Argument for the existence of God

[dream_weaver]

Do they refer only to the particular existents from which they are derived, or are they potentially referent to other existents. I am specifically speaking of the concept of logic here. Does "A is A" only refer to that which I have personally perceived or is it applicable to any and all potentially perceivable things?

Does "Man" only refer to the particular men whom I have perceived or does it refer to any and all entities which properly fit in that category (even the ones which I have not perceived)?

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

Is it also true when the numbers refer to the quantity of the same thing (i.e. 2 pencils and 2 pencils/ 2 entities and 2 entities/ 2a and 2a, etc...)?? And if yes, is this always the case or only when we perceive it to be so?

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

It seems like this answer is a re-wording of the second answer- that it is true regarding all which has been perceived (gathered from sense data), but that it is possibly not true about that which has not yet been perceived.

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

Is that what you are saying here?

And to put it differently- are contradictions possible? why or why not?

I think Grames is covering that with you just fine.

When I say "universal" I'm not really referring to "Universals" in the classical platonic sense. I simply mean that it is universally true- i.e. true about every possible thing in the universe...all encompassing...no exceptions.

In what sense is Peikoff referring to Rand as having solved the "problem of universals"? He draws a contrast of Miss Rand's solution, contrasting it with which historic views?

I'm sorry. I have no idea what your talking about. But could you please answer the questions which have to do with the heart of this discussion?

If you were honestly, intellectually pursuing a grasp and comprehension of the subject matter, your continual circling around and trying to raise a slightly different context of your same confusions might lead us to believe we may be the wrong source to deliver you a response that fits what you want to hear.

[Jacob86]

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

How is this different the the "problem of universals" Peikoff pointed out that Rand resolved on page 89 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand?

From what I have read and understood of that section, it is not different and I am arguing for Rand's side which you seem to be arguing against. To make it clear whether you agree with Rand's argument or disagree with Rand's argument in this particular discussion, you will need to do more than quote Rand- meaning you will need to directly answer these questions for yourself so that we can discuss them. If I could have a clarifying conversation with Rand herself, trust me, I would! But, I am not talking to Rand. I am talking to you. So please, answer the questions.

I think Grames is covering that with you just fine.

I take it then, that you agree with his position? If so, I would like to hear your reasoning for stating that contradictions are impossible (perhaps you might have a better answer than he).

In what sense is Peikoff referring to Rand as having solved the "problem of universals"? He draws a contrast of Miss Rand's solution, contrasting it with which historic views?

He seems to be contrasting it with historic views which I also reject but which you seem to think I am adhering to. In order to prove out whether or not I am being consistent with Rand's position or with other false positions, we need to discuss these issues and ask revealing questions- as I have been attempting to do.

If you were honestly, intellectually pursuing a grasp and comprehension of the subject matter, your continual circling around and trying to raise a slightly different context of your same confusions might lead us to believe we may be the wrong source to deliver you a response that fits what you want to hear.

At this point in the discussion (concerning logic, epistemology, etc..), I am not attempting to grasp the subject matter (I think I've got it down). I am trying to honestly grasp and understand your position and the position of the majority of Objectivists because it seems to be at odds with much of the rest of the Objectivist Worldview.

The "circling" and "different contexts" is an attempt on my part to communicate to you in an understandable way, since it seems that much of what I am saying or asking is either being misunderstood or ignored.

Concerning "what I want to hear"- all I want to hear is an honest and direct answer to my questions regarding your worldview so that I can assess it...and I want to honestly understand that which you say in answer to those questions (hence further clarifying questions). If you don't like the process of carefully trying to understand and evaluate the positions of others, then I'm sorry- but that's the only way I know how to have any meaningful discussion...let alone a debate.

[Grames]

I agree that the ideas of metaphysical contradictions are incoherent and meaningless (and therefore to be rejected).

Now, if someone claims as part of their metaphysics that which is logically contradictory, we both agree that they are wrong (and incoherent).

Therefore we know that "square circles existing" is false (and also incoherent and meaningless) and so we can conclude with absolute certainty that "no square circles exist".

If a worldview or philosophy is founded on contradictions, we can know that it is false.

Do you agree?

Yes, but now it is my turn to play "there are two kinds of X". There are internal and external contradictions. A philosophy or worldview can go wrong by contradicting itself (a methodological error), and it can go wrong by contradicting reality as we perceive, interact with and measure it. The two types of contradiction are heirarchically related. The external contradiction category is more general and contains within it as a special case the internal contradiction because the principle of non-contradiction primarily applies between reality and a concept and then only later between two concepts.

[dream_weaver]

Jacob86,

21 pages under the heading of "Argument for the existence of God" - 'Please convince me that this is false (IF indeed it is)' does not imply agreement with a Primacy of Existence position.

Stating you wish to be 'convinced' of something as being false(if indeed it is, suggest you do not a firm conviction of this yourself), runs afoul of the onus of proof lie on the individual who asserts the 'existence of God', not on demonstrating that such is not the case.

Your desire to make the distinction of using Mom, Dad, Grandma, Grandpa, Uncle Joe, Aunt Mary, the cashier at the grocery store, the clerk at the gas station as the perceptual data you used to integrate the concept 'man' from - later deducing that your local minister, the police officer and the President of the United States of America are further examples of 'man' - and then posing a question that reeks of the aroma of "There is a claim that there are 6.5 billion instances of 'man' on the planet - does my concept of 'man' refer to only the 8 individuals that I used to form the concept and the few instances I've included since formulating it" is an attempt to grasp someone else's 'world view'?

I am not persuaded. Godspeed in your pursuit.

[Jacob86]

Yes, but now it is my turn to play "there are two kinds of X". There are internal and external contradictions. A philosophy or worldview can go wrong by contradicting itself (a methodological error), and it can go wrong by contradicting reality as we perceive, interact with and measure it. The two types of contradiction are heirarchically related. The external contradiction category is more general and contains within it as a special case the internal contradiction because the principle of non-contradiction primarily applies between reality and a concept and then only later between two concepts.

I think we could be in agreement here. However it seems we disagree about the conclusion of this.

I conclude from this that when a contradiction is involved (and especially when it is a necessarily "either or" scenario) that it is possible to know/understand/prove that something is true/false without appealing to perception for evidence.

Example: The concept that "It is impossible to know objective truth" is self contradictory and therefore false (we don't need to appeal to evidence that some people do know absolute truth in order to show that it is false). Further, by the Law of the Excluded Middle, since this proposition is false, its opposite must be true and therefore we know absolutely that "it is possible to know objective truth".

I think you disagree with this conclusion and this type of argument (because it does not appeal to perception).

If not, awesome! If so, please tell me why such a conclusion is false and such an argument is wrong.

[Jacob86]

Jacob86,

21 pages under the heading of "Argument for the existence of God" - 'Please convince me that this is false (IF indeed it is)' does not imply agreement with a Primacy of Existence position.

Ya... I've stated a few times that I would like to forget about discussing arguments for the existence of God because it has been made evident that a discussion on epistemology is necessary before any meaningful discussion about the Arguments can be had. I believe this was actually Plasmatic's idea (to go over epistemology and foundational assumptions) and I agreed to it because it was obvious that we were all speaking past each other....which is what happens when those in a debate/conversation do not understand what they others mean in what they are saying.

Stating you wish to be 'convinced' of something as being false(if indeed it is, suggest you do not a firm conviction of this yourself), runs afoul of the onus of proof lie on the individual who asserts the 'existence of God', not on demonstrating that such is not the case.

An unfortunate mistake in my wording. I recant it.

Your desire to make the distinction of using Mom, Dad, Grandma, Grandpa, Uncle Joe, Aunt Mary, the cashier at the grocery store, the clerk at the gas station as the perceptual data you used to integrate the concept 'man' from - later deducing that your local minister, the police officer and the President of the United States of America are further examples of 'man' - and then posing a question that reeks of the aroma of "There is a claim that there are 6.5 billion instances of 'man' on the planet - does my concept of 'man' refer to only the 8 individuals that I used to form the concept and the few instances I've included since formulating it" is an attempt to grasp someone else's 'world view'?

The analogy using "Man" was meant as a substitute for "Logic" since you seemed to use them differently.

You and others on the forum seem to be saying that Logic is not applicable to that which has not been directly perceived- which would seem to imply that you only believe in the laws of logic because you have not yet run across anything acting differently but that it is possible to run across something in reality which is illogical.

So far, that is what I understand of your position (from what you have said). I am trying (very very hard and very very patiently) to figure out if this is your position or not...and if not, then how your position is different from this position.

How am I supposed to coherently respond to you if you refuse to answer questions meant to clarify where you stand on the issue at hand?

I am not persuaded. Godspeed in your pursuit.

If this is your "farewell" then I guess "good bye".

I really would like to have an honest discussion with Objectivists about these issues so that I can see if Objectivism is logically coherent or not.

[Jacob86]

In order to help people keep context, the current epistemological debate about the proper function of logic has sprung up mostly in response to my arguments against two common atheistic assumptions:

1)Naturalism: The idea that only physical nature exists.

2)Falsifiability: Only that which is scientifically testable can be true.

I have demonstrated that both are illogical and therefore must be rejected as pillars of one's worldview.

I will give a brief summary of the arguments here:

1) Naturalism: If only physical nature exists, then the activity in our brains is no more than physical molecules bumping into each other deterministically and therefore the activity in our brains cannot be said to correspond to reality any more than the activity in our stomachs. If this is the case, then no propositions can be objectively true about the world, including the proposition that "only physical nature exists". Therefore if Naturalism is true, then it is false at the same time.

2) Falsifiability: If only that which is scientifically testable can be true then any proposition which is not scientifically testable cannot be true. The proposition that "only that which is scientifically testable can be true" is a proposition which cannot be scientifically tested. Therefore, if the principle of Falsifiability is true, then it is false.

So far, the major response to my arguments has been basically "You can't use logic like that!".

So, this current debate is over whether or not logic can be used in the way that I have used it above.

I see absolutely no reason that Logic cannot be used in such a way-- and further, every attempt to declare that logic can't be used like this seems to heavily imply that contradictions are possible and that logic is simply a subjective tool to be discarded when it is inconvenient.

So, If you think that my arguments against Naturalism or Falsifiability are flawed...please point out the flaws. If you think that Logic cannot be used in such a way, please demonstrate how this is the case without turning logic implicitly into a pragmatic Kantian tool which can be discarded if we think we perceive a contradiction.

[Greebo]

Agreed!

But on what basis do you say that "Contradictions do not exist"?

Convince me that contradictions do not exist.

[i agree that they don't, but I want to understand the Objectivist answer to this question because I think it is very different from my answer]

If contradictions exist, then logic does can not be valid. If logic is valid, I must use something other than logic to prove that contradictions do not exist - but in order to prove something, one must by definition use logic.

You cannot *prove* that A is A. You can only attempt to prove "A is A" to be false - and in doing so, you use "A is A" to prove that "A is not A".

That is why it is axiomatic.

[Jacob86]

If contradictions exist, then logic does can not be valid. If logic is valid, I must use something other than logic to prove that contradictions do not exist - but in order to prove something, one must by definition use logic.

You cannot *prove* that A is A. You can only attempt to prove "A is A" to be false - and in doing so, you use "A is A" to prove that "A is not A".

That is why it is axiomatic.

Ok... so you agree that Logic is universally valid and needs no proof since it must be assumed in order to be argued against??

This is what I have been saying.

I only said that "it proves itself" meaning that this (what you've said about it's axiomatic nature) is its "proof".

So, one does not need to appeal to perception in order to demonstrate that "A is A". Right? All one needs to do is say what you have said above about the fact that it is inescapable. Right??

Edited November 27, 2010 by Jacob86

[Eiuol]

In order to help people keep context, the current epistemological debate about the proper function of logic has sprung up mostly in response to my arguments against two common atheistic assumptions:

1)Naturalism: The idea that only physical nature exists.

2)Falsifiability: Only that which is scientifically testable can be true.

That's not what falsifiability is in it's entirety. Falsifiability also involves the idea that some assertion COULD be proven false. This is not a viewpoint that is advocated by any Objectivist, and it is flawed for many reasons. Naturalism is not terminology often used that I've seen around here, and I do not know it's applicability to Objectivist thought. Concepts aren't physical, yet they exist. The important thing about concepts though, is that they can be connected to the perceptual level. So from what I gather, you are right in saying those positions are flawed. The issue in this thread is simply a lack of understanding how epistemology and metaphysics are connected.

True, to refute logic requires logic, but logic is dependent upon the three main axioms, especially the law of identity. Now to explain and grasp the law of identity requires logic, but the point is you implicitly acknowledge the law of identity as soon as you are able to have any sensations. To form a proposition "A is A" requires logic and a high level of abstraction, but it is implied in every word you utter and every action you take. It would help to read the chapter on axiomatic concepts in ITOE; I assume you have that book.

Edited November 27, 2010 by Eiuol

[Greebo]

Ok... so you agree that Logic is universally valid and needs no proof since it must be assumed in order to be argued against??

This is what I have been saying.

I only said that "it proves itself" meaning that this (what you've said about it's axiomatic nature) is its "proof".

So, one does not need to appeal to perception in order to demonstrate that "A is A". Right? All one needs to do is say what you have said above about the fact that it is inescapable. Right??

Correct, and I think I see where you are going with this.

So as a preemptive measure - bear in mind - Logic is a concept. The concept of logic is formed as all concepts are formed - from our observations of the universe.

[Jacob86]

Correct, and I think I see where you are going with this.

So as a preemptive measure - bear in mind - Logic is a concept. The concept of logic is formed as all concepts are formed - from our observations of the universe.

Yes, I understand that the formation of the concept of logic in my mind is preceded by perceptual observations of the universe. I am not denying this.

Here's a question that might make this conversation more helpful (or it might muddy the waters more...we'll see).

Are concepts only mental constructs in an individual's mind which refer only to the data which has been observed by that individual?

OR

Do concepts refer to objective truth?

[The reason I'm asking this is because it seems that you are stressing that "Logic" is a concept- so I'd like to understand your position on the correct use of concepts]

As of right now, I think I hold to the second option since the first would seem to lead to subjectivism rather quickly. So, I would say that my current position is that (true) concepts refer to that which is objectively true in reality. This does not mean that we know the concepts innately or that we learn them through any type of special revelation. I agree that we discover concepts (like Logic) through observation- but I hold that it is a discovery of something which is objectively true, not just a tool for organizing my personal thoughts.

Just like I discovered through perceptual observation that rocks are not alive- and yet the fact that rocks are not alive is not dependent upon my perceptual observation. I wouldn't know it personally had I not observed it, but my not knowing it would not have affected the rock in any way. Similarly, I hold that I discovered the laws of logic through perceptual observation- but the laws of logic are not dependent upon my observation. If I had never observed them, there still would be no contradictions in reality--- just like if I had never observed rocks, there still would be no living rocks in reality.

Does that make sense? Do you understand my position thus far?

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

Similarly, I hold that I discovered the laws of logic through perceptual observation- but the laws of logic are not dependent upon my observation. If I had never observed them, there still would be no contradictions in reality--- just like if I had never observed rocks, there still would be no living rocks in reality.

If you reworded this as such:

"]Similarly, I hold that I discovered the laws of logic through perceptual observation- but the laws of logic that existents have Identity is not dependent upon my observation.....If I had never observed them, there still would be no contradictions in reality--- no existents without Identity , just like if I had never observed rocks, there still would be no living rocks in reality.

What would contradict this according to Oist epistemology? My point is that "laws" refers to a mental grasp of existence by an observer. Otherwise things just are. There is nothing subjective about this.

Oism does not deny the ampliative nature of concepts or inductive propositions. So, if you think that an Oist thinks that one must observe enumeratively every instance of something to determine if it is true then your wrong.

Edited November 27, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Grames]

I think we could be in agreement here. However it seems we disagree about the conclusion of this.

I conclude from this that when a contradiction is involved (and especially when it is a necessarily "either or" scenario) that it is possible to know/understand/prove that something is true/false without appealing to perception for evidence.

Example: The concept that "It is impossible to know objective truth" is self contradictory and therefore false (we don't need to appeal to evidence that some people do know absolute truth in order to show that it is false). Further, by the Law of the Excluded Middle, since this proposition is false, its opposite must be true and therefore we know absolutely that "it is possible to know objective truth".

I think you disagree with this conclusion and this type of argument (because it does not appeal to perception).

If not, awesome! If so, please tell me why such a conclusion is false and such an argument is wrong.

Producing a counter-example is a better dis-proof than the self-contradiction argument, but pointing out the self-refuting nature of such a statement is easy and requires no further effort. Both refutations are valid, but counting on a person who could come up with such an illogical statement to understand the abstract logical critique of it is a gamble. Pointing out self-contradictions is best done for an audience not emotionally attached to the argument. Demonstrations are better in one-to-one discourse because it changes the conflict from person-to-person to person-vs.-reality. Few will persist in arguing against their own eyes.

Knowledge has both foundation (the perceptual level) and context (hierarchical and logical relations to other concepts and propositions). One attribute is not opposed to the other. Both attributes are necessary for there to be knowledge. Without the perceptual tie to reality knowledge is floating abstractions. Without the proper interrelations one might claim to know something and its opposite.

The justification for rejecting contradictions is that because something cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect, so one should not think something can be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect. The logical principle comes from the metaphysical principle. The metaphysical principle is implicit in every perception, but explicitly conceptualizing it omits the identification of every percept while retaining the essential fact the everything had an identity. The locations in time and space of whatever has been observed are also omitted, making the principle a universal principle applicable to all time and all space. The law of identity is derived from what exists by perceiving what exists and conceptualizing what exists, and the very nature of conceptual thinking means the law of identity is not therefore limited to only the particular things we have seen for ourselves.

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

Here's a question that might make this conversation more helpful (or it might muddy the waters more...we'll see).

Are concepts only mental constructs in an individual's mind which refer only to the data which has been observed by that individual?

OR

Do concepts refer to objective truth?

Jacob, objectivity according to Oism, is a relationship between mind independent existence and an observer that requires a specific method, which is dictated by the specific kind of consciousness posessed by the observers.

Edited November 27, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Jacob86]

Producing a counter-example is a better dis-proof than the self-contradiction argument, but pointing out the self-refuting nature of such a statement is easy and requires no further effort. Both refutations are valid, but counting on a person who could come up with such an illogical statement to understand the abstract logical critique of it is a gamble. Pointing out self-contradictions is best done for an audience not emotionally attached to the argument. Demonstrations are better in one-to-one discourse because it changes the conflict from person-to-person to person-vs.-reality. Few will persist in arguing against their own eyes.

I agree that another form of argumentation may be more effective on such an irrational person (although I think it is valuable to be able to demonstrate the utter insanity of their position up front sometimes).

However, I am not as concerned about convincing other people as I am about being convinced (being certain) myself.

Knowledge has both foundation (the perceptual level) and context (hierarchical and logical relations to other concepts and propositions). One attribute is not opposed to the other. Both attributes are necessary for there to be knowledge. Without the perceptual tie to reality knowledge is floating abstractions. Without the proper interrelations one might claim to know something and its opposite.

Agreed..I think..for the most part.

The only question I have regarding this paragraph is this:

would you say that the type of argument I presented above which did not appeal to perceptual evidence is simply "floating abstractions" and therefore false because of its failure to appeal to perceptual evidence?

Why or why not?

The justification for rejecting contradictions is that because something cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect, so one should not think something can be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect. The logical principle comes from the metaphysical principle. The metaphysical principle is implicit in every perception, but explicitly conceptualizing it omits the identification of every percept while retaining the essential fact the everything had an identity. The locations in time and space of whatever has been observed are also omitted, making the principle a universal principle applicable to all time and all space. The law of identity is derived from what exists by perceiving what exists and conceptualizing what exists, and the very nature of conceptual thinking means the law of identity is not therefore limited to only the particular things we have seen for ourselves.

I absolutely agree! And that is what I mean when I say that contradictions cannot exist in reality (which is another way of saying what Rand said so often: "Contradictions do not exist"). That is what I mean when I say that Logic is metaphysical, and therefore epistemological-- that nothing in reality can be not itself and therefore we know that any idea which supposes that something in reality is not itself is false.

Here's another question though....must we appeal to perceptual evidence in order to know with certainty that this is the case??

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

Jacob, objectivity according to Oism, is a relationship between mind independent existence and an observer that requires a specific method, which is dictated by the specific kind of consciousness posessed by the observers.

Hey! I'm eager to respond to your posts but can't at the moment. I will soon!

In the mean time, based on what you've said, it seems we have some agreement. Therefore I'd like to ask you if you see any problems with my arguments against Naturalism and Falsifiability; especially the alleged problem that "they do not appeal to perceptual evidence and therefore are invalid"...To you agree with this allegation? Do you see any other problems with those arguments?

[Greebo]

Are concepts only mental constructs in an individual's mind which refer only to the data which has been observed by that individual?

OR

Do concepts refer to objective truth?

This is a false dichotomy. Neither is correct.

Concepts are only mental constructs - but they need not refer only to the data observed by that individual.

Concepts are abstract. They are dissociated from the entity they conceptualize. The idea of a tree is not a climbable. The idea of a beer is not drinkable.

And because they are dissociated from their respective entities, they need not represent real entities. Thus I can imagine a beer tree from who's branches I can drink - ale from the tops, lager from the bottoms, and stout from a tap in the trunk.

Forming a new concept can be based on observation - or it can be a purely mental process. Thus is God imagined to be real.

[Greebo]

That is what I mean when I say that Logic is metaphysical, and therefore epistemological-- that nothing in reality can be not itself and therefore we know that any idea which supposes that something in reality is not itself is false.

If I understand this rather poorly written sentence, then you have abandoned logic at this point.

Nothing in reality can be not itself, it is true.

So with regard to concepts, a concept of "purple invisible unicorns who love pizza" can not NOT be a concept of "purple invisible unicorns who love pizza". In other words - a Concept of X can not NOT be a Concept of X. c(X)!= !c(X)

But all that concept is - is a concept. That it is a concept doesn't affect X. C is a true Concept of a FALSE idea - X - if X does not actually exist.

It's the difference between true logic and a logical Truth.

True logic can be based on false premises and reach a logical conclusion that is false. To be a TRUTH - the premises must be true as well as the logic.

Your idea that if we can imagine it, it must be possible to exist ultimately fails because it turns the statement that all real things can be conceptualized on it's head.

All real things can be conceptualized.

Not all concepts are of real things.

Again -the above is *IF* I interpreted your statement correctly.

Edited November 28, 2010 by Greebo

[Grames]

Agreed..I think..for the most part.

The only question I have regarding this paragraph is this:

would you say that the type of argument I presented above which did not appeal to perceptual evidence is simply "floating abstractions" and therefore false because of its failure to appeal to perceptual evidence?

Why or why not?

I take you to refer to this argument:

Example: The concept that "It is impossible to know objective truth" is self contradictory and therefore false (we don't need to appeal to evidence that some people do know absolute truth in order to show that it is false). Further, by the Law of the Excluded Middle, since this proposition is false, its opposite must be true and therefore we know absolutely that "it is possible to know objective truth".

The utility of deductive reasoning is limited. This is impeccable logic and must be true valid but as an exercise in pure deduction it cannot actually produce a method of how to know objective truth. It is all well and good to deduce the existence of a new planet from the perturbations in the orbit of a known planet, but the new planet has not been discovered until it has been photographed (reduced to the perceptual level).

I absolutely agree! And that is what I mean when I say that contradictions cannot exist in reality (which is another way of saying what Rand said so often: "Contradictions do not exist"). That is what I mean when I say that Logic is metaphysical, and therefore epistemological-- that nothing in reality can be not itself and therefore we know that any idea which supposes that something in reality is not itself is false.

Ascribing logic (why the capitalization when you write the word Logic?) to existence is the category error you keep making. There is no logic without a subject who reasons, so logic cannot be attributed to existence itself apart from a mind. Neither can logic be located in the mind entirely apart from existence, that would be subjectivism and the primacy of consciousness principle. The two elements of subject and object are both required together in relation, which Rand named Objectivism in contrast to Intrinsicism and Subjectivism.

In a similar pattern of thought, Aristotle's theory of universals was that the essence of a thing which made it a member of a class was in the thing itself, an intrinsic attribute, metaphysical. Aristotle's version is an improvement over Plato's theory which placed ideal forms in a completely different dimension, but it still fails to be reconcilable with demonstrable instances of relativity. Different persons can reason and even perceive differently when presented with the same scene entirely due to differences in the persons. The same person confronted with the same scene on two occasions can reason and even perceive differently depending on what he has learned in the interval between.

Here's another question though....must we appeal to perceptual evidence in order to know with certainty that this is the case?

That depends on how the word certainty is used, and which certainty is appropriate to the situation at hand. Deductive certainty is inferior to perceptual certainty, as I hope my example of discovering a new planet illustrated. Deductive certainty is adequate for quickly disposing of ill-formed arguments such as the example you gave. Starting on OPAR pg. 175 Peikoff makes the case that certainty should only be used as the end of the inductive progression through "transitional evidentiary states" from possible, through probable and stopping at certain. He would not use the word certain to describe the status of identifying percepts by name, or direct memory, or even the axioms of metaphysics. Such things are known, or they are not known.

The main problem with reasoning from "It is impossible to know objective truth" to "It is possible to know objective truth" is what does "objective truth" refer to? A statement of the form "Mugwumps are entirely green and not green at the same time" is false invalid, the contrary statement must be true is valid: "Mugwumps are not entirely green and not green at the same time". However, this does not prove that mugwumps even exist. It is not settled yet whether your understanding of what "objective truth" refers to is the same mine or Rand's, so even your example is ambiguous.

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

If you reworded this as such:

"]Similarly, I hold that I discovered the laws of logic through perceptual observation- but the laws of logic that existents have Identity is not dependent upon my observation.....If I had never observed them, there still would be no contradictions in reality--- no existents without Identity , just like if I had never observed rocks, there still would be no living rocks in reality.

So you would say that apart from observation, existents have Identity (A is A). Would you also say that an existent cannot be itself and not itself at the same time and in the same respect (apart from observation)? If so, (A is not ~A). Further would you say that apart from observation, an existent is either what it is or is not what it is at the same time and in the same respect? If so, (A v ~A).

This is what I mean by "The Laws of Logic" applying to reality/metaphysics. I know that our human linguistic constructs that we call "the laws of logic" are meant to apply to the mental process of humans in order to judge validity, etc.. But, are these human linguistic constructs representative of the way reality actually is or are they simply linguistic constructs?

When I say that they apply to reality, I don't mean that reality somehow has volition and that it should be reprimanded if it used such volition to violate the laws. Perhaps rather than saying "they apply to reality", it would be better to say that "they apply to all ideas about reality because they are representative of the way that reality is"

a ) do you understand what I'm saying here?

and

b ) do you agree?

What would contradict this according to Oist epistemology? My point is that "laws" refers to a mental grasp of existence by an observer. Otherwise things just are. There is nothing subjective about this.

Oism does not deny the ampliative nature of concepts or inductive propositions. So, if you think that an Oist thinks that one must observe enumeratively every instance of something to determine if it is true then your wrong.

I am currently trying to understand exactly what Oist epistemology does hold and does not hold. I've read official statements on Oist epistemology from both Rand & Peikoff, but often it is difficult to spot flaws in something until it is "fleshed out" in debate/discussion. From my reading of Rand, it seemed very much as though she functionally used the same type epistemology as myself. However, as debate continued in this forum many people seemed to be functioning off of a different epistemology and quoting Rand & Peikoff as sources for their functional epistemology. SO, now I am trying to unravel the pieces and get into the details so that I can find out where the points of disagreement are (if any)..or to find out that we might actually agree but be speaking past each other because of misunderstandings, etc..

That's why I want to get a good idea of what Oists on here would say in regard to various questions.

Like I said to DreamWeaver, if I could sit down and ask clarifying questions with Rand herself, I would!

Edited November 28, 2010 by Jacob86

[Jacob86]

It's the difference between true logic and a logical Truth.

True logic can be based on false premises and reach a logical conclusion that is false. To be a TRUTH - the premises must be true as well as the logic.

Your idea that if we can imagine it, it must be possible to exist ultimately fails because it turns the statement that all real things can be conceptualized on it's head.

All real things can be conceptualized.

Not all concepts are of real things.

I agree that this is a very important distinction which you are making. I have made the distinction (in other terms) in previous posts and tried to emphasize that I reject this kind of thinking.

I THINK "Conceptualism" is the common term for the idea that "all concepts are of real things" or that "if it can be imagined and if it is not illogical, therefore it is real". If know of a better name for such a position, let me know. For now, I'll refer to it as "Conceptualism".

I've tried to point out that I am not asserting Conceptualism in previous posts by using the example of unicorns- just because one can imagine a unicorn and because the idea of unicorns does not inherently violate any laws of logic, this does not give us any reason to believe that unicorns exist.

So, I completely agree with Objectivists on this issue. However, I think that you are missing a distinction which I am making. The distinction is between what I would call "logically necessary" vs. "logically possible". Unicorns are "logically possible" in strictly logical terms. But there is no reason to believe that unicorns exist and therefore the statement that "unicorns exist" is an arbitrary statement. I think we agree with this.

However, "A is A" is a logically necessary statement. It must be true because any attempt to deny it would violate the laws of logic. Likewise "There are no square circles" is logically necessary and therefore true because any attempt to deny it would necessarily violate the laws of logic. Likewise "it is possible to know objective truth" is logically necessary because any attempt to deny it would violate the laws of logic.

With this last statement about truth- this does not tell us what it is objectively true, but it does tell us that it is possible to know objective truth (countering all who wish to say that all truth is subjective or "your truth is your truth", etc..).

So what I am saying is that while I agree that not all purely logical ideas are true, there are some purely logical ideas that are (and must be) true. [by purely logical, I mean appealing only to logic without any appeal to perceptual evidence].

I want to elaborate further but don't have time at the moment. Does this distinction make sense though?

[dream_weaver]

I THINK "Conceptualism" is the common term for the idea that "all concepts are of real things" or that "if it can be imagined and if it is not illogical, therefore it is real".

Conceptualism: The theory that universals can be said to exist, but only as concepts in the mind.

or

Conceptualism is a doctrine in philosophy intermediate between nominalism and realism that says universals exist only within the mind and have no external or substantial reality.

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

So you would say that apart from observation, existents have Identity (A is A). Would you also say that an existent cannot be itself and not itself at the same time and in the same respect (apart from observation)? If so, (A is not ~A). Further would you say that apart from observation, an existent is either what it is or is not what it is at the same time and in the same respect? If so, (A v ~A).

This is what I mean by "The Laws of Logic" applying to reality/metaphysics. I know that our human linguistic constructs that we call "the laws of logic" are meant to apply to the mental process of humans in order to judge validity, etc.. But, are these human linguistic constructs representative of the way reality actually is or are they simply linguistic constructs?

When I say that they apply to reality, I don't mean that reality somehow has volition and that it should be reprimanded if it used such volition to violate the laws. Perhaps rather than saying "they apply to reality", it would be better to say that "they apply to all ideas about reality because they are representative of the way that reality is"

a ) do you understand what I'm saying here?

and

b ) do you agree?

Yes I agree and understand. Any Oist who rejects this does not understand Rand.

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

Yes I agree and understand. Any Oist who rejects this does not understand Rand.

Thank you. Do any Objectivists wish to comment or disagree on this issue??

Plasmatic:

Since you agree with this, do you see what I mean about the ability to know some things to be true without appealing to perceptual observation for proof? We've just seen it with the Laws of Logic, so would you agree with me that it is possible to know the truthfulness of some ideas without appealing to perception?

Are the arguments which I have submitted regarding "Square circles", "Objective truth", and "Naturalism" flawed because they fail to appeal to perceptual observation??