Argument for the existence of God

[Jacob86]

That's not what falsifiability is in it's entirety. Falsifiability also involves the idea that some assertion COULD be proven false. This is not a viewpoint that is advocated by any Objectivist, and it is flawed for many reasons. Naturalism is not terminology often used that I've seen around here, and I do not know it's applicability to Objectivist thought. Concepts aren't physical, yet they exist. The important thing about concepts though, is that they can be connected to the perceptual level. So from what I gather, you are right in saying those positions are flawed. The issue in this thread is simply a lack of understanding how epistemology and metaphysics are connected.

I'm not sure about all the assumptions lumped in with classical "Falsifiability". I was only using that as a label on a common objection. Perhaps another label would be more appropriate, but my emphasis is on the content and meaning of the assumption- not so much the label used to identify it. The assumption is "Only that which is empirically testable can be considered true". Regardless of the label, I contend that it is illogical and that therefore there must be some things which can be considered true which are not empirically testable.

From what you said above, I'm not sure if you would agree with this or not..??

Notice though: I am NOT saying that "empirical testability is unreliable and that we cannot know anything from it", nor am I saying "that we can know any and all truth apart from empirical testability". I am simply saying that "there must be some true things that can be known apart from empirical testability".

Regarding Naturalism, again I don't care so much about the label as I do about the content of the assumption. It seems that many (or most) Objectivists hold to the content of it. It's just easier to type "Naturalism" than it is to type "the idea that only physical nature exists". It seems (from discussions on this forum) that most Oists who hold to this would like to make concepts the result of chemical activity in the brain- and thus make no distinction between "mind" and "brain". However, if you reject the idea that "only physical nature exists" and you hold that concepts do exist and are not physical, then I am assuming that you would also agree that the mind (where concepts function) is non-physical and distinct from the physical activity of the brain?

If so, then you would seem to agree with my position much more than most Oists on here that I have talked to concerning that issue thus far.

However, I would ask that you tell me if you agree or disagree on the above. I want to make sure I accurately understand your position.

True, to refute logic requires logic, but logic is dependent upon the three main axioms, especially the law of identity. Now to explain and grasp the law of identity requires logic, but the point is you implicitly acknowledge the law of identity as soon as you are able to have any sensations. To form a proposition "A is A" requires logic and a high level of abstraction, but it is implied in every word you utter and every action you take. It would help to read the chapter on axiomatic concepts in ITOE; I assume you have that book.

I have read this chapter, but I may re-read it if necessary...

I agree with everything you've said here with the exception of the first sentence- which may just be a misunderstanding. It seems you are saying that logic is dependent upon the law of identity..? Aren't they one in the same? Isn't the law of identity the first and cardinal law of logic (from which the others are correlaries)??

Therefore I would say that the axioms (existence and consciousness) are systematically dependent upon logic- since any axiom is essentially a restatement of the law of identity.

Note: I know that the other axioms are not experientially dependent on logic; i.e. we experience and notice existence before identity. I am saying that the truthfulness of the statement "existence exists" is dependent on the truthfulness of the statement "A is A". If "A is not A", then "existence does not exist".

[Jacob86]

Conceptualism: The theory that universals can be said to exist, but only as concepts in the mind.

or

Conceptualism is a doctrine in philosophy intermediate between nominalism and realism that says universals exist only within the mind and have no external or substantial reality.

eh- then I suppose we will have to use a different label. Regardless, the point is that I am not suggesting the idea that "as long as it is imaginable and not illogical, therefore it is true". Label it what you wish, I do not hold to it.

[Eiuol]

I have read this chapter, but I may re-read it if necessary...

I agree with everything you've said here with the exception of the first sentence- which may just be a misunderstanding. It seems you are saying that logic is dependent upon the law of identity..? Aren't they one in the same? Isn't the law of identity the first and cardinal law of logic (from which the others are correlaries)??

Therefore I would say that the axioms (existence and consciousness) are systematically dependent upon logic- since any axiom is essentially a restatement of the law of identity.

Note: I know that the other axioms are not experientially dependent on logic; i.e. we experience and notice existence before identity. I am saying that the truthfulness of the statement "existence exists" is dependent on the truthfulness of the statement "A is A". If "A is not A", then "existence does not exist".

No, logic is a conceptual and active process. A wolf can implicitly act on the law of identity whenever it smells prey; only THAT prey smells THAT way. At the same time, a wolf does not use logic to determine which prey to hunt. Even on an epistemological level, logic is entirely different. Logic is a process, the law of identity is an identification of a concrete fact.

You can't experience existence before identity really, because you'd be experiencing consciousness of something, as a particular something. You'd be experiencing the identity of your own consciousness at the very least. Existence exists is really the same thing as the law of identity; the reason anyone bothers to write anything more is that to be able to function in the world, you have to limit what you are focusing on at a particular time. Logic is not something in its own little plane of existence, everything about it is only possible once a person implicitly grasps the law of identity and all the other "primary" axioms.

Edited November 29, 2010 by Eiuol

[Greebo]

Not Plasmatic but...

do you see what I mean about the ability to know some things to be true without appealing to perceptual observation for proof?

Absolutely not.

To be True (as a Truth) something must be based on valid (as in grounded in existence) premises. The premises can be quite a long way back in the logical chain - but they must be there. Case in point - current theoretical speculations on the nature of the universe on the largest possible scales (string theory, branes, etc). All those theories are based on observations of a TINY FRACTION of existence - but on existence they are based, and must be for them to be even considerable as valid theories.

That which you refer to - call it intuition - without verifiability cannot be considered as True. Lucky, maybe - but not True.

We've just seen it with the Laws of Logic, so would you agree with me that it is possible to know the truthfulness of some ideas without appealing to perception?

No, we haven't. We could not deduce the laws of logic without perception giving us the frame of reference from which to deduce them.

[Jacob86]

No, logic is a conceptual and active process. A wolf can implicitly act on the law of identity whenever it smells prey; only THAT prey smells THAT way. At the same time, a wolf does not use logic to determine which prey to hunt. Even on an epistemological level, logic is entirely different. Logic is a process, the law of identity is an identification of a concrete fact.

Ok. I think we agree here. It seems like it's really just semantics that was creating confusion. When I was speaking of logic I was referring to those concrete facts/laws (Identity, Non-Contradiction, and Excluded Middle), not so much the mental process of using them.

You can't experience existence before identity really, because you'd be experiencing consciousness of something, as a particular something. You'd be experiencing the identity of your own consciousness at the very least. Existence exists is really the same thing as the law of identity; the reason anyone bothers to write anything more is that to be able to function in the world, you have to limit what you are focusing on at a particular time. Logic is not something in its own little plane of existence, everything about it is only possible once a person implicitly grasps the law of identity and all the other "primary" axioms.

Yes, I agree. I was trying to stave off the suspicion that I was denying the metaphysical "Primacy of Existence". Do you agree, though, that the truthfulness of the axioms are ultimately dependent on the truthfulness of the laws of logic? Perhaps another way to put it (and this might raise some eyebrows here) is that Identity is epistemologically primary...?

My reasoning here is that (as I said above) if "A is A" is not true, then "existence exists" is not true. I know that metaphysically, something must exist in order to have identity. But I'm speaking epistemologically here. Another way to put it would be that the "actual" is in the context of the "possible" such that if something is "impossible" (i.e. illogical), it cannot be "actual" (i.e. metaphysical/existential).

Thoughts?

[Grames]

I'm still here. #420 at bottom of previous page is my latest response.

[Jacob86]

Not Plasmatic but...

Absolutely not.

To be True (as a Truth) something must be based on valid (as in grounded in existence) premises. The premises can be quite a long way back in the logical chain - but they must be there. Case in point - current theoretical speculations on the nature of the universe on the largest possible scales (string theory, branes, etc). All those theories are based on observations of a TINY FRACTION of existence - but on existence they are based, and must be for them to be even considerable as valid theories.

That which you refer to - call it intuition - without verifiability cannot be considered as True. Lucky, maybe - but not True.

No, we haven't. We could not deduce the laws of logic without perception giving us the frame of reference from which to deduce them.

I do not hold that I knew the laws of logic when I was born (innate knowledge) nor that a bright light spoke them to me (revelation) nor that they popped in my head one sunny Tuesday afternoon (intuition). Rather, I came to realize and understand them through a complex series of abstraction, etc... which - YES - involved much perceptual observation.

But all of that focuses on how I discovered them.

What I am referring to is the criteria for it to be so - or that to which one must appeal in order to demonstrate its truthfulness. In demonstrating the truthfulness of the Law of Identity, must I appeal to perceptual evidence or is the inescability of the Law of Identity sufficient to demonstrate its truthfulness? To put it another way, is the truthfulness of the Law of Identity dependent upon perceptual observation or is its truthfulness inherent in itself (i.e. inescapable apart from perceptual observation)?

[dream_weaver]

I do not hold that I knew the laws of logic when I was born (innate knowledge) nor that a bright light spoke them to me (revelation) nor that they popped in my head one sunny Tuesday afternoon (intuition). Rather, I came to realize and understand them through a complex series of abstraction, etc... which - YES - involved much perceptual observation.

But all of that focuses on how I discovered them.

What I am referring to is the criteria for it to be so - or that to which one must appeal in order to demonstrate its truthfulness. In demonstrating the truthfulness of the Law of Identity, must I appeal to perceptual evidence or is the inescability of the Law of Identity sufficient to demonstrate its truthfulness? To put it another way, is the truthfulness of the Law of Identity dependent upon perceptual observation or is its truthfulness inherent in itself (i.e. inescapable apart from perceptual observation)?

Jacob, that is the point. It is not that every instance a application of logic requires the full tracing back to the perceptual level every time it is invoked. Rather, it is that all knowledge is reducible to the perceptual level, in the validation of concepts, and the proof of propositons.

The law of identity is grasped from inducing, or conceptually grasping the common principle observed in common with all entities. They (the entitites) are what they are, each and every one of them (the entities, that is). Entity is Entity. A is A.

Logic requires a recognition of context and of hierarchy. Logic is "the art of noncontradictory identification"—while observing the full context of knowledge, including its hierarchical structure. A logical conclusion is one which has been related without contradiction to the rest of a man's conclusions (the task of integration)—and which has been related step by step to perceptual data (the task of reduction). Between the two processes, man achieves a double check on his accuracy. Every conclusion must stand the test of his other knowledge and (through the necessary intermediate chain) the test of direct experience.

[Jacob86]

Sorry for the delay. It's difficult to keep up with so many responses. I'm not complaining though! I actually enjoy much discussion. However, I attempted to address what seems to be the main point of your post here in my response to Greebo in post 422 (sorry- I have NO idea how to make that into a link for you! haha).

I take you to refer to this argument:

Example: The concept that "It is impossible to know objective truth" is self contradictory and therefore false (we don't need to appeal to evidence that some people do know absolute truth in order to show that it is false). Further, by the Law of the Excluded Middle, since this proposition is false, its opposite must be true and therefore we know absolutely that "it is possible to know objective truth".

The utility of deductive reasoning is limited. This is impeccable logic and must be true valid but as an exercise in pure deduction it cannot actually produce a method of how to know objective truth. It is all well and good to deduce the existence of a new planet from the perturbations in the orbit of a known planet, but the new planet has not been discovered until it has been photographed (reduced to the perceptual level).

Yes, that was the example I was referring to. I agree that this example does not produce a method for how to know objective truth (that is not its purpose). However, it does prove that it is possible to know objective truth. It does not give any specific detail of what it objectively true and what is not.... though, in fact, it does tell you that it is objectively true that it is possible to know objective truth. This is in counter to any and all subjective/relativistic ideas that "all truth is relative", "your truth is different from my truth", etc....

This may seem to be irrelevant, but I would argue that these types of things that can be known because of their logical necessity are ultimately foundational to the rest of knowledge. They help to set the boundaries of rationality in which all empirical knowledge can thrive.

Ascribing logic (why the capitalization when you write the word Logic?) to existence is the category error you keep making. There is no logic without a subject who reasons, so logic cannot be attributed to existence itself apart from a mind. Neither can logic be located in the mind entirely apart from existence, that would be subjectivism and the primacy of consciousness principle. The two elements of subject and object are both required together in relation, which Rand named Objectivism in contrast to Intrinsicism and Subjectivism.

On this issue, please see Plasmatic's post #424. I would like to know if you agree with him here or not. I don't mean to try and set up a division between the two of you, but for clarity sake, it'd be helpful to know where everyone stands.

I'm not familiar with "Intrinsicism", but it has been brought up a few times so I should probably look into it a little. Any suggested sources? (preferably online)?

I do hold (as is shown in the quote which Plasmatic responds to in 424) that logic must be "metaphysical" in the sense that apart from any perceptual observation, existents have identity, etc.. I am saying the the cognitive use of logic in evaluating the validity of ideas is accurate because it is representative of the way reality is. If it is not representative to the way reality is, then why should one trust it as tool for cognitive evaluation?? In this sense logic must "apply" to existence or be metaphysical.

If you say that this implies a universal consciousness/"subject"/"knower", then that seems more like a problem for your worldview than it is for mine. As of now, I would not argue that such an implication is necessary (though I will likely be looking into it as time allows), but IF that is your sole reason for objecting to this, then it sort of begs the question.

In a similar pattern of thought, Aristotle's theory of universals was that the essence of a thing which made it a member of a class was in the thing itself, an intrinsic attribute, metaphysical. Aristotle's version is an improvement over Plato's theory which placed ideal forms in a completely different dimension, but it still fails to be reconcilable with demonstrable instances of relativity.

As of right now, I don't think I have studies/thought enough about the issue of Universals (in the Aristotelian and Platonic senses), but if you'd like to begin a discussion on that, perhaps fleshing out the details will help me arrive at a conclusion.

Different persons can reason and even perceive differently when presented with the same scene entirely due to differences in the persons. The same person confronted with the same scene on two occasions can reason and even perceive differently depending on what he has learned in the interval between.

Hmmmm...what exactly is your point here? I don't mean that in a sarcastic way at all! It just seems that you are implying a type of relativism/subjectivism, so I want to make sure I accurately understand what you're saying.

That depends on how the word certainty is used, and which certainty is appropriate to the situation at hand. Deductive certainty is inferior to perceptual certainty, as I hope my example of discovering a new planet illustrated. Deductive certainty is adequate for quickly disposing of ill-formed arguments such as the example you gave. Starting on OPAR pg. 175 Peikoff makes the case that certainty should only be used as the end of the inductive progression through "transitional evidentiary states" from possible, through probable and stopping at certain. He would not use the word certain to describe the status of identifying percepts by name, or direct memory, or even the axioms of metaphysics. Such things are known, or they are not known.

By certainty, I simply mean "no possible rational way to doubt it" or "to doubt it would be an exercise in irrationality". "It" being the idea about which one is certain. I think the illustration is lacking in that it doesn't seem to accurately represent my view. To question whether or not there is a planet there is not illogical. It may be improbable, but it is not illogical. When I speak of deductive certainty, I mean that to doubt or question it is illogical.

The main problem with reasoning from "It is impossible to know objective truth" to "It is possible to know objective truth" is what does "objective truth" refer to?

I think I covered this well enough above..

[quote

A statement of the form "Mugwumps are entirely green and not green at the same time" is false invalid, the contrary statement must be true is valid: "Mugwumps are not entirely green and not green at the same time". However, this does not prove that mugwumps even exist. It is not settled yet whether your understanding of what "objective truth" refers to is the same mine or Rand's, so even your example is ambiguous.

Again I think your example with "Mugwumps" is not entirely accurate in representing my position. What you have proven in your example is that IF "mugwumps" exist, they would not be "green and ~green" at the same time. However, you are correct in saying that it gives no reason to believe that "mugwumps" even exist. But this is not the form of my argument. To deny the existence of mugwumps is not an exercise in irrationality. To deny the ability to know objective truth is and exercise in irrationality because it ultimately violates the laws of logic. To deny that unicorns exist is not an exercise in irrationality since no law of logic is violated in such a denial. However, the affirmation that square circles exist is an exercise in irrationality because it does violate the laws of logic.

I'm not sure what the accurate description would be for your example with Mugwumps. Perhaps it would be "smuggling in a false concept" or something to that effect. If you think that I have done that in any of my arguments, please point it out; i.e. point out the "mugwumps" or "unicorns" in my deductive arguments.

[Plasmatic]

Jacob said:

On this issue, please see Plasmatic's post #424. I would like to know if you agree with him here or not. I don't mean to try and set up a division between the two of you, but for clarity sake, it'd be helpful to know where everyone stands.

I'm not familiar with "Intrinsicism", but it has been brought up a few times so I should probably look into it a little. Any suggested sources? (preferably online)?

I do hold (as is shown in the quote which Plasmatic responds to in 424) that logic must be "metaphysical" in the sense that apart from any perceptual observation, existents have identity, etc.. I am saying the the cognitive use of logic in evaluating the validity of ideas is accurate because it is representative of the way reality is. If it is not representative to the way reality is, then why should one trust it as tool for cognitive evaluation?? In this sense logic must "apply" to existence or be metaphysical.

For the record, I did in another post clarify that "laws" are epistemological not metaphysical. My agreement must be understood as one that realizes your use of improper terminology to refer to the objectivity of therelationship between subject and object Grames further clarified for you.

Edited November 29, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Jacob86]

Jacob said:

For the record, I did in another post clarify that "laws" are epistemological not metaphysical. My agreement must be understood as one that realizes your use of improper terminology to refer to the objectivity of therelationship between subject and object Grames further clarified for you.

I think I've made it clear though that when I speak of logic being metaphysical, that I don't mean that reality must "obey" the laws in the same we that we must. I mean that reality simply is (and "must be" in the sense that we must understand that it simply is) logical, i.e. non-contradictory... and this must be understood apart from appealing to sense perception.

Because, if we must appeal to sense perception in order to prove that reality is "logical" (i.e. does not contain any contradictions) than we imply that it is possible for reality to contain contradictions which is absurd.

Edited November 29, 2010 by Jacob86

[Jacob86]

Jacob, that is the point. It is not that every instance a application of logic requires the full tracing back to the perceptual level every time it is invoked. Rather, it is that all knowledge is reducible to the perceptual level, in the validation of concepts, and the proof of propositons.

The law of identity is grasped from inducing, or conceptually grasping the common principle observed in common with all entities. They (the entitites) are what they are, each and every one of them (the entities, that is). Entity is Entity. A is A.

I agree that it is induced (i.e. discovered) by observing the commonality of it to all entities. However, the question here is this: "Is the mere observation of it the only reason to believe that it is true or valid?".

A similar question is "Do I only believe that 2 and 2 make 4 because that is what I have observed?". If this is the case, then I would argue that one has not "grasped that 2 and 2 make 4" in the way that Rand means it in the following quote:

"The choice--the dedication to one's highest potential--is made by accepting the fact that the noblest act you have ever performed is the act of your mind in the process of grasping that two and two make four."

The mere observation of 2 entities and 2 more entities, and then subsequently counting and seeing that there are 4 entities; followed by the consequential memorization of this act does not seem as "noble" as it is to understand that for anything, 2 and 2 must and always will equal 4- whether it is observed or not.

Likewise with Logic: If "A is A" is only held as a memorized formula which is only developed by the repetitious observation of the fact that every entity you've experienced thus far has had identity, then it implies that it is possible for some entity to not have identity. Rather, it is "nobler" to realize that "a is a" and "entities have identity" because it simply must be so- apart from appealing to experiential perceptual observation.

Do you see the difference?

Here's yet another way to look at it:

Is "A is A" true because we have discovered it?

OR

Have we discovered it because it is true?

Rather, it is that all knowledge is reducible to the perceptual level, in the validation of concepts, and the proof of propositons.

Is this bit of knowledge reducible to the perceptual level??

Edited November 29, 2010 by Jacob86

[Greebo]

A is A, like 2+2, was discovered because it is true. It was discovered to be true due to observation at the perceptual level.

Is this bit of knowledge reducible to the perceptual level??

Isn't that obvious?

[Greebo]

I think I've made it clear though that when I speak of logic being metaphysical, that I don't mean that reality must "obey" the laws in the same we that we must.

The contradiction here is that you are putting "we" outside of "reality". We are part of reality. We must obey the laws of existence because reality must.

I mean that reality simply is (and "must be" in the sense that we must understand that it simply is) logical, i.e. non-contradictory... and this must be understood apart from appealing to sense perception.

Because, if we must appeal to sense perception in order to prove that reality is "logical" (i.e. does not contain any contradictions) than we imply that it is possible for reality to contain contradictions which is absurd.

Do not confuse the nature of reality with the proof of the nature of reality.

The nature of reality does not rely on our perceptions. Existence exists whether we perceive it or not.

PROVING the nature of reality, however, requires consciousness and that consciousness' perceptual awareness of existence.

[Jacob86]

A is A, like 2+2, was discovered because it is true. It was discovered to be true due to observation at the perceptual level.

Agreed. All I am saying is that because it is (and must be) "universally true" (meaning true about all of reality), is it not possible to "establish"/ "demonstrate"/ "prove"/ "know" that it is true without appealing to observation? If this is not possible (as has been implied by many) than it is not possible to know that they are objectively true about all of reality. This doesn't necessitate any sort of mystical intuition/revelation/etc... It simply means that once discovered/realized, there are certain truths which are not dependent upon perceptual observation.

Isn't that obvious?

It was rhetorical. The purpose is to show that any categorical statement/standard about truth/knowledge which does not meet its own standard, must be rejected as irrational.

[dream_weaver]

I agree that it is induced (i.e. discovered) by observing the commonality of it to all entities. However, the question here is this: "Is the mere observation of it the only reason to believe that it is true or valid?".

Mere observation is not the only reason. Consciousness is an active process of differentiation and integration.

A similar question is "Do I only believe that 2 and 2 make 4 because that is what I have observed?". If this is the case, then I would argue that one has not "grasped that 2 and 2 make 4" in the way that Rand means it in the following quote:

"The choice--the dedication to one's highest potential--is made by accepting the fact that the noblest act you have ever performed is the act of your mind in the process of grasping that two and two make four."

Again, grasping that 2+2=4 is a process. A noble act, is an action. It is establishing and maintaining the tie (relationship) between the word, via definition to invoke the concept which was formed by the relationship between consciousness and existence to the existent(s) which the concept was abstracted from. I do not know if you believe that 2+2=4 strictly based on observation or not.

The mere observation of 2 entities and 2 more entities, and then subsequently counting and seeing that there are 4 entities; followed by the consequential memorization of this act does not seem as "noble" as it is to understand that for anything, 2 and 2 must and always will equal 4- whether it is observed or not.

2+2=4 whether it is observed or not, providing that conceptual consciousness maintains the relationship between the word 'two' and the concept '||' which is related to the observations of 'A A', 'cat cat', 'dog dog', 'house house' or abstract it more fully as the 'relationship between a group of entities and one of its members taken as a unit'.

Likewise with Logic: If "A is A" is only held as a memorized formula which is only developed by the repetitious observation of the fact that every entity you've experienced thus far has had identity, then it implies that it is possible for some entity to not have identity. Rather, it is "nobler" to realize that "a is a" and "entities have identity" because it simply must be so- apart from appealing to experiential perceptual observation.

Memorizing a formula may work for a parrot to be able to repeat it, but does the parrot conceptualize the crucial differences that tie its 'words' to the 'concepts' to the 'existents' which validate them?

Here's yet another way to look at it:

Is "A is A" true because we have discovered it?

OR

Have we discovered it because it is true?

Well, since the metaphysical is the given, and our concepts have to be integrated into the words we create to reference them, 'A is A' is true because of what we stipulate what the words mean by relating them to the concepts we percieved from the existents that we observe are there.

Is this bit of knowledge reducible to the perceptual level??

Yes. Reducing abstractions from abstractions through the web of often intertangled relationships between the conceptual and ultimately to the perceptual level, helps to understand the process of reasoning, I have heard.

[Jacob86]

The contradiction here is that you are putting "we" outside of "reality". We are part of reality. We must obey the laws of existence because reality must.

Haha. I was only making a distinction between "we" as volitional entities and "reality" as non-volitional. I was trying to stave off the suspicion that I was treating reality as though it had some sort of choice in "obeying logic".

Do not confuse the nature of reality with the proof of the nature of reality.

The nature of reality does not rely on our perceptions. Existence exists whether we perceive it or not.

PROVING the nature of reality, however, requires consciousness and that consciousness' perceptual awareness of existence.

Absolutely: "Existence exists whether we perceive it or not". That is an expression of the point I've been laboring to make.

And one does not have to observe all existents in order to know that for any existent, this axiom is true-- which implies that it is possible to know something which is true apart from appealing to perception. Yes, perception is needed to first grasp "existence" and logic then is used to grasp "existence exists" concerning that particular existent. But then, logic alone can be used to reason that "existence exists" concerning ALL possible existents (whether perceived or not). This is what I mean.

[Jacob86]

Mere observation is not the only reason. Consciousness is an active process of differentiation and integration.

Again, grasping that 2+2=4 is a process. A noble act, is an action. It is establishing and maintaining the tie (relationship) between the word, via definition to invoke the concept which was formed by the relationship between consciousness and existence to the existent(s) which the concept was abstracted from. I do not know if you believe that 2+2=4 strictly based on observation or not.

It seems we are in agreement here. I conclude from this that it is possible to know something without appealing to observation. Do you?

For instance, say I have never heard of a "key" but someone tells me that they have 2 keys and that they will be receiving 2 more keys. I do not need to perceive ANY keys (or really to even understand what a "key" is) in order to say with confidence that this person will be in possession of 4 keys! Pure logic. No perception appealed to. Not a big deal.

Do you agree?

2+2=4 whether it is observed or not, providing that conceptual consciousness maintains the relationship between the word 'two' and the concept '||' which is related to the observations of 'A A', 'cat cat', 'dog dog', 'house house' or abstract it more fully as the 'relationship between a group of entities and one of its members taken as a unit'.

Yes, it assumes that equivocation is not going on and that the definitions of what is being talked about are not morphing mid sentence.... big deal. haha. This is sort of assumed in every sentence.

Memorizing a formula may work for a parrot to be able to repeat it, but does the parrot conceptualize the crucial differences that tie its 'words' to the 'concepts' to the 'existents' which validate them?

Except, what I am arguing is that the person who insists that the statement "2 and 2 make 4" must be backed up by pointing to 2 entities, then 2 more, then counting as a means of validating such a statement is being more like the said parrot and less like a man. If one cannot know "2+2=4" apart from "seeing it occur with their own eyes", then they are less human (i.e. less rational) and more like a monkey or parrot.

Yes. Reducing abstractions from abstractions through the web of often intertangled relationships between the conceptual and ultimately to the perceptual level, helps to understand the process of reasoning, I have heard.

I agree that such a process could be helpful, but this doesn't answer the question. Can you trace the idea that "all knowledge is traceable back to the perceptual" back to the perceptual? I.e. can you point my perception in the direction where I can perceive "all knowledge being traceable to the perceptual" with my eyes or ears or fingers?

[dream_weaver]

It seems we are in agreement here. I conclude from this that it is possible to know something without appealing to observation. Do you?

For instance, say I have never heard of a "key" but someone tells me that they have 2 keys and that they will be receiving 2 more keys. I do not need to perceive ANY keys (or really to even understand what a "key" is) in order to say with confidence that this person will be in possession of 4 keys! Pure logic. No perception appealed to. Not a big deal.

Do you agree?

No, and no I do not agree.

[Jacob86]

For those who SEEM to agree with me on this epistemological use of logic, we MAY be able to move forward with part of the previous discussion...So I would like to ask:

Is there any problems with my arguments against "Naturalism" and against the "Testability/Falsifiability" principle because of their failure to appeal to perceptual observation? (If you'd like me to re-state these, let me know).

If you don't see any problem on that level, do you see any other problems with them?

Do you accept them?

Why or why not?

[Plasmatic]

Jacob , I can say this without risking the ambiguity of your word usage.

If a person says to me , " Yesterday I acquired 5 apples from 2 trees by picking 2 apples from both trees!" I can say this was an impossibility without having been there to witness it. All the previous presumes that I have the requisite knowledge of all the referents employed in the statement. That I am not claiming that knowledge of the referents employed was some how gained without perception.

Or if one claimed " Yesterday I acquired 5 _ from 2 trees by picking 2 _ from both trees!" where _ is understood as an concrete entity, I can dismiss this as a violation of identity. Within the understanding that knowledge of all the referents employed including the concepts, entity , identity and existence was acquired through perception.

1) Naturalism: If only physical nature exists, then the activity in our brains is no more than physical molecules bumping into each other deterministically and therefore the activity in our brains cannot be said to correspond to reality any more than the activity in our stomachs. If this is the case, then no propositions can be objectively true about the world, including the proposition that "only physical nature exists". Therefore if Naturalism is true, then it is false at the same time.

2) Falsifiability: If only that which is scientifically testable can be true then any proposition which is not scientifically testable cannot be true. The proposition that "only that which is scientifically testable can be true" is a proposition which cannot be scientifically tested. Therefore, if the principle of Falsifiability is true, then it is false.

I need more info.

"Naturalism"

Why cant volition be an attribute of concrete entities ? Why cant it be a result of a complex arrangement of matter? I don't see how "non-physical" attributes are "necessary".

"Falsifiability" [forgetting that your using a word that has a different original context than you use it for]

No one here contends this. Id start by pointing out that it asserts a false premise.

Jacob said earlier:

If logic in only epistemological and not metaphysical (i.e. doesn't apply to reality), then how can you be so sure that no contradiction has ever or will ever be perceived? Doesn't this mean that contradictions are metaphysically possible?

We need to solve this terminology problem!

Logic is the epistemological method employed by conscious observers/subjects that is a consequence of ontological/metaphysical Identity [including that of the observers].

"contradiction" is a concept of consciousness.

This whole thing reminds me of this discussion of Binswangers here:

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/01/modal-confusion-in-randpeikoff.html

"Peter Lupu,

Thank you for your response. Yes, the name-calling and question-begging is irritating.

You write:

"common sense distinguishes between facts that *could have been otherwise* and facts which *could not been otherwise*."

Yes, and Objectivism not only agrees with that but insists on that. That's a distinction among facts. And, as I said, you can distinguish among truths *about* what could have been otherwise and truths *about* what couldn't. But the difference doesn't attach to the truth-relation. If F is, then the proposition asserting F, is true. Full stop.

Secondly, Objectivists object to the word "contingent" as a term to describe what could have been othewrise. "Contingent" carries too much baggage in its association with the "iffy," the "pure happenstance," etc. The only thing that is actually non-necessitated is human volition and its effects. To highlight this, we use the term "man-made" to describe non-necessitated facts.

"historically it provided the foundation for a variety of offshoots of similarly structured logics such as doxastic logic, deontic logic, etc."

Well, modal logic, as far as my limited familiarity is concerned, seems at least consistent and does square with what some would call "our intuitions" (but which I think actually means, here: how we use concepts). But I would probably take issue with the validity of doxastic logic and deontic logic. But let's waive that.

Objectivism is a huge champion of the Burden of Proof principle, so I was glad to see that brought in here. I think the burden of proof is on anyone who asserts the need for a distinction. In this case, the burden of proof is met by those who (like all sides in our discussion) distinguish between necessitated and non-necessitated occurrences. But what about the assertion of a distinction among kinds of truth (not kinds of truths, but of truth)? Where is the evidence that anything at all is lost by dropping the distinction? Remember, we're not dropping the vital distinction between truths *about* the necessary and truths *about* the man-made; we continue to make the metaphysical distinction, just drop the epistemic one (about truth).

"You seem to endorse a correspondence theory of truth, but rename it by the word ‘identification’. I am troubled by this terminology for various reasons, but will simply assume that by ‘identification’ you mean that a true proposition corresponds to the relevant facts in the world that make it true."

Well, now you've hit on a deep issue. I didn't know if anyone would pick up on this. Good for you that you did. The term "identification" in Rand's writings is a term of art. It has the same meaning as in common usage, but one that is refined and canonized, as it were. The short explanation is that "identification" is the awareness of identity. For Objectivism, both "awareness" and "identity" are "axiomatic concepts" (the first axiomatic concept being "existence").

So "identification" stresses the awareness part of truth, rather than "correspondence" which can seem like a relation between marks on paper and facts. In this sense, the Objectivist theory of truth encompasses the point Strawson makes against Russell, about sentences having meaning only as used by a mind, in a context. It is not clear to me, by the way, whether this theory of truth is a "new and improved" version of the correspondence theory or actually a fourth theory of truth. I go back and forth on that.

The relevance of "identification" as opposed to (plain vanilla) correspondence is precisely in regard to truth, and precisely in relation to the Burden of Proof Principle. Objectivism holds that assertions without any evidence to support them are neither true nor false, but cognitively meaningless. They fail to refer; they aren't even *propositions*, just emotional ejaculations. One subhead in Peikoff's book, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, in the chapter on reason, is "The Arbitrary as Neither True nor False." "Arbitrary" is the term we use for assertions devoid of the slightest evidentiary backing.

So if Nostradamus pronounced "On December 27, 1820, an earthquake will strike Lisbon," his statement is not true--even if an earthquake strikes Lisbon on that date. If that's a case of correspondence, then so much the worse for the correspondence theory; his words were not an *identification* of anything.

Moving on.

"There is nothing incoherent about the idea that while all true propositions correspond to certain facts (those that make them true), there are different kinds of facts and therefore there are different kinds of truths."

Yes, yes! That's exactly our position. There are different kinds of truths--but not of what it is to be true.

"So from the mere fact that we recognize one and only one relationship that is uniform between true propositions and facts (call it ‘identification’ or ‘correspondence’ or whatever) it certainly does not follow that there cannot be a distinction between contingent and necessary truths."

But I have been at pains to argue that "necessary truth" is systematically ambiguous between: a) true about a necessary fact, and a special kind of truth-relation. This is the distinction between the relation and the relata. The relation is neither necessary or contingent; the relata are either necessary or contingent (i.e., man-made).

"We may cheerfully admit this distinction and the accompanying characterization in terms of *origin* and so forth. The question is how does this distinction is supposed to assist in undermining the completely different distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts?"

It doesn't! It is what supports that distinction (except for the baggage-laden term "contingent").

"Surely you do not wish to suggest that your proposed distinction can replace the distinction between contingent and necessary facts"

Not even replace--it is that distinction, but with more clear terminology.

"The fact that there are exactly 34,671 leaves on this tree in my backyard is contingent but not man-made"

Well, I spoke too fast. If that's the distinction you want, we indeed want to replace it. Our position, like Leibniz's, is that all non-chosen events are necessary (couldn't have been otherwise). Assuming there's no influence of human choices on the leafing of a tree, it *has* to have the number of leaves it does have. Aside from man's free will, everything is necessitated.

And that view of causality--that it is either volitional causality or deterministic causality--is what leads us to our views, not some "logical blunder" of misplaced modal operators as is suggested by:

"BUT! From the above it simply does not follow, nor does it mean that, the proposition P is necessary. And this point was made clearly, explicitly, and forcefully by Bill. To say otherwise is to be involved in a logical blunder."

To repeat what I said in the previous post:

"This is a distinction based on the nature of the causality that produced the fact. It is *not* a deduction from Bill's proposition a.: 'It is impossible that F exist and p not be true.' It is, perforce, not a deduction from Bill's proposition a*.: 'It is necessary that if F exists, then p is true.'

"Since the position that all truths are 'necessary' is not a deduction from a. or a*., it is not the case that any logical fallacy is committed."

In other words, the Objectivist view on the proper usage of "necessary" is supported by our ontology, not by a deduction from "If F then necessarily p is true" to "If F then p is necessarily true" or anything of the like.Finally, you write:

"Even if we accept that the physical world is deterministic (a huge assumption given current physical theories), it does not follow that the deterministic laws that govern this world are necessary: the world could have been governed by alternative laws of physics."

But that begs the question at issue. As I wrote in the last post:

"The laws of physics are inherent in the nature of matter."

You disagree. Okay, but IF you agreed that there can be no alternative laws of physics, would you then agree with our position on necessity vs. choice? If not, then we have some epistemological disagreement somewhere, yet to be pinpointed. If so, then what we should be discussing is metaphysics--specifically causality, identity, and determinateness.

In other words, I don't see how the laws of physics "could have been otherwise." Depending on what? The whim of a Creator? You know we reject that. So, if the laws of physics that do obtain could have been otherwise, what made them be as they are? Call it X. Then what made X obtain? Y? You see the regress.

Whereas with man-made facts, we can state what that X is--i.e., makes what could have been otherwise yet be what it turned out to be: human choice. Because I chose to write on this subject, I write on this subject. And because I choose now to stop . . ."

Edited November 30, 2010 by Plasmatic

[Jacob86]

Jacob , I can say this without risking the ambiguity of your word usage.

If a person says to me , " Yesterday I acquired 5 apples from 2 trees by picking 2 apples from both trees!" I can say this was an impossibility without having been there to witness it. All the previous presumes that I have the requisite knowledge of all the referents employed in the statement. That I am not claiming that knowledge of the referents employed was some how gained without perception.

Or if one claimed " Yesterday I acquired 5 _ from 2 trees by picking 2 _ from both trees!" where _ is understood as an concrete entity, I can dismiss this as a violation of identity. Within the understanding that knowledge of all the referents employed including the concepts, entity , identity and existence was acquired through perception.

I assume that you wish to stress the parts which I underlined... and I underlined them because I wish to stress that I agree. But I would like to add that it is a mute point. My assertion that "the truthfulness of "A is A" is not dependent upon perceptual observations" in NO WAY denies/undercuts/ignores/belittles/evades the fact that I used perceptual observation to form the concepts which are spoken of in that sentence. This distinction must be grasped. There is a difference between how I developed the ideas and that upon which the truthfulness of the ideas themselves depend. The objective truthfulness of "A is A" is not dependent upon my perceptual observations. My subjective discovery and formation of "A is A" is dependent upon my perceptual observations. This is a crucial distinction.

I DO NOT care about the subjective discovery and formation of concepts- because we all agree on that process and because as I have attempted to stress before; it belongs to the realm of Cognitive Science rather than Epistemology because it is obsessed with the subjects development of ideas rather than the objective systematic ordering of truth and truth criteria. It's tantamount to a Linguistics Professor declaring that Philosophy is dependent upon Linguistics/Language because the philosopher never would have been able to understand or communicate any ideas without language and that therefore all Philosophical ideas must bow the knee to Linguistic ideas. The grave mistake being made is the confusion of the subjective dependence upon language (in the philosophers development of ideas) and the objective independence of ideas in reality. No one would object to the Philosopher saying that truth and reason is not dependent upon language in spite of the face that language is being used to communicate this true idea. Nor would anyone object to the fact that biology is dependent upon chemistry in spite of the fact that one must be a biological creature in order to know and say such a thing.

SO, when I refer to "establishing" or "validating" or "proving" something to be true apart from perception, I DO NOT mean that my mind is suddenly being mystically disconnected from reality [any more than the Chemistry professor is pretending that he is not a biological creature in asserting Chemistry's foundation to Biology]. I am speaking about the truth criteria; that which is necessary to know and to demonstrate and to establish that a proposition is true.... not the process of discovery of the concepts used in the proposition.

If I have not made this distinction clear enough, I don't know how else to communicate it.

I need more info.

"Naturalism"

Why cant volition be an attribute of concrete entities ? Why cant it be a result of a complex arrangement of matter? I don't see how "non-physical" attributes are "necessary".

Because both volition and reason require and imply freedom from the physical cause and effect system of the physical universe-- which is impossible unless there is some non-physical aspect which is free. If the activity in your brain is no different than the activity in your stomach (i.e molecules deterministically bumping into each other), then there is no reason to consider the activity in your mind to be correspondent to reality any more than that of your stomach.

"Falsifiability" [forgetting that your using a word that has a different original context than you use it for]

Would you rather call it "Testability"? The assumption really has many different names and expressions. I'm after the content not the label. If someone has a better label, go for it.

No one here contends this. Id start by pointing out that it asserts a false premise.

A few have hinted at it by claiming that my arguments were absurd/arbitrary/false because they lacked empirical data.

The point is that if one's definition of absurd/arbitrary is "that which lacks empirical data" then this very definition is absurd and arbitrary by its own standards.

We need to solve this terminology problem!

Logic is the epistemological method employed by conscious observers/subjects that is a consequence of ontological/metaphysical Identity [including that of the observers].

"contradiction" is a concept of consciousness.

Agreed. However you want to word it, I am simply stressing that the proposition that "contradictions cannot/do not exist" must be objectively and universally true- regardless of the subject in question. If you think that this implies a "Universal Subject" (i.e. God), then that is a problem for your worldview- not mine. As I said before, I wouldn't argue for that particular conclusion right now, but I suspect that this (feared) conclusion is what is being avoided. If so, it begs the question.

If "A is A" (along with all of its correlaries) is not universally true about all of reality (meaning if it is possible for something in reality to contradict itself), then no knowledge of anything is possible. Or to put it differently, all knowledge is utterly dependent upon the objective and universal truthfulness of "a is a".

This means that "a is a" must be more than an artful tool in our cognitive bag of tricks. If it is simply the memorized commonality of that which we have perceived, then it is possible for a to be non-a... which means that no cognitive grasp of anything is possible.

This whole thing reminds me of this discussion of Binswangers here:

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/01/modal-confusion-in-randpeikoff.html

"Peter Lupu,

Thank you for your response. Yes, the name-calling and question-begging is irritating.

You write:

"common sense distinguishes between facts that *could have been otherwise* and facts which *could not been otherwise*."

Yes, and Objectivism not only agrees with that but insists on that. That's a distinction among facts. And, as I said, you can distinguish among truths *about* what could have been otherwise and truths *about* what couldn't. But the difference doesn't attach to the truth-relation. If F is, then the proposition asserting F, is true. Full stop.

Secondly, Objectivists object to the word "contingent" as a term to describe what could have been othewrise. "Contingent" carries too much baggage in its association with the "iffy," the "pure happenstance," etc. The only thing that is actually non-necessitated is human volition and its effects. To highlight this, we use the term "man-made" to describe non-necessitated facts.

"historically it provided the foundation for a variety of offshoots of similarly structured logics such as doxastic logic, deontic logic, etc."

Well, modal logic, as far as my limited familiarity is concerned, seems at least consistent and does square with what some would call "our intuitions" (but which I think actually means, here: how we use concepts). But I would probably take issue with the validity of doxastic logic and deontic logic. But let's waive that.

Objectivism is a huge champion of the Burden of Proof principle, so I was glad to see that brought in here. I think the burden of proof is on anyone who asserts the need for a distinction. In this case, the burden of proof is met by those who (like all sides in our discussion) distinguish between necessitated and non-necessitated occurrences. But what about the assertion of a distinction among kinds of truth (not kinds of truths, but of truth)? Where is the evidence that anything at all is lost by dropping the distinction? Remember, we're not dropping the vital distinction between truths *about* the necessary and truths *about* the man-made; we continue to make the metaphysical distinction, just drop the epistemic one (about truth).

"You seem to endorse a correspondence theory of truth, but rename it by the word ‘identification’. I am troubled by this terminology for various reasons, but will simply assume that by ‘identification’ you mean that a true proposition corresponds to the relevant facts in the world that make it true."

Well, now you've hit on a deep issue. I didn't know if anyone would pick up on this. Good for you that you did. The term "identification" in Rand's writings is a term of art. It has the same meaning as in common usage, but one that is refined and canonized, as it were. The short explanation is that "identification" is the awareness of identity. For Objectivism, both "awareness" and "identity" are "axiomatic concepts" (the first axiomatic concept being "existence").

So "identification" stresses the awareness part of truth, rather than "correspondence" which can seem like a relation between marks on paper and facts. In this sense, the Objectivist theory of truth encompasses the point Strawson makes against Russell, about sentences having meaning only as used by a mind, in a context. It is not clear to me, by the way, whether this theory of truth is a "new and improved" version of the correspondence theory or actually a fourth theory of truth. I go back and forth on that.

The relevance of "identification" as opposed to (plain vanilla) correspondence is precisely in regard to truth, and precisely in relation to the Burden of Proof Principle. Objectivism holds that assertions without any evidence to support them are neither true nor false, but cognitively meaningless. They fail to refer; they aren't even *propositions*, just emotional ejaculations. One subhead in Peikoff's book, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, in the chapter on reason, is "The Arbitrary as Neither True nor False." "Arbitrary" is the term we use for assertions devoid of the slightest evidentiary backing.

So if Nostradamus pronounced "On December 27, 1820, an earthquake will strike Lisbon," his statement is not true--even if an earthquake strikes Lisbon on that date. If that's a case of correspondence, then so much the worse for the correspondence theory; his words were not an *identification* of anything.

Moving on.

"There is nothing incoherent about the idea that while all true propositions correspond to certain facts (those that make them true), there are different kinds of facts and therefore there are different kinds of truths."

Yes, yes! That's exactly our position. There are different kinds of truths--but not of what it is to be true.

"So from the mere fact that we recognize one and only one relationship that is uniform between true propositions and facts (call it ‘identification’ or ‘correspondence’ or whatever) it certainly does not follow that there cannot be a distinction between contingent and necessary truths."

But I have been at pains to argue that "necessary truth" is systematically ambiguous between: a) true about a necessary fact, and a special kind of truth-relation. This is the distinction between the relation and the relata. The relation is neither necessary or contingent; the relata are either necessary or contingent (i.e., man-made).

"We may cheerfully admit this distinction and the accompanying characterization in terms of *origin* and so forth. The question is how does this distinction is supposed to assist in undermining the completely different distinction between contingent vs. necessary facts?"

It doesn't! It is what supports that distinction (except for the baggage-laden term "contingent").

"Surely you do not wish to suggest that your proposed distinction can replace the distinction between contingent and necessary facts"

Not even replace--it is that distinction, but with more clear terminology.

"The fact that there are exactly 34,671 leaves on this tree in my backyard is contingent but not man-made"

Well, I spoke too fast. If that's the distinction you want, we indeed want to replace it. Our position, like Leibniz's, is that all non-chosen events are necessary (couldn't have been otherwise). Assuming there's no influence of human choices on the leafing of a tree, it *has* to have the number of leaves it does have. Aside from man's free will, everything is necessitated.

And that view of causality--that it is either volitional causality or deterministic causality--is what leads us to our views, not some "logical blunder" of misplaced modal operators as is suggested by:

"BUT! From the above it simply does not follow, nor does it mean that, the proposition P is necessary. And this point was made clearly, explicitly, and forcefully by Bill. To say otherwise is to be involved in a logical blunder."

To repeat what I said in the previous post:

"This is a distinction based on the nature of the causality that produced the fact. It is *not* a deduction from Bill's proposition a.: 'It is impossible that F exist and p not be true.' It is, perforce, not a deduction from Bill's proposition a*.: 'It is necessary that if F exists, then p is true.'

"Since the position that all truths are 'necessary' is not a deduction from a. or a*., it is not the case that any logical fallacy is committed."

In other words, the Objectivist view on the proper usage of "necessary" is supported by our ontology, not by a deduction from "If F then necessarily p is true" to "If F then p is necessarily true" or anything of the like.Finally, you write:

"Even if we accept that the physical world is deterministic (a huge assumption given current physical theories), it does not follow that the deterministic laws that govern this world are necessary: the world could have been governed by alternative laws of physics."

But that begs the question at issue. As I wrote in the last post:

"The laws of physics are inherent in the nature of matter."

You disagree. Okay, but IF you agreed that there can be no alternative laws of physics, would you then agree with our position on necessity vs. choice? If not, then we have some epistemological disagreement somewhere, yet to be pinpointed. If so, then what we should be discussing is metaphysics--specifically causality, identity, and determinateness.

In other words, I don't see how the laws of physics "could have been otherwise." Depending on what? The whim of a Creator? You know we reject that. So, if the laws of physics that do obtain could have been otherwise, what made them be as they are? Call it X. Then what made X obtain? Y? You see the regress.

Whereas with man-made facts, we can state what that X is--i.e., makes what could have been otherwise yet be what it turned out to be: human choice. Because I chose to write on this subject, I write on this subject. And because I choose now to stop . . ."

And this reminds me that I need to consider writing a response to the ASD.

[dream_weaver]

I DO NOT care about the subjective discovery and formation of concepts- because we all agree on that process and because as I have attempted to stress before; it belongs to the realm of Cognitive Science rather than Epistemology because it is obsessed with the subjects development of ideas rather than the objective systematic ordering of truth and truth criteria.

I have to hand it to you. Few people out there could have stated as succinctly what you have here. Considering that the objective, systematic ordering of truth is 'stored' if you will 'in concepts', separating the 'subjective discovery and formation of concepts' (truth criteria) identifies it quite Objectively.

[Greebo]

Agreed. All I am saying is that because it is (and must be) "universally true" (meaning true about all of reality), is it not possible to "establish"/ "demonstrate"/ "prove"/ "know" that it is true without appealing to observation?

No.

Because all of those verbs rely upon an actor, and that actor must observe things to gain knowledge.

You are proposing the brain in a box scenario which suggests that a brain in a box with no sensory input could divine the nature of reality without it. Rand addressed this - I believe in "Philosophy, Who Needs It".

If this is not possible (as has been implied by many) than it is not possible to know that they are objectively true about all of reality.

False. Once one knows that contradictions cannot exist, one knows why it cannot ever not be true.

It was rhetorical. The purpose is to show that any categorical statement/standard about truth/knowledge which does not meet its own standard, must be rejected as irrational.

If "it's own standard" is what you describe earlier in this post, then you have the standard wrong.

[Greebo]

It seems we are in agreement here. I conclude from this that it is possible to know something without appealing to observation. Do you?

For instance, say I have never heard of a "key" but someone tells me that they have 2 keys and that they will be receiving 2 more keys. I do not need to perceive ANY keys (or really to even understand what a "key" is) in order to say with confidence that this person will be in possession of 4 keys! Pure logic. No perception appealed to. Not a big deal.

Do you agree?

This is hogwash.

You do not know what the "key" is - NOR do you *know* that there are two of them. You *KNOW* that someone TOLD you they have two keys. You are accepting what that person told you as true - you do not *KNOW* it to be true.

But you DO know that it is true that 2+2=4 because you have observed it and thus it has been proven to you.

Since 2+2=4 is universal, it does not matter what there are two of - 2(X) + 2(X) = 4(X) for ANY value of X - apples, keys, widgets, truths, lies. You KNOW that 2+2=4 from observation. You do not know that there are 4 keys. You only trust that there are 4 keys.

Your sin here is confusing the quantity with the entity. 2 is quantity. Key is entity. Quantity is not an attribute pertaining to a key - or rather the quantity of ANY single entity (key) is 1. 2 keys is shorthand for a group of two keys. The group is an entity (single) containing a quantity (two) of keys(single).

Edited November 30, 2010 by Greebo