argument sidesteps or (by implication) disavows the simpler truth:
Such a founding principle is monstrous in theory.
Although it requires a rational inquiry and a rejection of ingrained falsehoods (such as the morality of self-sacrifice), it is clear that the principle is inimical to life, the good of the person and is an evil.
 

An abstraction that existed metaphysically would not be an abstraction, it would be just another concrete.  In fact abstractions are concretes, they are attributes of the brains of those abstractors who have preformed that mental action.  But as a product of human action such abstractions are not metaphysically-given, which is why they must be acknowledged as epistemological.
A metaphysically given abstraction is a contradiction in terms.